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01- 1118 Scheidler v. NOW
01-1119 Operation Rescue v. NOW
Ruling Below: (NOW, Inc. v. Scheidler and Operation Rescue, 7th Cir., 267 F.3d 687, 2001
U.S. App. Lexis 21295)
The court held that private individuals may seek injunctive relief against another party in
violation of RICO. The court also found that the violent conduct of the protestors was not
protected by the First Amendment. Finally, the court found the injunction granted against
the protestors was not vague and overbroad, but struck the proper balance and avoided the
risk of curtailing protected activities.
Questions Presented: (1) May injunctive relief be given in a private civil action for treble
damages brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)?
(2) Does the Hobbs Act, which makes it crime to obstruct, delay, or affect interstate
commerce "by robbery or extortion," and which defines "extortion" as "the obtaining of
property from another, with [the owner's] consent," when such consent is "induced by the
wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear," 18 U.S.C. @ 1951(b)(2), apply
to intangible property and may the Hobbes act be violated without the defendant either
seeking or receiving money or anything else?
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, Inc.; Delaware Women's Health
Organization, Inc., and Summit Women's Health Organization, Inc., Plaintiffs-
Appellees,
V.
Joseph M. SCHEIDLER, Pro-Life Action League, Inc., Andrew D. Scholberg,
Timothy Murphy, and OPERATION RESCUE, Defendants-Appellants.
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Decided October 2, 2001
WOOD, Circuit Judge:
This case is in its fifteenth year of
contentious litigation. The defendants are
anti-abortion activists who employ a
protest tactic they call "rescues," in which
they and other activists physically block
access to abortion clinics so that the
patients and staff cannot get in or out of
the buildings. Plaintiffs use words less
benign than "rescue" to describe the
defendants' activities. We will refer to
them as "protest missions," in the hopes
that this will be understood as a neutral
term. The defendants' goal is frankly to
prevent abortions from taking place.
Participants in the protest missions engage
in a substantial amount of protected
speech, including efforts to persuade clinic
patients not to have abortions and to
persuade clinic doctors and staff to quit
performing abortions. Unfortunately, the
protest missions also involve illegal
conduct: protesters do everything from
sitting or lying in clinic doorways and
waiting to be arrested to engaging in more
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egregious conduct such as entering the
clinics and destroying medical equipment
and chaining their bodies to operating
tables to prevent the tables from being
used. In a few instances, protesters
apparently have physically assaulted clinic
staff and patients. In addition to staging
these protests, the defendants have issued
letters and statements to other clinics
threatening to stage missions at those
clinics unless they voluntarily shut down.
The plaintiffs, the National Organization
for Women (NOW) and two clinics that
were the targets of protest missions,
brought this class action alleging, among
other things, that the defendants' conduct
amounted to a pattern of extortion which
violated the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 5
1961-68 (RICO)... After a trip through
this court to the Supreme Court of the
United States during which many of the
legal issues in the case were clarified or
resolved, the case was remanded to the
district court for trial of the plaintiffs'
RICO claims. A jury found for the
plaintiffs and awarded damages to the two
named clinics, and the district court issued
a permanent nationwide injunction
prohibiting the defendants from
conducting blockades, trespassing,
damaging property, or committing acts of
violence at the class clinics. The
defendants have appealed a wide range of
issues relating to the conduct of the trial
and the issuance of the injunction. We
find that the district court navigated its
way through this complex and difficult
case with care and sensitivity and affirm
its judgment in all respects.
I
The defendants [are] organizers of the
Pro-Life Action Network (PLAN), which
is a loose national organization of groups
that engage in protest missions and other
aggressive anti-abortion tactics. Beginning
in the mid-1980's, PLAN held annual
conventions, organized in part by the
defendants here, which included seminars
on protest strategies. Those conventions
concluded with protest missions being
staged in the convention city. PLAN also
sent a newsletter to its members and
coordinated a hotline that potential
protesters could call to get information
about upcoming missions. The plaintiffs
alleged, and at trial the jury found, that
PLAN was an "organization or enterprise"
for purposes of RICO liability.
During the course of the seven-week trial,
the plaintiffs introduced evidence of
hundreds of acts committed by the
defendants or others acting in concert
with PLAN which, the plaintiffs
contended, constituted predicate acts
under RICO. The alleged predicate acts
included violations of federal extortion
law (the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 5 1951),
state extortion law, the federal Travel Act,
18 U.S.C. § 1952, and conspiracy to
violate these laws...
Based on this and other evidence in the
voluminous record that was created at the
trial, the jury found in response to special
interrogatories that the defendants or
others associated with PLAN committed
21 violations of the Hobbs Act, 25
violations of state extortion law, 25 acts of
conspiracy to violate federal or state
extortion law, four acts or threats of
physical violence, 23 violations of the
Travel Act, and 23 attempts to commit
one of these crimes. The jury awarded
damages to both clinics; once the damages
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were trebled, as RICO requires, the
awards totaled over $ 163,000 to Summit
Women's Health Organization, and over $
94,000 to Delaware Women's Health
Organization.
II
Initially, we must consider the defendants'
contention that RICO does not permit
private plaintiffs to seek injunctive relief.
The only court of appeals to have
addressed this issue directly, the Ninth
Circuit, concluded in 1986 that private
plaintiffs cannot seek injunctions under
RICO, relying largely on the court's
reading of the statute's legislative history.
See Religiaw Teh. Ctr v Wdlershein 796
F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1986). The other
courts of appeals that have addressed the
point in dicta are split.
Our study of Supreme Court decisions
since the 1986 Wlesheim opinion
convinces us that the approach of the
Ninth Circuit (which relied almost
exclusively on the legislative history of
RICO to reach its result, as opposed to
the actual language of the statute) no
longer conforms to the Court's present
jurisprudence...
Both parties have offered interpretations
of this text that support their positions.
The plaintiffs read the statute in a
straightforward manner. Section 1964(a),
they contend, grants the district courts
jurisdiction to hear RICO claims and also
sets out general remedies, including
injunctive relief, that all plaintiffs
authorized to bring suit may seek Section
1964(b) makes it clear that the statute is to
be publicly enforced by the Attorney
General and it specifies additional
remedies, all in the nature of interim relief,
that the government may seek. Section
1964(c) similarly adds to the scope of §
1964(a), but this time for private plaintiffs.
Those private plaintiffs who have been
injured in their business or property by
reason of a RICO violation are given a
right to sue for treble damages. As the
plaintiffs note, this reading of the statute
gives the words their natural meaning and
gives effect to every provision in the
statute.
The defendants argue for a less intuitive
interpretation. Relying on Wdlshein they
argue that 5 1964(a) is purely a
jurisdictional provision authorizing the
district court to hear RICO claims and to
grant injunctions to parties authorized by
other provisions of the law to seek that
form of relief. Section 1964(b), in the
defendants' view, allows the Attorney
General to institute RICO proceedings
and authorizes the government to seek
not only the relief described in that
subsection, but also the relief described in
5 1964(a). Section 1964(c) then provides a
limited right of action for private parties.
They read the two clauses of 5 1964(c),
however, as tightly linked provisions,
under which private plaintiffs may sue ody
for monetary damages. The mention of
this type of relief in the second clause
must mean, the defendants argue, that by
implication no other remedies, particularly
injunctive remedies, are available. We
cannot agree that this is a reasonable
reading of the statute.
[W]e cannot agree with the defendants'
contention that 5 19 6 4(a) is a purely
"jurisdictional" statute... § 1964(a) is
strikingly similar to the statute the
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Supreme Court construed in Steel Ca u
Citizer for a Bater Enromnr4 523 U.S.
83, 90, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 140 L. Ed. 2d 210
(1998). The statute at issue in Steel Co.
provided that "the district court shall have
jurisdiction in actions brought under
subsection (a) of this section against an
owner or operator of a facility to enforce
the requirement concerned and to impose
any civil penalty provided for violation of
that requirement." Id, quoting 42 U.S.C. 5
11046(c). Noting that "'jurisdiction' . . . is
a word of many, too many, meanings," the
Court held that it would be "unreasonable
to read [the statute] as making all the
elements of the cause of action under
subsection (a) jurisdictional, rather than as
merely specifying the remedial poues of
the court, viz., to enforce the violated
requirement and to impose civil
penalties." Id This part of the Steel Ca
holding supersedes any rationale to the
contrary that the courts of appeals may
have followed in earlier years. We find
that it is applicable to RICO and that 5
1964(a) both confers jurisdiction on the
district courts and specifies certain
remedial powers that the courts will have
in cases brought before them.
the court noted that one year after the
bill's passage, Congress failed to pass a bill
introduced in the Senate with the same
language as the Steiger amendment. See
id. at 1086...
Again, with respect, we cannot agree with
the Ninth Circuit that these snippets of
legislative history amount to the kind of
"'clearly expressed legislative intent to the
contrary" that we would require to cast
doubt on unambiguous statutory
language. NOW I, 510 U.S. at 261. Even
these excerpts do not unequivocally
indicate that Congress intended private
plaintiffs to be limited to damages
remedies. As the Wdlesheim decision itself
notes, there are indications in the
legislative history to the contrary. 796 F.2d
at 1085. More importantly, however,
although the Wdlesheim court may well
have made a reasonable decision in 1986
to rely on Congress's refusal to enact
amendments to the statute, recent
Supreme Court precedent teaches that this
type of legislative history is a particularly
thin reed on which to rest the
interpretation of a statute.
III
Perhaps realizing that the plain text of the
statute strongly suggests that private
plaintiffs can seek injunctions, the
Wdlesheim court relied heavily in its
decision on two pieces of legislative
history. First, the court noted that, during
the floor debate on the bill in the House,
Representative Steiger, the House sponsor
of the bill, introduced an amendment that
would have, among other things, made
private plaintiffs' right to seek injunctive
relief explicit. The amendment was
withdrawn after another representative
described it on the House floor as creating
"an additional civil remedy." See
Wdlesheiry 796 F.2d at 1085-86. Second,
With this much established, we may turn
to the defendants' First Amendment
arguments. All parties acknowledge that
the defendants engaged in a substantial
amount of protected speech during the
protest missions and other anti-abortion
activities, including picketing on public
sidewalks in front of clinics and verbally
urging patients not to have abortions. We
entirely agree with the defendants that
liability cannot constitutionally be
imposed on them for this portion of their
conduct. But the record is replete with
evidence of instances in which their
conduct crossed the line from protected
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speech into illegal acts, including acts of
violence, and it is equally clear that the
First Amendment does not protect such
acts...
The defendants' First Amendment
arguments fall into two categories. First,
they argue broadly that imposing liability
on them on the basis of their protest
activities violates the First Amendment.
Second, they argue that, even assuming
they could constitutionally be held liable
for their alleged conduct, the jury
instructions and verdict form in this case
did not contain necessary First
Amendment safeguards...
A.
Protection of politically controversial
speech is at the core of the First
Amendment, and no one disputes that the
defendants' speech labeling abortion as
murder, urging the clinics to get out of the
abortion business, and urging clinic
patients not to seek abortions is fully
protected by the First Amendment...
In this case, the plaintiffs presented ample
evidence that the individual defendants
and others associated with PLAN engaged
in illegal conduct that directly threatened
an important governmental interest. The
evidence presented at trial showed that, at
PLAN-sponsored events, protesters
trespassed on clinic property and blocked
access to clinics with their bodies,
including at times chaining themselves in
the doorways of clinics or to operating
tables. At other times, protesters
destroyed clinic property, including
putting glue in clinic door locks and
destroying medical equipment used to
perform abortions. On still other
occasions, protesters physically assaulted
clinic staff and patients. In addition,
defendant Scheidler, on behalf of
defendants PLAL and PLAN, sent letters
to class clinics threatening that they would
be subjected to similar attacks if they
did not cease performing abortions. In
light of the protesters' conduct at other
PLAN events, the district court correctly
concluded that these letters were not
protected political speech but constituted
true threats outside the protection of the
First Amendment.
* * *
At this point, the defendants shift their
argument to a more personal one: maybe
someone associated with PLAN was
engaged in unprotected conduct, but the
evidence did not establish that the
defendants themselves were involved.
[Our reading of Supreme Court decisions
suggests that] in order to impose liability
on an individual based on that individual's
association with an organization, a
plaintiff must show both that the
organization itself, rather than just isolated
members, possessed unlawful goals and
that the individual defendant held a
specific intent to further those illegal aims.
Id at 920.
Even though this is an exacting test, once
again the record shows that the plaintiffs
satisfied it in this case... The plaintiffs put
into evidence numerous letters,
newsletters, and other publications
authored by defendant Joseph Scheidler,
executive director of PLAL, and by
Randall Terry, executive director of
Operation Rescue, detailing the activities
planned for upcoming PLAN events. The
activities detailed in these letters included
blocking access to clinics and entering
clinics to block passageways...
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B.
Turning to the defendants' narrower First
Amendment argument, the defendants
contend that, regardless of whether there
was sufficient evidence from which the
jury could have found that they engaged
in unprotected activities, the jury
instructions and verdict form used by the
trial court allowed the jury to find the
defendants liable based solely on the
defendants' protected speech. The verdict
form that the district court used asked [if
PLAN is associated for a common
purpose, if they are associated with the
defendants and if any defendant or
member of PLAN committed any of the
illegal acts.]
Our review of jury instructions is
deferential, and we consider only whether
the instructions, taken as a whole,
adequately informed the jury of the
applicable law. Mdnar v Booth, 229 F.3d
593, 602 (7th Cir. 2000). We are confident
that these instructions did so. This jury
could not have found the defendants
liable without finding that the defendants
themselves specifically intended to further
PLAN's illegal airs. Jury Instruction 30
made this requirement explicit, and absent
any indication to the contrary, we
presume that jurors follow the
instructions they are given. Miksis U
Houzn 106 F.3d 754, 763 (7th Cir.
1997)...
IV
The last serious contention we must
address is the defendants' argument that
the injunction in this case is vague and
overbroad...
We are satisfied that the injunction drafted
by the district court here has struck the
proper balance and has avoided any risk
of curtailing protected activities. By its
terms, the injunction prohibits only illegal
conduct -- trespassing, obstructing access
to clinics, damaging property, using
violence or threats of violence, or aiding,
abetting, inducing, directing, or inciting
any of these acts. We do not find any
ambiguity in the terms the district court
used to describe the prohibited conduct,
and as discussed above, none of this
conduct is protected by the First
Amendment.
Nor do we find that the injunction
impermissibly holds the defendants
responsible for the actions of persons
beyond their control... [T]o the extent the
injunction reaches the conduct of
individuals not named in this lawsuit, the
order enjoins those individuals from
violating its mandates. If individuals acting
in concert with the defendants or PLAN
violate-the injunction, without inducement
or direction by the defendants, the
violators, not the defendants, would be in
contempt of the court's order. Nothing in
the order purports to hold the defendants
liable for actions they do not direct, micite,
or control.
V
[The court noted that the defendants
"have raised a hodgepodge of other
challenges," including whether certain
allegations are precluded by res judicata,
whether the court properly allowed
amendments to a complaint and whether
NOW and the named clinics are adequate
class representatives. After briefly
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addressing each issue, the court concluded
that these arguments lacked merit.]
The defendants have also argued that the
conduct in which they engaged is not
prohibited by RICO for a number of
reasons. First, the plaintiffs alleged as
predicate acts numerous violations of the
federal extortion statute, the Hobbs Act,
18 U.S.C. 5 1951, and the defendants
argue that the Hobbs Act does not apply
to their conduct. The defendants' primary
contention on this point is that the Hobbs
Act defines extortion as "the obtaining of
property from another, with his consent,
induced by wrongful use of actual or
threatened force, violence, or fear," and
that the things the plaintiffs claim were
taken here -- the class women's rights to
seek medical services from the clinics, the
clinic doctors' rights to perform their jobs,
and the clinics' rights to provide medical
services and otherwise conduct their
businesses -- cannot be considered
"property" for purposes of the Hobbs
Act. However, this circuit has repeatedly
held that intangible property such as the
right to conduct a business can be
considered "property" under the Hobbs
Act, see, eg, Umtd Statf v Andermo 716
F.2d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 1983), and we will
not revisit that holding here...
We have considered all of the defendants'
remaining contentions, but find none that
requires comment. For the foregoing
reasons, the judgment of the district court
is Affirmed in all respects.
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Abortion Clinic Protest Rules Face Review;
Supreme Court: Justices Will Decide Whether a Law Targeting Mobsters Can Apply
to Actions Meant to Halt Providers.
Los Angeles Times
April 23, 2002
David G. Savage
The Supreme Court, taking up an appeal
from militant antiabortion activists, said
Monday it will decide whether medical
clinics can use the federal racketeering law
against protesters who conspire to shut
down businesses that perform abortions.
The case, to be heard in the fall, does not
concern the right to demonstrate
peacefully. The justices turned away
Operation Rescue's claim that its clinic
invasions were protected as free speech
under the 1st Amendment.
However, the court agreed to hear the
claim that abortion opponents did not use
the kind of force and threats that would
constitute racketeering activity. At issue
again is the reach of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act of 1970, better known as RICO.
Congress passed this broadly worded
measure as a weapon against organized
crime. Mobsters who preyed on legitimate
businesses could be prosecuted in federal
court or sued by private lawyers. Violators
could be ordered to stay away from these
businesses and forced to pay for losses
they caused.
But the law was used widely during the
1980s, and the Supreme Court has said it
extends well beyond mob cases.
In their latest appeal, however, lawyers for
Operation Rescue argue that RICO does
not apply to its activists because they were
not seeking to "obtain property" through
the use of force and threats, citing a clause
from the federal "extortion" law.
RICO is unusual in that it incorporates
many other laws. For example, an arsonist
could be charged with violating arson law,
and a "pattern" of violations could trigger
a RICO case as well.
Lawyers for the National Organization for
Women brought a civil RICO suit against
Operation Rescue and alleged that the
group had engaged in a national campaign
of violence and intimidation targeting
health clinics that performed abortions.
Their lawsuit cited dozens of incidents: In
Chico, Calif., clinic staff members were
shoved against a glass door and injured. In
Pensacola, Fla., several staff members
were pushed down stairs, their offices
were trashed and their medical equipment
damaged. In Los Angeles, a patient who
had undergone surgery was hit over the
head with a sign and left bleeding on the
sidewalk.
The suit said the antiabortion leaders who
were behind these incidents violated the
anti-extortion statute known as the Hobbs
Act. This measure makes it a federal
offense to "obstruct commerce" or
"obtain property" through the "wrongful
use of actual or threatened force, violence
or fear." Repeated violations of the Hobbs
Act make for a "pattern of racketeering
activity" that comes under RICO.
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But in the appeal, lawyers for Operation
Rescue argued its members did not violate
the Hobbs Act because they did not
obtain property.
The decision to hear the appeal was
unexpected, since the justices rejected a
similar claim arising from the same case
eight years ago.
At one point, a U.S. appeals court i
Chicago threw out NOWs suit on the
grounds that Operation Rescue was acting
for moral reasons, not an "economic
motive." Unlike mobsters, they were not
seeking money from the businesses they
targeted, the court said.
But the Supreme Court in 1994
unanimously reversed that ruling and
cleared the way for the suit to proceed.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist said at
the time that RICO covers a "pattern of
racketeering activity" such as robbery,
murder and assaults, but it does not
require that money be the motivation.
The case went to trial in Chicago, and
NOW prevailed. A jury found dozens of
examples in which the protesters used
force, human blockades and violence
against clinics. The plaintiffs were
awarded $258,000 in damages, and the
trial judge issued a nationwide order that
forbids the protesters from trespassing at
clinics, damaging property or interfering
with their operation for 10 years.
Violators can be charged with a crime.
"The injunction has been enormously
effective in stopping clinic violence," said
Fay Clayton, the Chicago lawyer who
represents NOW.
The U.S. Court of Appeals in Chicago
also upheld the injunction and the
damages verdict last year. But lawyers for
antiabortion activist Joseph Scheidler and
Operation Rescue appealed to the high
court.
The court granted both appeals Monday.
Scheidler vs. NOW, 01-1118, and
Operation Rescue vs. NOW, 01-1119.
The move suggests the justices, or at least
some of them, are interested in
reconsidering the broad use of RICO.
Jay Sekulow, who represents Operation
Rescue, said he was heartened. "A federal
statute designed for drug dealers and
organized crime has been misapplied to
silence the pro-life message."
Copyright @ 2002 Los Angeles Times
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And Liberty for Some; Switching Sides on Free Speech
The New York Times
April 26, 1998
Neil A. Lewis
WHEN a Chicago jury ruled last week
that a group of abortion opponents had
violated a Federal anti- racketeering
statute, officials of the National
Organization for Women cheered: A law
intended to hobble the mafia had been
used successfully to punish aggressive
protesters.
But officials at another group that, like
NOW, supports the abortion rights
movement were dismayed. The American
Civil Liberties Union had argued that
using the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act, known as
RICO, against abortion protestors set a
dangerous precedent. "We have always
been afraid of using the racketeering law
this way," said Nadine Strossen, the
A.C.L.U.'s president and a professor at
New York Law School. "This now could
theoretically be used against any kind of
protest movement."
And the penalties are harsh. The winner
may collect triple the amount of actual
damages from the loser.
Guessing Wrong
"The problem with RICO is that it's often
hard to draw the line between acceptable
protest and the kind of conspiracy which
the law punishes," Ms. Strossen said. "The
threat of having to pay such huge civil
damages if you guess wrong as to the
outer boundaries of free speech is far too
harsh."
To many this is no mere intramural
conflict. It is an element in a larger battle
about free speech and the shape of
American civil liberties doctrine at the end
of the 20th century, a conflict in which
liberals and conservatives, in many
important ways, seem to have changed
places.
Liberals, having used freedom of
expression to achieve many of their goals
over the last few decades, like legal
equality for minorities, may no longer see
the need for free speech as much as they
once did. Universities, for example, where
liberals have achieved supremacy, have
been hotbeds of efforts to limit free
expression with codes that prohibit racist
comments or speech that could be
construed as offensive to some group.
At the same time, it is the corporations
and the wealthy who are arguing for
unrestricted use of their assets to publicly
press their agendas. Steve Forbes, for one,
objects to any restrictions on spending his
family publishing fortune to further his
Presidential ambitions. Tobacco
companies insist that Congress may not
restrict their freedom to advertise without
running afoul of the First Amendment.
"I think what is happening now is part of
the wheel of history turning," said Burt
Neuborne, a law professor at New York
University and a former legal director of
the A.C.L.U. "The fact that we've been
fairly successful in the last 10 or 20 years
in Insuring the effective protection of
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speech has led some people to think they
can can tinker with the First Amendment
without risking its overall structure," he
said.
Moreover, the last period of intense
censorship and suppression occurred
more than 40 years ago when the nation
was frightened by the threat of domestic
Communism. "People believe that having
freedom of expression is a natural
phenomenon," Mr. Neubome said. "It's
not. It's the result of intense care and
vigilance."
But Mr. Neubome himself embodies both
sides of the debate. He is wary of
tinkering with freedom of expression yet
he wrote a brief in the abortion clinic case
in Chicago arguing that the use of the
racketeering statute was acceptable.
"I believed the use of RICO was okay
because it involved an effort to curb
violence against the clinics," he said. "But
I understand why the A.C.L.U. and others
are nervous about it."
The difficulty, of course, is allowing the
Government to decide which issues are so
important, so urgent, that a measured
curtailment of civil liberties may be
acceptable. That's what occurred during
World War II when Japanese-Americans
were interned, and what happened during
the Communist scare of the 1950's, both
actions now widely believed to have been
excessive.
Professor Cass Sunstein of the University
of Chicago Law School is a leader in
advocating the notion that it is possible to
carve out exceptions to traditional ideas
about free speech without harming the
basic principles of civil liberties.
"Just invoking the First Amendment often
has the effect of ending debate about
policy questions which are real and are
difficult," he said. In many instances, he
argued, there should be a balancing
between freedom of expression and
greater benefits for the community.
That conflict is at the center of the
movement to prohibit cigarette
advertising as part of a nationwide
settlement in which the tobacco industry
would be given immunity from lawsuits
brought by smokers.
A similar conflict underlies a new debate
over whether the Supreme Court should
reverse itself and allow more restrictions
on campaign spending. Again it is largely
liberals who argue against the Court's
1976 opinion in Buckley v. Valeo, which
relied on a free-speech argument to throw
out some spending restrictions. They say
the decision allowed corporations to use
their wealth to dominate the political
process.
Mr. Neubome, the former A.C.L.U.
official, said he is a pragmatist on the
issue. He believes that additional
restrictions on large political donations are
troubling. But, he said, "campaign finance
is in such a crisis, it's worth the risk."
Attacking Incivility
The other great influence in the debate
over civil liberties at the end of the
century, many feel, is a growing public
intolerance for the incivility of modem
life.
Professor William Van Alstyne of the
Duke University Law School said in an
interview that there is a troubling
willingness to suppress civil liberties
deemed destructive to community values.
"This is occurring not just in the free
speech area, but in the growth of
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variations on Megan's law," the notion
that a neighborhood should be informed
if a sex offender moves in.
Delaware recently enacted a law requiring
sex offenders to be so identified on their
driver's licenses. "All of this means that
society believes it's acceptable to treat
such people as so beyond the pale, they
have no right to live undisturbed," he
lamented.
And the United States Court of Appeals
in San Francisco is expected to rule soon
on a case involving an extension of
Federal child pornography laws. Courts
have previously upheld laws prohibiting
the possession of child pornography on
the basis that it provided a market that
exploits children.
But the amendment goes further by
prohibiting the possession of computer-
generated sexual images of children, that
is, not even real children.
To Professor Van Alstyne this is
unthinkable suppression. To Professor
Sunstein, it's just fine.
Copyright @ 1998 The New York Times
Company
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Behavior Modification; Illegal Conduct No Longer Tolerates
Chicago Tribune
May 1, 1998
Gina Raith and Jennifer Koehler
Since a federal jury last week returned a
verdict in favor of the plaintiffs in the case
of National Organization for Women vs.
Scheidler, some have voiced legitimate
confusion about its potential impact on
free speech and the 1st Amendment.
Others have cried the sky is falling,
intentionally blurring the line between
protected civil disobedience and illegal
acts of violence--implying that
overzealous protesters will now be
characterized as racketeers and non-profit
organizations with noble intentions will be
vulnerable to hefty monetary penalties.
Free speech advocates and civil
disobedients need not be alarmed. The
jury rightly saw the difference between
illegal conduct, such as arson and
bombing--or the threat of those acts--and
protected free speech. Any concerns
involving the 1st Amendment are well
taken by NOW and the health care clinic
plaintiffs. The point is not lost on us that
women, or for that matter, any other
marginalized segment of our society,
would be powerless without the 1st
Amendment. NOW feels the defendants
were shameless in their attempt to pervert
the 1st Amendment. Our right of free
speech, certainly one of our most
treasured rights, does not exist in a
vacuum. Instead, our freedom of speech
co-exists with other fundamental rights,
including our property rights and our right
to reproductive health care. Reason and
the Constitution tell us that every right
and privilege we possess has its limits.
When an anti-abortion extremists, like
Joseph Scheidler, of the Pro-Life Action
League, uses words to make clinic workers
fear for their safety and women fear
keeping their doctor appointments, he
exceeds the boundaries of free speech.
While sidewalk counseling, leafleting and
protests are protected free speech--
threats, intimidation and the advocacy of
arson and bombing are not.
None of the peaceful protest strategies
just mentioned were at issue with NOW
vs. Scheidler and, accordingly, none have
been jeopardized by the jury's decision.
The reason the lawsuit was brought is that
the defendants refused to confine
themselves to these lawful acts which do
not trample on the rights of women to
freely make reproductive health care
choices.
And a national injunction is not only
necessary, it is long overdue. Violence at
clinics has been ongoing since the passage
of the Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act in 1994. One out of four
clinics still experiences violence, and the
level of the violent acts has escalated from
physical blockades, harassment and
intimidation to acid attacks and murders.
Last year, an off-duty police officer was
killed in a bombing incident at an
Alabama clinic.
The campaign against reproductive
freedom, as pronounced by Joseph
Scheidler, was one of fear and pain and
now he, and the co-defendants, Operation
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Rescue, the Pro-Life Action League and
others must pay the price for an illegal,
nationwide conspiracy and campaign of
violence.
Lastly, some have criticized the use of the
federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act as egregious though the
U.S. Supreme Court ruled unanimously
that the law could be applied against the
defendants in this case. RICO allows
private plaintiffs to seek monetary
damages from groups engaged in a pattern
of criminal activity, which is defined as
only two or more felony crimes.
Courts and juries are given the
responsibility to make certain that the
alleged activities rise to the level of crimes
required by RICO, namely serious felonies
as opposed to orderly protest activities.
The jury found, after a seven week trial,
that the defendant had committed more
than three dozen acts of physical
extortion, based on threats or actual force,
to deprive clinic doctors and patients of
their right to engage in lawful business
and to seek medical services.
Lead attorney Faye Clayton had the duty
to zealously represent NOW to the best
of her ability and she did so brilliantly by
using all the tools available and best suited
for achieving our goal. While ultimately a
matter of legal strategy, judging by the
plaintiff's complete victory in this case, the
attorneys involved clearly made the right
choice in using RICO.
With this verdict, NOW wins a permanent
injunction against the defendants'
blockades, extortion, force and violence.
RICO allows clinics to petition for triple
damages and women are guaranteed to
their constitutional right to control an
abortion. Justice prevailed, and it will
continue to do so on a case by case basis
in a society that is quite capable of
discerning the difference between civil
disobedience and intolerable illegal
conduct.
Gina Raith and Jennifer Koehler, both
lawyers, are board members of the
Chicago chapter of the National
Organization for Women
Copyright © 1998 Chicago Tribune
Company
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Antiabortion Racketeers?
The Washington Post
June 6, 1998
Nat Hentoff
Robyn Blumner -- a former ACLU official
and now a syndicated columnist at the St.
Petersburg Times -- is the most consistent
civil libertarian I know and ardently pro-
choice. When a federal jury in Chicago
recently convicted antiabortion organizers
of violating federal racketeering laws
(RICO), Blumner wrote:
"I've been on the front lines of the
abortion war. I know how ugly it gets
when escorts have to crowd around a
patient so she doesn't have to endure the
pictures of mangled fetuses thrust in her
face. . . . I have even had an elderly
scarecrow of a man with 'God is Pro-Life'
tattooed across his knuckles, wrapped
around my legs reciting Scripture and
trying to crawl past me. He didn't get past.
He got arrested."
Blumner, however, is not celebrating the
victory of the National Organization for
Women, which brought the RICO suit in
Chicago against the pro-lifers. "I am not
willing," Blumner says, "to sacrifice the
First Amendment to silence these
abortion opponents." RICO -- Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act -- became law in 1970 and was aimed
at mobsters who use violence,
intimidation and other forms of extortion
to take over businesses and otherwise
increase Mafia profits.
The law was drafted by G. Robert Blakey,
now a Notre Dame law professor. He says
the bill was never intended to apply to
social or political movements, particularly
after he tried to narrow its language
following a strong concern by Sen. Ted
Kennedy (D-Mass.). Kennedy feared that
President Nixon might use RICO against
anti-Vietnam war demonstrators -- and
activists in other social causes.
But now that a federal grand jury has
extended RICO to pro-lifers, Sen.
Kennedy -- being vigorously pro-choice --
is silent about the verdict in Chicago.
Through the years, RICO, it should be
noted, increasingly took on expanded and
vague meanings as the courts tried to
interpret the statute, which was becoming
more and more slippery. At one point,
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia
complained about the "meager guidance"
the court itself had been able to derive
from the law.
Robyn Blumner notes that RICO is "too
potently punitive; and with its loosely
drawn definition of a criminal enterprise,
too easily fits political advocacy
organizations whose leaders and followers
engage in occasional law violations in
furtherance of a cause."
In the Chicago lawsuit, NOW claimed
that the pro-lifers' illegal actions -- such as
blockading an abortion clinic -- were
forms of extortion through threats of
violence, and some actual violence.
But as Prof. Blakey emphasizes in the
National Law Journal, with the NOW
victory opening the way for future RICO
suits against diverse demonstrators, it will
"unconstitutionally chill social protest --
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of all types, not just antiabortion
demonstrations. The verdict establishes
no bright line for distinguishing 'picketing'
from 'pushing' or 'yelling' from
'threatening.' "
As the Chicago Sun-Times said in an
editorial, peace and civil rights groups
have sometimes used illegal tactics, but
there are specific laws against those
tactics, laws that should be enforced
rather than having the Godzilla of
punitive statutes imposed: RICO, with its
triple damages and huge cumulative
lawyers' fees during the long, serpentine
course of trial and appeals. (This NOW
case started 12 years ago.)
As for illegal acts against abortion clinics
and their workers, there is in place a 1994
statute that makes it a federal crime "to
use force or physical obstruction to
interfere with a woman seeking to obtain
reproductive health" -- it is called the
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances
Act (FACE). The penalties are stiff. With
FACE on hand, there is no need for
RICO terror tactics against any
demonstrators.
As Robyn Blumner points out: "With this
win, NOW and other pro-choice groups
have the tool they need to bankrupt their
most ardent and indefatigable antiabortion
rivals... . And corporate farms have the
tool they need to bankrupt the United
Farmworkers Union."
One of the defense attorneys at the
Chicago trial tells me that Judge David
Coar, who is black, and was involved in
the historic civil rights movement, said
during a break in the trial that RICO, if it
had existed then, could probably have
been used against civil rights activists.
Consider the black students, sitting in at
segregated southern lunch counters,
preventing whites from using those
facilities -- and also preventing the white
business owners from the use of their
property. Those students were insisting on
integration through, in RICO's term,
"extortion."
[Nat Hentoff is a nationally syndicated
columnist.
Copyright ( 1998 The Washington Post
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01- 1437 Branch v. Smith
01- 1596 Smith v. Branch
Ruling Below: (Smith v. Gark, S.D. Miss.., 189 F. Supp. 2d 548, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3386)
The court held that no enactment passed by the Mississippi Legislature (including grants of
jurisdiction over equity) gave the District Court in question the power to redistrict the state
for congressional elections. Furthermore, without such an enactment, Article I, section 4 of
the U.S. Constitutional precludes a court form assuming such authority.
Questions Presented: (1) Whether Article I, $4 of the U.S. Constitution deprives state
courts of general jurisdiction of all power in congressional redistricting cases in the many
states where no state statute explicitly speaks of such power?
(2) Does any enactment of the Mississippi legislature grant the power to chancery courts to
redistrict the State of Mississippi for congressional elections?
John Robert SMITH, et al., Plaintiffs
V.
Erick CLARK, Secretary of State of Mississippi, et al., Defendants
United States District Court
For the Southern District of Mississippi, Jackson Division
Decided February 26, 2002
JOLLY,
District
Judge:
Circuit Judge; WINGATE,
Judge; BRAMLETTE, District
Today we have enjoined the defendants
from implementing the congressional
redistricting plan for the 2002 primary and
general election that was adopted by the
Hinds County, Mississippi chancery court.
We have ordered the defendants to
conduct said congressional elections based
on this court's plan issued on February 4,
2002. The basis for this injunction and
order is reflected in our opinion of
February 19, that is, the failure of the
timely preclearance under 5 5 of the
Voting Rights Act of the Hinds County
Chancery Court's plan. The opinion that
follows, holding that the adoption of the
state court's plan is unconstitutional, for
the reason that it violates Article I, Section
4 of the United States Constitution, is this
court's alternative holding, in the event
that on appeal it is determined that we
erred in our February 19 ruling.
Furthermore, inasmuch as the Interveners
are presently seeking a stay of this court's
orders, it is expedient and efficient that
the Supreme Court have before it the case
as a whole, instead of truncated sub-
parts.'
I
Our order entered on January 15, 2002,
and our opinion filed on February 19,
1 We have jurisdiction to address this question
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2 2 84(a) ("[a] district court
of three judges shall be convened ... when an
action is filed challenging the constitutionality of
the apportionment of congressional districts").
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2002, contain the facts and procedural
history of the case before us, and we refer
to those documents for the background of
this case. As we noted in our opinion of
February 19 (footnote 7 on page 43), there
remain, however, other constitutional
questions raised by the plaintiffs as to the
chancery court plan, that have remained
dormant awaiting preclearance. Primarily,
the plaintiffs have contended from the
beginning of this lawsuit that under the
United States Constitution, a state court
may not constitutionally redistrict a state
for United States congressional elections;
that under the Constitution only the
legislature can do so.
The United States Constitution specifically
provides in Article I, Section 4: "The
Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and
Representatives shall be prescribed in each
State by the Legislature thereof."
(Emphasis supplied.) No case -- or any
other authority -- has ever expressed
doubt that this constitutional provision
applies to congressional redistricting.
Consequently, this provision is
indisputably applicable to congressional
redistricting in the state of Mississippi in
2002. Because the issue is squarely
presented by the plaintiffs, we cannot --
nor can any other court or any other party
to the case before us -- sidestep this
express provision of the United States
Constitution. The specific question we
must confront is: What is the practical
meaning of this constitutional provision,
and how it is to be applied here, where the
state chancery court -- not the legislature -
prescribed the "Places and Manner of
holding Elections for ... Representatives
In determining this question, we have
looked to the plain meaning of the easily
understood words of this section, and
applied it to the facts before us. We have
then looked to case authority, including
authorities of the Supreme Court of the
United States, the lower federal courts,
and the state courts that have addressed
this particular section of the Constitution.
This review of authorities leads us to this
conclusion: Although the constitutional
provision may not require the state
legislature itself to enact the congressional
redistricting plan, the state authority that
produces the redistricting plan must, in
order to comply with Article I, Section 4
of the United States Constitution, find the
source of its power to redistrict in some
act of the legislature.
This predicate conclusion raises the next
question that we must resolve: whether
any enactment of the Mississippi
legislature grants to the chancery court the
power to redistrict the State of Mississippi
for congressional elections. We find no
such statute. Furthermore, no case of the
Mississippi Supreme Court has ever
indicated there is such a statute. We thus
come to the final conclusion that the
redistricting plan for congressional
elections in 2002 produced by the Hinds
County Chancery Court transgresses
Article I, Section 4 of the United States
Constitution, is therefore unconstitutional,
and is consequently a nullity. We order it
enjoined and direct that the said 2002
elections be conducted on the basis of the
plan described in and attached to our
February 4, 2002 order.
II
The Meaning of the Term "Legislature"
We turn now to investigate and resolve
the meaning of the term "Legislature" as
used in Article I, Section 4, to consider
whether the chancery court can fall within
the meaning of that term and to provide
the appropriate remedy.
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AThe Constitutional Clause
To begin, we turn our attention
specifically to the words of Article I,
Section 4: Reviewing the plain language,
the provision provides that the "Times,
Places and Manner of holding Elections
for Senators and Representatives shall be
prescribed in each state by the Legislature
thereof." Applying these words to the
facts before us, everyone agrees that the
legislature has not enacted a redistricting
plan. Instead of the legislature, the
chancery court has chosen the "Places and
Manner" of conducting the congressional
elections in Mississippi. It would surely
seem, on the basis of the plain
constitutional language, that the chancery
court's order implementing its plan
constitutes a violation of Article I, Section
4. But, the answer is not quite so simple.
We therefore turn now to consider the
cases that have considered the meaning of
"Legislature."
B
Cases Considering the Term "Legislature"
[Only three cases have construed this
constitutional term and all of them] have
made clear that the reference to
"Legislature" in Article I, Section 4 is to
the law-making body and processes of the
state. These cases suggest that
congressional redistricting must be done
within the perimeters of the legislative
processes, whether the redistricting is
done by the legislature itself or pursuant
to the valid delegation of legislative
power. We have found no cases that
support a contrary conclusion.2
2 While we recognize that there have been a
number of cases in which state courts have
exercised the power to redistrict congressional
Growe v. Emison
The Intervenors understandably rely on
Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 122 L. Ed.
2d 388, 113 S. Ct. 1075 (1993) and argue
that it trumps all cases we have discussed
respecting Article I, Section 4 in
redistricting matters. At the outset, we
should note our agreement with the
Intervenors that Growe seems to stand
for the proposition that the role of state
courts in redistricting, generally, must be
fully respected by the federal courts. We
should further note that if Growe stood
alone as the authority on the issue before
us -- that is, if we could disregard Article
I, Section 4 and the cases we have referred
to earlier -- we would dismiss the
plaintiffs' claim forthwith. However, we
cannot ignore the Constitution and other
Supreme Court authority, so we turn now
to examine Growe and to determine if,
indeed, it is contrary to or requires us to
disregard our earlier conclusion that there
must be a source of legislative authority
for congressionat redistricting.
In Growe, a number of plaintiffs filed suit
in state court, challenging the existing
legislative and congressional districts in
seats, none of these cases has addressed the Article
I, Section 4 question.
In California, on two occasions the Supreme Court
of the state has reapportioned congressional
districts. Legislature v. Reinecke, 10 Cal.3d 396,
401, 110 Cal. Rptr. 718, 516 P.2d 6 (Cal. 1973) (In
Bank); Wilson v. Eu, 1 Cal.4th 707, 823 P.2d 545
(Cal. 1992) (In Bank). In both cases, the California
Supreme Court acted under its original mandatejurisdiction, as granted to the court in the state
constitution, which of course provides a source of
law for the state. See Cal. Const. Art. VI, § 10. The
Article I, Section 4 issue was not raised.
[Cases in New York, Texas and New Jersey were
similarly distinguished.]
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C
Minnesota under the 14th Amendment to
the United States Constitution and the
Minnesota Constitution Article 4, Section
2, i.e., the one person-one vote principle,
in the light of the new census. The parties
stipulated that the existing districts were
unconstitutional, and the Minnesota
Supreme Court appointed a Special
Redistricting Panel, consisting of one
appellate judge and two district judges, to
preside over the case. Id. at 28. The
Minnesota Supreme Court did so because
"the Chief Justice has authority to appoint
a special redistricting panel under Minn.
Stat. §5 2.724 and 480.16."' Cotlow v.
Growe, 622 N.W.2d 561, 562 (Minn.
2001). Meanwhile, two suits were filed in
federal court and a federal three-judge
panel was convened to hear the
consolidated cases. Growe, 507 U.S. at 28.
After a period of deferral to allow the
state legislature to act, the federal court
stayed the proceedings in state court,
which had developed a redistricting plan,
proceedings and ultimately adopted its
own federal plan for state legislative and
for congressional redistricting plans. Id. at
30-31. The Supreme Court held that the
district court erred in not deferring to the
state court's timely consideration of
legislative and congressional
reapportionment. Id. at 36-37.
The Supreme Court in Growe indicated
that state courts have a significant role in
redistricting. Growe declares:
In the reapportionment context, the Court
has required federal judges to defer
consideration of disputes involving
redistricting where the State, through its
3 Minn. Stat. § 2.724 provides in relevant part:
"When public convenience and necessity require it,
the chief justice of the supreme court may assign
any judge of any court to serve and discharge the
duties of judge of any court in a judicial district not
that judge's own at such times as the chief justice
may determine."
legislative or judicial branch, has begun to
address that highly political task itself....
The Constitution leaves with the States
primary responsibility for apportionment
of their federal congressional and state
legislative districts. See U.S. Const., Art. I,
5 2. 'We say once again what has been said
on many occasions: reapportionment is
primarily the duty and responsibility of the
State through its legislature or other body,
rather than of a federal court.' Chapman v.
Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27, 42 L. Ed. 2d 766, 95
S. Ct. 751 (1975).
507 U.S. at 34. To place the holding of the
Supreme Court in context, we start with
the pivotal observation that the Article I,
Section 4 issue was not discussed or even
raised in Growe because -- unlike this case
-- the parties did not dispute the
constitutional jurisdiction of the state
court. See id. at 32. (See also Texas v.
Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 168, 149 L. Ed. 2d
321, 121 S. Ct. 1335 (2001)
("Constitutional rights are not defined by
inferences from opinions which did not
address the question at issue.")) Without
objection from any party, the Minnesota
Supreme Court relied on its specific
authority under the statutes of Minnesota
to assign judges to hear cases "where need
therefor exists," and appointed a three-
judge panel. We also note that Chapman,
relied on by the Court in Growe, involved
only the reapportionment of the state
legislature, not congressional districts, and
therefore no Article I, Section 4 question
could have been implicated.
It is certainly true that the Supreme Court
chastised the federal court in Growe for
dismissing the role of the state court in
the redistricting process. Nevertheless, we
cannot conclude that Growe stands for
the proposition that we may disregard
Article I, Section 4, or these previously
cited Supreme Court authorities. This
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conclusion is undergirded by the facts
that: Article I, Section 4 was not raised in
Growe; the earlier Supreme Court cases
addressing Article I, 4 were not referred
to, much less overnled, see United States
v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 567 (2001) ("it is
[the Supreme] Court's prerogative alone to
overrule one of its precedents") (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted));
the Chapman case relied upon in Growe
involved only a state court redistricting
the state legislature, not congressional
redistricting; and, finally, there was some,
albeit tenuous, legislative authority for the
Minnesota Supreme Court's action in
Growe.
Thus, based on our understanding of the
constitutional provision in the light of its
plain language and the case authority
when considered as a whole, we hold:
Article I, 5 4 requires a state to adopt a
congressional redistricting plan in a
manner that comports with legislative
authority as defined by state law.
III
Authority of the Chancery Court
In the case before us, we can find no
legislative act upon which to base the
chancery court's authority to act in
congressional redistricting. Unlike in
Minnesota and California, the Mississippi
Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction
only. While the Mississippi legislature has
empowered other state bodies to redistrict
a number of state electoral districts, it has
not authorized any other state body,
including the chancery court, to redistrict
congressional districts. For example, the
state constitution grants the Mississippi
Supreme Court the authority to redistrict
circuit and chancery court districts in the
State of Mississippi when the legislature
fails to do so. See Miss. Const. Art. 6, 5
152. In another instance, the legislature
has provided that if it is unsuccessful in
redistricting state legislative districts, a
five-member commission will redistrict
the state. Miss. Const. Art. 13, § 254. This
commission consists of the chief justice of
the Mississippi Supreme Court as
chairman, and the attorney general,
secretary of state, speaker of the house of
representatives, and president pro
tempore of the senate. Id. There is no
similar legislative grant for redistricting
congressional districts. Further, there is no
statutory authority in Mississippi for
Supreme Court judges to assign individual
judges to hear cases when the public
necessity requires, unlike in Minnesota.
The intervenors argue that the Mississippi
chancery courts have jurisdiction over "all
matters in equity," Miss. Const. Art. 6, §
159, and that this constitutes the authority
for the Hinds County Chancery Court to
redistrict the state for congressional
elections. However, the Mississippi
Supreme Court has specifically held, in the
past, that the state chancery courts have
no jurisdiction over a complaint that
sought to enjoin congressional elections
on the ground that a congressional
redistricting statute adopted by the state
legislature violated a federal statute which
required congressional districts to contain
"as nearly as practicable an equal number
of inhabitants." See Brumfield v. Brock,
169 Miss. 784, 142 So. 745, 746 (Miss.
1932). "By a long line of decisions this
court has held that courts of equity deal
alone with civil and property rights and
not with political rights." Id. In 1994, the
Mississippi Supreme Court stated:
"Chancery courts in this state do not have
the jurisdiction to enjoin elections or to
otherwise interfere with political and
electoral matters which are not within the
traditional reach of equity jurisdiction." In
re McMillin, 642 So.2d 1336, 1339 (Miss.
1994).
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It is true, of course, that in In re Mauldin,
No. 2001-M-01891 (Miss. Sup. Ct., Dec.
13, 2001), the Mississippi Supreme Court
held that this Hinds County Chancery
Court did have jurisdiction over the state
lawsuit brought in the instant case. The
court did not provide any basis for its
holding, did not refer to its earlier cases to
the contrary, and did not point to any
legislative authority that authorized the
chancery court to act.
In sum, we can only conclude that the
requirements of Article I, Section 4 were
not met in this case, as there has been no
indication that the chancery court had any
legislative authority to draw the state's
congressional districts. Indeed, the
Mississippi Supreme Court has specifically
held that such matters do not fall within
the equity jurisdiction of the chancery
courts. Therefore, irrespective of whether
the chancery court plan is precleared, the
chancery court plan cannot be
implemented by the State of Mississippi,
because the chancery court's adoption of
it, in the absence of any state legislative
authority, violates Article I, Section 4.
IV
Remedy
The precise question of an appropriate
remedy for an Article I, Section 4
violation has not been addressed before.
However, under established principles,
this court has the authority to order the
use of its own congressional redistricting
plan in place of a state's plan if we find a
constitutional violation in the state's plan.
[Citations omitted.]
V
Conclusion
In the light of the foregoing analysis, the
congressional redistricting plan adopted
by the chancery court is declared
unconstitutional, and the state's
implementation of the chancery court
plan is enjoined, as per our Final
Judgment entered today.
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Supreme Court to Rule on Drawing Congress Boundaries
Financial Times
June 11, 2002
Deborah McGregor
The Supreme Court yesterday agreed to
review a congressional boundary dispute
in Mississippi, in a case likely to set an
important precedent for future contests
determining control of Congress.
Wading for the first time into the
jurisdictional brambles arising from latest
census data, the Court will weigh
arguments concerning who has the final
say in redrawing congressional maps.
States must redraw boundaries for
congressional districts every 10 years to
reflect population shifts found in the
census. In the Mississippi case, the dispute
centers on two court-drawn plans. One,
that favors the Republicans, was drawn by
a federal three-judge panel. The other,
favoring Democrats, was drawn by a state
judge.
The federal panel ruled that the state
judge did not have a constitutional right to
get involved in the congressional
boundary challenge.
Yesterday's Supreme Court decision was
viewed as a victory for Democrats, who
had protested that the new map helped
Republicans. While it did not come in
time to affect this year's congressional
elections, it will set a significant precedent
for future challenges.
The redrawing had wound up in the
courts after Mississippi's Democrat-
controlled legislature failed to agree how
to reshape the boundaries.
In the absence of consensus, a group of
Democrats asked a state judge to settle the
matter; Republicans went to federal court.
Lawyers for both sides used the Supreme
Court's 2000 ruling in Bush v Gore, which
threw the presidential election to George
W. Bush, to plead their case.
Because of slow population growth in the
1990s, Mississippi is losing one of its five
congressional seats. The disputed district
is already home to an unusually bitter
clash between two congressmen, thrown
together as a result of the downsizing.
Republican "Chip" Pickering, whose
father's federal judicial nomination was
blocked by Senate Democrats, is squaring
off against Democrat Ronnie Shows.
The court's ruling had been eagerly
awaited by officials in both parties.
Partisan sentiments have been inflamed by
the high stakes in this year's congressional
elections. Democrats need to pick up six
net seats to gain the House majority.
"Redistricting" already means more
incumbents in Congress will lose this year
than in either of the past two House
elections. Other states where incumbents
of opposite parties are vying for the same
seat are Connecticut, Illinois and
Pennsylvania.
Copyright @ 2002 The Financial Times
Limited
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Fight Over Political Map Centers on Race
The New York Times
February 21, 2002
David E. Rosenbaum
The Bush administration Justice
Department is using its authority under
the Voting Rights Act to block a
redistricting plan for Congressional seats
in Mississippi that was drawn by a black
state judge and is supported by blacks and
Democrats here.
The department questions whether a
lower-court state judge should have the
authority to draft a Congressional district
map for the entire state. Because of the
department's action, the plan likely to be
imposed on the state is one written by a
panel of white Republican-appointed
federal judges and is favorable to
Republican candidates.
Bitter redistricting battles involving bare-
knuckle politics are being waged all over
the country as states revise their
Congressional district maps to take
account of population changes reported in
the 2000 Census. The outcome of these
battles could determine which party
controls the House of Representatives
after the November election.
Nowhere is the fight more byzantine than
in Mississippi.
Experts on the Voting Rights Act from
both parties said in interviews today that
they could not recall another instance
when the Justice Department had blocked
a redistricting plan that was clearly
favorable to blacks. The act, one of the
landmark civil rights laws of the 1960's,
was intended to prevent discrimination
against minonty voters.
Dan Nelson, a spokesman for the
department, said the move was not
motivated by partisan considerations.
"The question," Mr. Nelson said, "is not
just whether this plan is fair to minority
voters but whether the process is fair in
this case and in future rounds of
redistricting."
The main issue, he said, was whether it
was proper for a state judge elected in one
district to write a redistricting plan for the
entire state, a procedure the Mississippi
Supreme Court has upheld. Some day, he
said, a white judge might draw a map that
was disadvantageous to blacks.
The fight over redistricting
several odd twists.
involves
The Republican congressman who stands
to benefit if the state judge's plan is
blocked, Representative Charles W.
Pickering Jr., is the son of the federal
judge whose nomination by President
Bush to the federal court of appeals is
being thwarted by Democrats in the
Senate.
The panel whose redistricting map is likely
to be imposed is comprised of two federal
trial judges who are colleagues of Judge
Pickering and one who sits on the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, which he wants to join.
The governor here is a Democrat, and
both houses of the Legislature are
controlled by Democrats, a situation that
should have guaranteed an unfavorable
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outcome for the Republicans. But the
Democratic Party is so riven by intemal
rivalries and sectional disputes that the
politicians were paralyzed.
Normally in legal disputes, Republicans
advocate states' rights and Democrats
stnve to get matters into federal court.
But in this case the roles are reversed.
Democrats on the House Judiciary
Committee, led by Representative John
Conyers Jr. of Michigan, the senior
member of the Congressional Black
Caucus, wrote to President Bush last week
to complain that the Justice Department
action "turns the Voting Rights Act on its
head."
Representative Pickering, on the other
hand, said justice was being done because
the federal court map has compact
districts. The Democrats, he said, "want
to gerrymander the state in a way that has
never been done before."
Mr. Pickering said his father's
confirmation as an appeals judge had
become caught up in the redistricting
fight. The Democratic strategy, he said,
was to demonize the Pickering name and
to hold his father's confirmation hostage
for a redistricting outcome favorable to
Democrats.
Judge Pickering seems to enjoy strong
support from blacks in Laurel, Miss., his
hometown, but that backing does not
extend to the state's black political leaders.
In Washington, Democratic senators have
criticized his stands on civil rights matters
on and off the bench.
Mississippi now has five seats in the
House of Representatives, two held by
white Democrats, two by white
Republicans and one by a black
Democrat. The state lost a seat as a result
of the 2000 census, a reflection of the
slow population growth here in the 1990's.
The Legislature spent last year trying to
draw a new four-district map, but no
agreement could be reached. The only
consensus was that the state's most junior
congressmen, Mr. Pickering and Ronnie
Shows (rhymes with cows), a white
Democrat who enjoys strong support
from blacks, would be pitted against each
other in a new district.
With the Legislature stymied, Democrats
took the matter to the state chancery
court, a trial court that handles civil cases.
On Dec. 21, Judge Patricia Wise approved
a map that would have Mr. Pickering and
Mr. Shows compete in a district in which
37.5 percent of the voting-age population
would be black
The racial composition of districts is
crucial in Mississippi because nearly all
blacks vote Democratic and a large
percentage of whites vote Republican.
Some of the districts on Judge Wise's map
would be oddly shaped. Republicans
derided it as the "tornado plan" because a
district in the northern part of the state
would swoop down like a funnel into the
center of the state to pick up some of the
Jackson suburbs.
Chancery court judges do not run with
party labels, but Judge Wise is black and
was elected from a heavily Democratic
district.
Because of Mississippi's history of
discrimination, the Voting Rights Act
requires the Justice Department to certify
that changes in the state's election laws
and procedures do not discriminate
against voters from minority groups. The
certification process is known as
preclearance.
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So on Dec. 26, the state attorney general,
Mike Moore, sent the plan and supporting
documents to the department in
Washington.
Under the law, the Justice Department has
60 days to review a plan. Mr. Moore asked
the department to act quickly because the
filing deadline for Congressional races in
Mississippi is March 1.
But the state did not hear from
Washington until last Thursday when it
received a five-page list of detailed
questions that the department said needed
to be answered before it could give
preclearance. None of the questions
implied that the state court plan was
discriminatory, but they centered on the
question of the authority of Judge Wise.
Mr. Moore's office worked on the
questions through the weekend and sent
the replies to Washington on Tuesday
night. Theoretically, the Justice
Department has another 60 days to review
the replies, and if it uses that time, the
plan could not be in place by the filing
deadline.
During the long hiatus, Republicans took
the matter to federal court. Last week, a
panel consisting of Judge E. Grady Jolly
of the United States Court of Appeals and
Judges David C. Branette and Henry T.
Wingate of Federal District Court, all
white and all put on the bench by
Republican presidents, put forward a
redistricting map in which 30.4 percent of
the voting-age population would be black,
toa plan more advantageous
Representative Pickering.
On Tuesday, the panel announced that it
would unilaterally impose its plan if the
Justice Department did not grant
preclearance to the state plan by next
Monday. Redistricting plans drawn by
federal courts do not require Justice
Department certification.
Mr. Nelson, the Justice Department
spokesman, said he did not know if the
department could act one way or the
other by Monday. The review has taken a
long time, he said, because it is a
complicated case.
"As with all voting changes," Mr. Nelson
said, "the department will render its
decision based on the facts before it and
the relevant law and will do so in a
consistent and principled fashion."
Robert B. McDuff, a lawyer for the
Democrats, filed an emergency appeal
today to the United States Supreme Court
seeking to stop the federal plan. He
conceded that winning the appeal was a
long shot.
Mr. Shows is furious.
"The deck is stacked against me," he said.
"The Justice Department is sticking it to
me because of pure partisan politics."
Copyright * 2002 The New York Times
Company
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Race Takes Back Seat as States Prepare to Redistrict
The New York Times
February 4, 2001
Robert Pear
State officials say that recent court
decisions on voting rights have created
confusion, uncertainty and immense new
difficulties as they prepare to redraw the
boundaries of Congressional districts and
state legislative districts.
The court decisions have made clear that
states must take race into account, but
must not give it too much weight, or else
their plans can be thrown out as
unconstitutional. Thus, state officials said,
they will focus less on race than in the last
round of redistricting 10 years ago, and
they will pay more attention to other
factors -- what the courts have described
as "race-neutral principles" like creating
compact districts and protecting
incumbents.
Asked to describe the impact of the
rulings, State Senator Hob Bryan of
Mississippi, a Democrat, said: "We've got
to figure out what they mean. I'm not sure
the court decisions are clear enough to
know. Can you send me a synopsis of the
law?"
Mr. Bryan is chairman of the Senate
Elections Committee and vice chairman
of the panel that will draw new
Congressional and state legislative districts
in Mississippi.
Others are in the same quandary.
"Supreme Court decisions in the 90's
raised as many questions as they
answered," said Tim Storey, a policy
analyst at the National Conference of
State Legislatures.
In New York, Assemblyman William L.
Parment, a Democrat who is co-chairman
of the legislative task force on
redistricting, said: "The court decisions
have removed some of the certainty of the
rules that were employed after the 1990
census. It's much less clear what it is you
have to do to meet the requirements of
various statutes and court cases."
In view of those court decisions, state and
local officials said, they now have a
heavier burden to justify the creation of
additional districts in which black or
Hispanic voters are in the majority.
Jon A. Boller, a staff lawyer for the New
Mexico Legislature, said: "We must satisfy
the requirements of Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act, which says you must
take race into account on some level. But
at the same time, we cannot make race the
primary factor."
In 1991, under pressure from the Justice
Department, many states tried to
maximize the number of districts
controlled by black or Hispanic voters.
The Supreme Court later said that was not
required. This year many state legislators
say their goal is simply to prevent a
reduction in the number of minority-
controlled districts. "We don't have to
maximize the number of minority
districts, as we felt we had to in 1991,"
said State Representative Bob Hanner of
Georgia, a Democrat.
At the national level, both parties look to
redistricting to increase their numbers in
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the United States House of
Representatives, where Republicans now
have 221 seats, just 10 more than the
Democrats.
Republicans appear to be in a stronger
position today than in the last round of
redistricting. They control both chambers
of the legislature in 18 states, up from 6 in
1991. Democrats control both chambers
in 16 states, down from 30 a decade ago.
But Democrats said that population shifts
favored them. Hispanics account for
much of the population growth in states
like Arizona, Colorado and Texas, which
are gaining seats in Congress. Hispanic
voters favored the Democrat over the
Republican by a ratio of more than two to
one in each of the last four presidential
elections.
The legal standards for redistricting have
become more important than ever. Most
states expect to be sued over the plans
they adopt, so courts will probably end up
determining the boundaries in many
crucial states. After the 1990 census, more
than 130 suits were filed in 40 states, some
challenging the states' overall plans, some
contesting individual districts. New York
had cases in four federal courts and three
state courts. "You know you're going to
be sued," said Linda Meggers, director of
reapportionment services for the Georgia
Legislature.
From the passage of the Voting Rights
Act in 1965 until the early 1990's, state
officials felt pressure from the Justice
Department and the courts to help blacks
and other minonties elect candidates of
their choice. In practice, that meant that
state legislators often tried to create
districts in which blacks or other
minorities accounted for more than 50
percent of the voting-age population.
But in a series of landmark decisions
starting with Shaw v. Reno in 1993, the
Supreme Court struck down districting
plans on the ground that state legislators
had given too much weight to race as a
factor in drawing the lines.
In March, the Census Bureau will provide
detailed data to the states, showing total
population and voting-age population, by
race and by Hispanic origin. The bureau
will decide late this month whether the
data should be adjusted for a potential
undercount or overcount.
Mark A. Packman, a lawyer who advises
many state and local governments, said
they "must use computerized census data
and maps to take race into account m
redistricting decisions," and may be
required to create black-majority districts
where voting tends to follow racial lines.
But, Mr. Packman said, "The very actions
that state and local governments take to
avoid liability under the Voting Rights Act
expose them to liability under recent
Supreme Court decisions."
In Texas, State Senator Jeff Wentworth, a
Republican who is chairman of the Senate
Redistricting Committee, summarized the
situation this way "Race can be a factor,
but it cannot be the dominant factor in
drawing boundary lines. We still have to
protect minority districts, and we will. But
you can't have very unusually shaped
districts, as we did last time."
Antonia Hernandez, president of the
Mexican American Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, said, "The Supreme
Court has said, in effect, that it's O.K. to
go back to your old system of
gerrymandering, at times to the detriment
of minorities."
Still, Ms. Hernandez, said: "I believe the
interest of the Latino community will be
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Legislatures Suit Up for Battle over Boundaries of Districts; Census Data Will Mean
New Maps, with Lawmakers' Political Careers at Stake
St Louis Post-Dispatch
March 19, 2001
Karen Branch-Brioso
Forget abortion. Forget gun control.
Forget budgets.
The most divisive war of all is about to
begin in state legislatures across the
nation. And the pressing issue is?
Lawmakers' own political careers.
The once-a-decade battle over redrawing
the maps for congressional and legislative
seats is getting under way, as the states
receive detailed population data this
month from the 2000 census. The lofty
constitutional reason is to ensure that each
district represents roughly the same
amount of people as the rest -- the "one
man, one vote" argument. In reality,
population equality is the legal nuisance in
a political game that often places as much
emphasis on voter registration numbers
and voter performance as census
numbers. Thirty-eight states give their
legislatures the authority to draw their
own districts and congressional seats, too.
Illinois is among them. This is the state
assembly that was so at odds over its
legislative boundaries that in 1964, it
ended up with no boundaries at all. Every
member of the Legislature ran statewide
on a ballot so long it was dubbed the "bed
sheet ballot."
After a 1980 musical-chairs nightmare for
Missouri, when 10 congressional
incumbents tried to fit into nine
congressional seats, the Legislature tried
to get out of the redistricting business
altogether. It proposed a constitutional
amendment to hand over its congressional
mapping duties to a bipartisan committee
similar to those that have drawn state
House and Senate seats for decades.
The voters' response: an uninterested no
go.
"Not too many people here in the United
States seem to pay attention to
redistricting," said Laura Handley,
president of Frontier International
Electoral Consulting in Washington and
an academic expert on redistricting.
"In the other long-standing democracies,
the public is much more politically aware.
The United States is one of the few
countries that actually have left
redistricting in the hands of their
legislators," Handley said.
Just seven states have ceded both
congressional and legislative mapping
duties to a commission: Alaska, Arizona,
Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, New Jersey and
Washington.
In each of those states, except Alaska,
majority and minority party leaders
appoint an equal number of the
commission members.
Arizona voters last fall wrested control of
redistricting from the hands of their
legislature with a constitutional
amendment. Now a five-member
commission, two Republicans and two
Democrats with an independent as the
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chairman, will draw the maps. The self-
described citizens advocacy group
Common Cause and the League of
Women Voters led thecharge.
Common Cause also has started or backed
similar efforts to change the systems in
Florida, Rhode Island and Delaware. Don
Simon, the group's outside general
counsel, says it is fundamentally wrong for
politicians to be drawing the boundaries
of their districts.
"It really is an enormous conflict of
interest," Simon said. "You're talking
about how safe a seat will be, whether
incumbents will be paired. These are
inherently political calculations and to
have the legislators themselves making
these judgments about their own future
and the future of their own colleagues
really results in a very distorting process."
Some redistricting commissions are still
inherently political. In Arkansas, for
example, congressional seats are drawn by
a panel of three: the governor, the
secretary of state and the attorney general,
all partisan elected officials.
In Alaska, all members of the legislative
redistricting panel were appointed by the
governor until this year. Thanks to a 1998
constitutional amendment, the governor
gets two picks, and the House speaker,
Senate president and Supreme Court chief
justice get one each.
The system also adds an insurance policy
against self-interest playing a role, says
Alaska Supreme Court Chief Justice Dana
Fabe: "a one-term prohibition from
running in the general election" after the
plan is adopted. Hawaii and Arizona
impose a two-term ban on members
running for the seats they draw.
But in the never-ending battles for control
by the two major political parties, some
party loyalists believe the idea of giving
control to a commission is downright un-
American. The panels are often composed
of nonofficeholders with no party getting
the upper hand.
"What commissions do is allow state
legislatures to abdicate responsibi lity for
tough issues," said one national GOP
source, who spoke on the condition of
anonymity. "We would prefer to draw the
lines in all 50 states. The Democrats
would prefer to draw the lines in all 50
states. We'd both rather see a commission
than the other side draw the lines."
Jeffrey M. Wice, a lawyer working with
national Democratic redistricting efforts
in legislatures across the nation, also is
skeptical that the commissions do any
better.
"One political party is going to gain or
lose, and commissions don't make that
much of a difference in the end," Wice
said. "One party will end up winning."
Yet redistricting doesn't leave the
bickering along partisan lines alone. In
congressional redistricting, where states
lose or gain seats depending on how their
population changed in respect to the rest
of the nation, the battles can pit members
of the same party against each other.
In Missouri, the final map drawn after the
1980 census left Republican Rep. Wendell
Bailey's hometown of Willow Springs in
the district where fellow GOP Rep. Bill
Emerson planned to run. Bailey moved to
less familiar territory to challenge
Democratic Rep. Ike Skelton instead and
lost.
Two St. Louis Democrats, House
Minority Leader Richard A. Gephardt and
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Rep. William Lacy Clay Jr., may face a
similar dilemma this year, even though
Missouri won't lose any congressional
districts. The two share the predominantly
Democratic population in the city of St.
Louis, which lost almost 50,000 people in
the last decade. Each district will have to
reach further into more politically
conservative suburbia to reach the
622,000 population target.
Darrell Jackson, who supervises the
redistricting staff in the Missouri House,
said just one likely will get the bulk of the
city's black po pulation to maintain the
state's only "majority-minority" district,
now held by Clay. The Voting Rights Act
of 1965 and years of Supreme Court
rulings since have deemed that districts
should not dilute minority voting strength,
if minority communities are compact
enough to be included in the same district.
"In congressional redistricting, that's not
terribly complex, because there's only one
place in the state that's compact enough
to make a (minority) district, and that's St.
Louis," Jackson said.
It will be a dilemma that the Legislature
will have to settle or, as often occurs
across the nation, a three-judge panel of
federal judges. The political impasses are
so frequent that the courts often end up
drawing the maps themselves.
In 1971 and 1981, the courts drew
Missouri's congressional maps, but the
Legislature finally reached agreement in
1991 after state voters refused to let them
off the hook.
Things weren't as rosy in Illinois
have they been for decades.
nor
After the infamous "bed sheet ballot" of
1964, a new Constitution adopted in 1970
created a back-up commission of four
nonlegislators, two from each party, to
draw legislative districts when the
Legislature couldn't agree by a deadline.
The Legislature couldn't work it out in
1971, 1981 and 1991. The comnuission
drew the maps in 1971 but had to resort
to a "tie-breaker" fifth member in the next
two decades before it could settle on a
final plan.
Copyright © 2001 St. Louis Post-
Dispatch, Inc.
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01-1067 United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe
01-1375 United States v. Navajo Nation
Ruling Below: (White Mountain Apache Tribe v. United States, Fed. Cir., 249 F.3d 1364,
2001 U.S. App. Lexis 9330)
The court held that Pub. L. No. 86-392, 74 Stat. 8 (1960) provided the Indian tribe with
jurisdiction to bring the claim, it created the trust relationship, and provided a fiduciary
relationship. The statute authorized the government to use the Indian tribe's trust property
for governmental purposes, and subjected the government to trustee liability for the failure
to maintain the trust property. The government was liable for money damages resulting from
its breach of fiduciary duties in allowing the buildings to deteriorate.
Question Presented: Whether a 1960 Act of Congress, Pub. L. No. 86-392, 74 Stat. 8
(1960) obligates the United States to maintain or restore certain property and buildings held
by the United States in trust for the White Mountain Apache Tribe so that the Tribe can
maintain a suit for damages in the Court of Federal Claims?
WHITE MOUNTAIN APACHE TRIBE, Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals
For the Federal Circuit
Decided May 16, 2001.
DYK, Circuit Judge
This case presents the question of
whether a 1960 Act of Congress, Pub. L.
No. 86-392, 74 Stat. 8 (1960) (the "1960
Act"), obligates the United States to
maintain or restore certain property and
buildings held by the United States in trust
for the White Mountain Apache Tribe
(the "Tribe")' so that the Tribe can
maintain a suit for damages in the Court
of Federal Claims. We hold that it does,
though the obligation created is narrower
than that claimed by the Tribe. We
accordingly reverse and remand the
1 The Tribe is a federally recognized Native
American tribe organized under section 16 of the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 984,
25 U.S.C. 5 476.
decision of the Court of Federal Claims in
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. United
States, 46 Fed. Cl. 20 (1999), for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 1870, the United States Army
established a military post known as "Fort
Apache" on approximately 7,500 acres of
land within the borders of what later
became the White Mountain Apache
Tribe's reservation in Arizona. The Army
operated Fort Apache as a military post
until 1922, when Congress transferred
control of the Fort to the Secretary of the
Interior, and designated approximately
400 acres of the Fort for use as a boarding
school for Native American children to
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fulfill certain unspecified treaty obligations
of the United States. See 25 U.S.C. § 277
(1994).
In 1960, Congress passed the 1960 Act
which declared the Fort to be "held by the
United States in trust for the 'White
Mountain Apache Tribe, subject to the
right of the Secretary of the Interior to use
any part of the land and improvements for
administrative or school purposes for as
long as they are needed for that purpose."
Pub. L. No. 86-392, 74 Stat. 8 (1960).
Pursuant to that statute, the government
allegedly controls and has the ability to
use approximately thirty-five buildings on
the site...
At issue in this appeal is the government's
obligation as trustee to maintain and
restore those buildings, which include,
inter alia, barracks constructed by the
United States Army, the Native American
boarding school and student dormitories,
and various administrative buildings
constructed by the Department of the
Interior.
According to the Tribe, the government
has had exclusive access to and control
over those buildings and has allowed
many of them to fall into disrepair...
On March 19, 1999, the Tribe
commenced a breach of trust action in the
Court of Federal Caims seeking $ 14
million dollars in damages for the
government's alleged breach of "its
fiduciary duty to maintain, protect, repair
and preserve the Tribe's trust corpus."
The Tribe alleged that its claim arose
under the 1960 Act, as well as the Snyder
Act (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 13), the
National Historic Preservation Act of
1966 (codified at 16 U.S.C 5 470 et seq.)
and a variety of other federal statutes and
regulations.
The government filed a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted and for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction...
DISCUSSION
I
The question before us is whether the
Court of Federal Claims erred in
dismissing this breach of trust claim
against the United States for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. We review that decision without
deference. First Hartford Corp. Pension
Plan & Trust v. United States, 194 F.3d
1279, 1286-87 (Fed. Cir. 1999). We have
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
28 U.S.C. 5 1295(a)(3) (1994).
II
The Tucker Act gives the Court of
Federal Claims jurisdiction over broad
categories of claims against the United
States and constitutes a waiver of
sovereign immunity as to those claims. 28
U.S.C. § 1491 (1994); Mitchell II, 463 U.S.
at 212. A companion statute, the Indian
Tucker Act, further confers jurisdiction
on the Court of Federal Claims to hear
any claim brought by a Native American
tribe against the United States that "is one
which otherwise would be cognizable in
the Court of Federal Claims if the
claimant were not an Indian tribe." 28
U.S.C. 5 1505. Although the Tribe
premised jurisdiction in the Court of
Federal Claims upon both statutes, it is §
1505 that primarily confers jurisdiction
over this action.
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III
Before the Court of Federal Claims and
on this appeal, the Tribe argued that a
variety of statutes and regulations, other
than the 1960 Act, impose fiduciary
obligations upon the United States. We
disagree.
Accordingly, we turn our attention to the
1960 Act.
IV
Both the Tribe and the United States in
their briefs agree that the 1960 Act creates
a "trust... "t2
However, the mere fact that the 1960 Act
creates a trust relationship does not end
the inquiry. We must also determine
whether there is a fiduciary obligation
created by the 1960 Act or merely a "bare
trust." Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 224. If
there is no fiduciary obligation, then there
is no claim for money damages for the
alleged breach of that obligation.
In Mitchell I, the Supreme Court held that
federal statutes and regulations that create
only a "limited trust relationship" between
the United States and Native American
tribes do not impose fiduciary obligations
that give rise to claims for money
damages. 445 U.S. at 542...
2 Inexplicably, at oral argument the government
reversed its position by arguing that a beneficial
interest in the property had not yet passed to the
Tribe. But for the reasons stated in the text, we
find that the 1960 Act creates a "trust."
In Mitchell II, the Supreme Court agreed
that the allottees had properly stated a
claim against the United States for breach
of trust, reasoning that:
In [Mitchell I], this Court recognized that
the General Allotment Act creates a trust
relationship between the United States
and Indian allottees but concluded that
the trust relationship was limited. . . . In
contrast to the bare trust created by the
General Allotment Act, the statutes and
regulations now before us clearly give the
Federal Government full responsibility to
manage Indian resources and land for the
benefit of the Indians. They thereby
establish a fiduciary relationship and
define the contours of the United States'
fiduciary responsibilities.
Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 224 (emphasis
added). In reaching this conclusion, the
Court first noted (with regard to the
timber management statutes) that
"virtually every stage of the process is
under federal control," and that "the
Department [of the Interior] exercises
comparable control over grants of rights-
of-way on Indian lands held in trust." Id.
at 222-23. The Court further observed
that "the language of these statutory and
regulatory provisions directly supports the
existence of a fiduciary relationship." Id.
at 224.
On this appeal, the government urges that
the Mitchell cases, read together, impose a
fiduciary obligation only when the
pertinent statute or other authorizing
document creating the trust relationship
also directs the United States to manage
the trust corpus for the benefit of the
beneficiaries, i.e., the Native Americans. It
is undisputed that the 1960 Act contains
no such requirement, and the government
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accordingly argues that the statute cannot
serve as a basis for the imposition of
fiduciary obligations on the United States.
We do not agree.
To be sure, Mitchell II, which found a
fiduciary obligation, involved a situation
where the government not only controlled
the trust corpus, but also had an
obligation to manage it for the benefit of
the Indians. But the language of Mitchell
II makes quite clear that control alone is
sufficient to create a fiduciary relationship.
In the present case, the 1960 Act
authorizes the government to use the
Tribe's trust property for governmental
purposes. Pub. L. No. 86-392, 74 Stat. 8
(1960) (creating trust "subject to the right
of the Secretary of the Interior to use any
part of the land and improvements for
administrative or school purposes . . ).
We think that, to the extent that the
government has actively used any part of
the Tribe's trust property, and has done so
in a manner where its control over the
buildings it occupies is essentially
exclusive, the portions of the property
that have been so used can no longer be
classified as being held in merely a "bare
trust" under Mitchell I. Rather, the
government's decision to use such trust
property for its own purposes carries a
responsibility to act as a fiduciary.
Although neither the 1960 Act nor any
pertinent regulation sets forth clear
guidelines as to how the government must
manage the trust property, we think it is
reasonable to infer that the government's
use of any part of the property requires
the government to act in accordance with
the duties of a common law trustee...
To the extent that the federal government
has, indeed, used buildings to the
exclusion of the Tribe, we think the
federal government does owe a fiduciary
duty. Where such use and control was
absent, the government owes no such
duty. On remand the Court of Federal
Claims must determine which portions of
the trust property were under exclusive
United States control and thus the subject
of a fiduciary obligation.'
V
We must next determine whether the
complaint here states a claim enforceable
in a present suit for money damages with
respect to the property controlled by the
United States. It is undisputed that the
1960 Act does not explicitly define the
government's obligations. Once we have
determined that a fiduciary obligation
exists by virtue of the governing statute or
regulations, it is well established that we
then look to the common law of trusts,
particularly as reflected in the Restatement
(Second) of Trusts, for assistance in
defining the nature of that obligation...
Under the common law of trusts, it is
indisputable that a trustee has an
affirmative duty to act reasonably to
preserve the trust property. As the
Restatement makes clear, "the trustee is
under a duty to the beneficiary to use
reasonable care and skill to preserve the
trust property." Restatement (Second) of
Trusts 5 176 (1959). Comment (b) to this
provision makes clear that this obligation
extends to the protection of the trust
property from loss or damage: "It is the
duty of the trustee to use reasonable care
I If any of the buildings was constructed after the
creation of the trust in 1960, the government's
obligation with respect to those buildings may be
quite different.
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to protect the trust property from loss or
damage."
While we look to the law of trusts for the
general principles that govern the
obligations of the United States as trustee,
in each case we must also examine the
particular statute, treaty, "or other
fundamental document," Mitchell II, 463
U.S. at 225, that creates the trust
relationship in order to determine the
nature of that relationship and whether
the general law of trusts has been altered
in any particular way, either by the
imposition of additional obligations or by
the modification of existing obligations.
Here, we believe that the 1960 Act
establishes several important principles.
First, the right of the United States to use
the trust property is expressly limited to
use for "administrative or school
purposes." Pub. L. No. 86-392, 74 Stat. 8
(1960)...
Second, the reasonableness of the
government's actions are to be measured
by the potential loss of economic value to
the Tribe unless the Tribe can establish
that the United States, when it passed the
1960 Act, undertook an obligation to
maintai the property for other
purposes...
Third, the obligation of the United States
to maintain the property for eventual
transfer to the Tribe must be defined in
light of the anticipated duration of the
United States' use of the trust property at
the time the 1960 Act was passed; the
possible need of the United States to
modify or demolish existing structures in
order to make use of the property during
the period of United States occupancy,
and the economic value of the property at
the time of the alleged breach...
Finally, in addition to an obligation to
maintain and repair the property, the
United States may be obligated to restore
the property upon transfer to the Tribe if
the United States has violated its
maintenance obligations during the term
of the trust or if it has (properly) modified
the property to suit its own needs during
the term of the trust...
-r '-
VII
We conclude that the 1960 Act creates an
enforceable fiduciary relationship between
the United States and the Tribe, the
breach of which may give rise to a
cognizable claim for money damages. On
remand, however, the Court of Federal
Claims may determine that the suit is
premature as to buildings that the United
States continues to use for administrative
or school purposes. See note 15, supra.
On remand, the Court of Federal Claims
must further determine which portions of
the property were under United States
control. Even as to the property that was
so controlled, we recognize that the
existence of this "general fiduciary
relationship does not mean that any and
every claim . .. necessarily states a proper
claim for breach of the trust a claim
which must be fully tried" in the Court of
Federal Claims. Pawnee v. United States,
830 F.2d 187, 191 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1032, 100 L. Ed. 2d 602,
108 S. Ct. 2014 (1988). The merits of the
Tribe's claim will be accordingly
determined on remand in the light of this
decision.
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MAYER, Chief Judge, dissenting:
In this case, the 1960 Act, which created
the trust, reserved to the government the
right to use any part of the land and
improvements for administrative or
school purposes for as long as they are
needed for those purposes. This provision
limits the government's obligation to the
Tribe and creates a bare trust relationship
similar to the General Allotment Act
considered in Mitchell I...
The government argued that the Tribe's
future interest was contingent and that the
common law of property as reflected in
sections 188, 189, and 195 of the
Restatement (First) of the Law of
Property bars the Tribe's claim for
monetary damages. The court does not
disagree that money damages would be
barred if the Tribe's future interest were
contingent; it merely asserts that it is not.
Therein lies the error. As the court said,
Section 188 provides: "When a present
estate for life precedes a future interest in
fee simple which is subject to a condition
precedent, or which is vested but
defeasible either in whole or in part upon
an event the occurrence of which is not
improbable, then the owner of such future
interest, in a judicial proceeding brought
solely in his behalf, cannot recover
damages immediately payable to himself
for any act or omission of the owner of
the estate for life." Restatement (First) of
Law of Property 5 188 (1936).
White Mountain Apache Tribe, ante at 24
n.14. The court goes on to note that there
must be an uncertainty as to the future
interest for this rule to apply, and makes
the conclusory statement that there is "no
'uncertainty as to the future interest' of the
Tribe in the trust property." Id. Contrary
to this assertion, there is a condition
precedent to the vesting of the Tribe's
future interest, namely that the
government no longer needs to use the
property for school or administrative
purposes. Until the Secretary of the
Interior determines that the property is no
longer needed for school or administrative
purposes, the condition precedent will not
occur, and the Tribe's interest will not
vest. Because there is nothing in the 1960
Act that prevents the government from
continuing to use the property for school
or administrative purposes indefinitely,
there is no guarantee that the condition
precedent will ever be met and the Tribe's
future interest will ever vest. This
precludes its claim for money damages
and is an independent ground on which to
affirm the judgment of the Court of
Federal Claims.
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Ruling Below: (Navajo Nation v. United States, Fed. Cir., 263 F.3d 1325; 2001 U.S.
App. Lexis 18190, 150 Oil & Gas Rep. 28, 32 ELR 20028)
The court held that it could not be reasonably disputed that the United States breached its
fiduciary duties to the tribe, since the United States' actions were clearly in the mining
company's interest and contrary to the tribe's interest. Further, by statute the United States
was granted the pervasive authorization, supervision, and control of the tribe's mineral
leasing activities, and the United States thus had an obligation to maximize the benefit to the
tribe. Therefore, a trust relationship existed between the United States and the tribe, and
monetary damages were available for the United States' breach of trust.
Question Presented: Whether the United States had a fiduciary duty under a 1960 Act of
Congress, Pub. L. No. 86-392, 74 Stat. 8 (1960) to maintain or restore certain property held
by the United States in trust for the Navajo Nation, and whether the United States breached
that fiduciary duty by urging the tribe to renegotiate the lease of tribal lands to a coal mining
company, resulting in a low royalty rate, when a higher rate had already been upheld by the
government?
NAVAJO NATION, Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals
For the Federal Circuit
Decided August 10, 2001.
NEWMAN, Circuit Judge.
The Navajo Nation appeals the decision
of the United States Court of Federal
Claims, dismissing its complaint against
the United States for breach of trust and
breach of contract. The court ruled that
although the United States had breached
its fiduciary obligations to the Navajo
Nation, this breach was not actionable
because the United States did not have a
trust relationship with the Navajo Nation
and monetary relief was not available.
However, a trust relationship indeed
existed and exists with the Navajo Nation,
and monetary damages are an available
remedy for breach of this trust.
BACKGROUND
The United States, through the Secretary
of the Interior and the Interior
Department's Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA), supervises and regulates the
development and sale of mineral resources
on Indian reservation lands, pursuant to
the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938,
25 U.S.C. 5 396 et sai., the Indian Mineral
Development Act of 1982, 25 U.S.C. 55
2101-2108, and implementing regulations.
In 1964 the Navajo Nation entered into a
lease agreement with the Sentry Royalty
Company (predecessor in interest to the
Peabody Coal Company) for the mining
of coal deposits on Navajo lands. The
agreement provided for payment of a
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royalty not to exceed 37.5 cents per ton,
and authorized the Secretary of the
Interior or his delegate to readjust the
royalty rate to a "reasonable" level on the
twentieth anniversary of the lease. As that
anniversary approached, due to increases
in the market price of coal the rate of 37.5
cents per ton was equivalent to about 2%
of gross proceeds. It is not disputed that
this was well below then-prevailing royalty
rates.
Negotiations proceeded between the
Navajo and Peabody. No agreement was
reached, and the Navajo asked the
Department of the Interior to resolve the
issue, in accordance with statute, and to
set the royalty at a fair market rate. The
BIA Area Real Property Management
Officer issued an Initial Decision to
increase the royalty rate to 20%, based on
an analysis by the Bureau of Mines. The
BIA's Navajo Area Director adopted this
decision, and so notified Peabody.
Peabody appealed to the Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Indian Affairs John Fritz,
acting as both Commissioner of Indian
Affairs and the Assistant ecretary for
Indian Affairs, an appellate path provided
by the regulations. See 25 C.F.R. 55 2, 3.
The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Indian
Affairs considered the matter and reached
a decision affirming the 20% rate.
However, this decision was withdrawn at
the instruction of the Secretary of the
Interior. The Appendix to the decision of
the Court of Federal Claims contains a
memorandum from Secretary Hodel to
John Fritz, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Indian Affairs, stating "I suggest that you
inform the involved parties that a decision
on this appeal is not imminent and urge
them to continue with efforts to resolve
this matter in a mutually agreeable
fashion." 46 Fed. Cl. at 237 Mr. Fritz
complied with this instruction.
The record before the Court of Federal
Claims reports numerous contacts during
this period, on behalf of Peabody, with
Interior officials including the Secretary.
The Navajo were not told that a decision
on Peabody's appeal had been made in
their favor. Facing severe economic
pressures, the Navajo eventually agreed to
a royalty rate of 12.5%.
It can not be reasonably disputed that the
Secretary's actions were in Peabody's
interest and contrary to the Navajo's
interest. The Court of Federal Claims
found that the government's actions
"violated the most fundamental fiduciary
duties of care, loyalty and candor." 46
Fed. Cl. at 227. However, the court also
held that there was no trust relationship
between the agency and the Navajo with
respect to these events, and thus that no
monetary relief was available.
DISCUSSION
The Fiduciary Relationship
The fiduciary relationship between the
United States and the Indian tribes is
manifested in various ways. For example,
with respect to Indian reservation lands,
precedent recognizes a distinction
between the laws whereby the United
States has only a limited trust relationship
with the Indian tribes who occupy the
land, and the laws giving rise to a full
fiduciary duty toward the Indians. The
difference lies in the level of control the
United States exercises in its management
of the land and its resources for the
benefit of the Indians. When the United
States controls the Indian resources, the
duty is that of a fiduciary, when the
Indians control their own resources, the
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duty of the United States is lessened
appropriately.
The Indian Mineral Leasing Act and its
regulations are similar to those governing
timber resources that were the subject of
Mitchell II, insofar as federal authority is
retained. The Mineral Leasing Act starts
with the provision that no mining lease
may be entered unless approved by the
Secretary of the Interior.
The statute and its implementing
regulations give the Secretary the final
authority on all matters of any significance
in the leasing of Indian lands for mineral
development. The statute assigns to the
Secretary the broad and unqualified
obligation to "protect[] the interests of the
Indians," and includes the power to
"perform any and all acts and to make
such rules and regulations not inconsistent
with this section as may be necessary and
proper for the protection of the interests
of the Indians and for the purpose of
carrying the provisions of this section into
full force and effect." 25 U.S.C. 5 399.
Thus the statute explicitly requires that the
Secretary must act in the best interests of
the Indian tribes.
The statutory purpose is to protect the
natural resources of the Indians and
manage them in a manner that maximizes
their benefit to the Indians. The Court has
consistently resolved ambiguity in favor of
the Indian tribes.
In addition to violation of common law
fiduciary duties, the Secretary also violated
statutory fiduciary duties, in acting to
benefit Peabody to the detriment of the
Navajo. By suppressing the royalty
decision of Interior's Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Indian Affairs the Secretary
acted in direct contravention of the Act's
charge to the Secretary to obtain for the
Indians the maximum return for their
minerals. In failing to act in the best
interests of the Navajo, the government
violated its fiduciary responsibilities.
Although the government argued, at the
hearing of this appeal, that the Secretary's
actions were justified in that they reflected
a balance of national interests, it is
hornbook law that a trustee's competing
interests do not excuse a breach of
fiduciary duty.
SCHALL, Circuit Judge,
part and dissenting-in-part:
concurring-in-
I agree with the majority that IMLA and
the regulations at 25 C.F.R. part 211
create a scheme under which the
government plays a major role in mineral
leasing on Indian land and that, therefore,
there exists a general fiduciary relationship
between the Nation and the government
regarding coal leases, such as the 1964
Lease at issue here.
It is at this point, however, that I part
company with the majority. A court first
must decide whether a general fiduciary
relationship exists in a particular area
between Indians and the government.
Then, it must determine whether, in the
context of that relationship, the
government has breached any specific
fiduciary responsibilities. It makes this
determination by considering the
government conduct at issue in light of
the requirements of the statutes and
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regulations that create the general
fiduciary relationship in the first place...
In this case, the majority properly
undertakes the first step of the analysis
but not the second. After concluding that
a general fiduciary relationship exists
between the government and Indians with
respect to the mining of coal on Indian
lands, the majority, focusing exclusively
on Secretary Hodel's actions relating to
BIA's royalty decision, fails to properly
conduct the required second step of the
analysis. I believe the majority ems in two
respects: first, it fails to find a breach of a
specific fiduciary responsibility that falls
within the scope of the statutes and
regulations that establish the general
fiduciary relationship; second, it only
considers one aspect (Secretary Hodel's
actions relating to BIA's royalty decision)
of the overall government conduct that is
at issue.
IV.
In my view, the only government action in
this case that implicated a specific
fiduciary responsibility to the Nation was
DOI's approval of the Agreement. The
Nation and Peabody submitted the
Agreement to DOI for review. DOI
indicated, in an internal report, that it was
reviewing the Agreement pursuant to
DOI's powers of lease approval under 25
U.S.C 5 396a and the regulations under
25 CF.R part 211, sources of law that
establish a fiduciary relationship between
the Nation and the government.
Thereafter, when DOI approved the
Agreement, it invoked its approval powers
under 25 U.S.C § 396a and 25 CF.R. 5
211.2, both of which subject the leasing of
mineral rights on Indian land to DOI
approval. The government's obligation
under 25 U.S.C. 5 396a and 25 CF.R. 5
211.2 is to either approve, or disapprove,
a lease, or lease amendment, and since this
obligation falls within "the contours of the
United States' fiduciary responsibilities,"
Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 224, the
government must make its approval
decision with the reasonable care and skill
demanded of a trustee, White Mountain
Apache Tribe, 249 F.3d at 1378-79. It is
undisputed that, when deciding whether
to approve the amendment of the 1964
Lease, DOI failed to perform any
economic analysis regarding the lease
amendments. In my view, this failure
constituted a breach of a fiduciary
obligation owed to the Nation... I do not
believe, however, that any of the other
breaches that are alleged by the Nation
implicate a fiduciary obligation on the part
of the government so as to give rise to a
claim for monetary damages against the
United States.
Initially, the Nation alleges general
violations of the common trust
obligations of care, candor, and loyalty. In
making this allegation, the Nation points
to the ex parte communications between
Secretary Hodel and Peabody and DOI's
failure to secure a 20% royalty rate. While
these duties, based on the common law of
trust, are relevant to determining the
government's obligations, White
Mountain Apache Tribe, 249 F.3d at
1377-78, the scope and extent to which
these obligations apply to governmental
action is governed by the statutes and
regulations that create the fiduciary
relationship, id. at 1380. See also Mitchell
II, 463 U.S. at 224; Brown, 86 F.3d at
1563. The Nation must explain how
DOI's actions, which may demonstrate
disloyalty to the Nation in a vacuum, fall
within the boundaries of a specific
fiduciary obligation. That it has not done.
The Nation also alleges violations based
on internal agency policy, expressed in
BIA Manuals, 54 BIAM § 604.5 for
example, and DOI manuals, 130 DM 10.5
for example. Neither of these manuals, or
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general agency policy, can support a claim
for monetary damages because a
substantive right to monetary relief must
be found "in some .. . source of law, such
as 'the Constitution, or any Act of
Congress, or any regulation of an
executive department. "' Mitchell II, 463
U.S. at 216 (citing 28 U.S.C. 5 1491). The
Nation fails to show how these manuals
"can be fairly interpreted to create a
substantive right to monetary
compensation from the United States,"
Hamlet v. United States, 63 F.3d 1097,
1102 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
I would remand the case to the Court of
Federal Claims for the limited purpose of
determining what damages, if any, the
Nation suffered as the results [of the
DOI's failure to perform an economic
analysis on the Agreement between
Peabody and the Nation]. Otherwise, I
would, in all respects, affirm the decision
of the Court of Federal Claims.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully
concur-in-part and dissent-in-part.
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Supreme Court Agrees to Consider Damage Awards to Navajo Nation
Associated Parss
June 3, 2002
The Supreme Court agreed Monday to
consider the government's case in a $600
million contract disagreement with the
Navajo Nation.
Justices will decide if an appeals court
wrongly opened the government to
liability from the Navajo Nation -- and
potentially many other tribal governments
in future cases.
At issue is whether a federal agency failed
to protect the tribe's interest in mining
leases on reservation land and must pay
for it.
The Navajo claim that former Interior
Secretary Donald Hodel secretly
conspired with Peabody Coal Co. to
undermine tribal contract negotiations
with the company in the 1980s. The tribe
leases mining rights to Peabody for two
strip mines -- the Black Mesa Mine and
the Kayenta Mine -- in northeastern
Arizona.
"Any Indian tribe that believes, with the
benefit of hindsight, that it could have
negotiated a better mineral lease deal may
seek to obtain damages," Solicitor General
Theodore Olson told justices in court
papers. "At a minimum, such a
development will subject the United States
to costly litigation over such matters."
Paul E. Frye, attorney for the tribe, said
the government instead of protecting
Indians from unfair transactions as the
law requires actively worked to hurt the
tribe.
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
ordered a lower court to award damages.
The Navajo are seeking $600 million.
The Supreme Court will consider the case
along with another tribal case in the term
that begins in the fall. The court
announced in April that it would decide if
the government can be sued for allowing
buildings on Indian land to fall into
disrepair.
The cases are United States v. Navajo
Nation, 01-1375, and United States v.
White Mountain Apache Tribe, 01- 1067.
Copyright 0 2002 The Associated Press
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Court to Rule on Indian Buildings' Repair
The Seattle Times
April 23, 2002
The Associated Press
The Supreme Court said yesterday it
would decide if the government can be
sued for allowing buildings on Indian land
to fall into disrepair.
The decision could be far-reaching,
because the United States has millions of
acres in trust for Indian tribes. Justices will
review a case involving the White
Mountain Apache Tribe, which wants the
government to spend $14 million
repairing buildings at Fort Apache in
Arizona.
The Bush administration argues that the
government never promised to keep up
the buildings.
Fort Apache was built by the Army in
1870. Since 1960, the Interior Department
has controlled the land, which includes a
school and more than 30 other buildings.
Some of the buildings have been
condemned.
The United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit said the government
could be sued for breach of trust under
the 1960 law that put the land under the
Interior Department.
Solicitor General Theodore Olson told
the Supreme Court that the government's
protection from "money damages is a
matter of bedrock importance."
"The broad reasoning of the court of
appeals could subject the United States to
large money-damages claims in Indian
breach-of-trust litigation," Olson wrote in
the government filing.
The case is United States v. White
Mountain Apache Tribe, 01-1067.
Copyright @ 2002 The Seattle Times
Company
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Bush Wants Navajo Ruling Reversed
truthout
March 27, 2002
The Bush administration has asked the
Supreme Court to overturn a landmark
$600 million trust fund claim won by the
Navajo Nation for fear other tribes will
file similar challenges.
Charging that "significant" resources are
at stake, the Department of Justice this
month called on the nation's highest court
to throw out an August 2001 ruling made
in the tribe's favor. Unless the lower
decision is reversed, the Bush
administration says the government could
face "adverse consequences."
"The decision below will encourage the
filing of damages claims against the
United States for breach of trust,"
Solicitor General Ted Olson writes in his
March 15 brief. "At a minimum, such a
development will subject the United States
to costly litigation."
At issue are Navajo tribal leases with
Peabody Coal, which has mined Navajo
and Hopi lands since the 1960s. All sides
in the dispute, including the Department
of Interior, agree a 12.5 percent royalty
rate contained in the agreements is far
below accepted market value for the coal.
But the Bush administration disputes the
notion that it has a trust responsibility to
ensure better returns. The Navajo Nation
cannot point to any specific law which
imposes such a higher duty, Olson claims.
In arguing the case in the lower courts,
the tribe has countered that underhanded
dealings of the Reagan administration
show the government has violated its
obligations. Specifically, the tribe points
out then-Secretary Paul Hodel in 1985
held secret meetings with a Peabody
lobbyist, Stanley Hulett, who happened to
be a personal friend.
Without knowledge of the discussions, the
tribe was subsequently encouraged to
work with the company to come to a
resolution. Additionally, it was never
disclosed that the Bureau of Indian Affairs
approved more favorable 37.5 percent
rate after a standard internal appeals
process.
As a result of the "suppressing and
concealing" by government officials, the
tribe was forced to accept the lower rate
"facing economic pressure," wrote the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1
decision. The appeals panel said a lower
court must determine exactly how much
the tribe is owed.
A dissenting voice, however, said the tribe
could only be awarded limited damages.
Unlike Olson, all three judges agreed a
trust relationship existed but U.S. District
Judge Lawrence M. Baskir said it doesn't
"mandate monetary relief."
Coupled with a case involving the White
Mountain Apache Tribe, the request for
the Supreme Court's intervention
represents the Bush administration's
attempt clarify what it considers the
federal circuit's departure from trust law.
The appeals court has issued decisions
which could force payouts in addition to
the Cobell class action affecting individual
Indians.
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For the Navajo Nation, the case has
represented victory after nearly a decade
of litigation, including an initial negative
decision by a federal judge. With the
presence of former Reagan appointees,
including Ross Swimmer and Deputy
Secretary J. Steven Griles, in the current
administration, the dispute has gained
added fire among tribal officials who have
vehemently opposed Secretary Gale
Norton's proposal to reorganize Indian
trust duties.
The Navajo Nation's attorney will be
filing a response, due April 18, to the
government's petition for writ of
certioran.
[truthout is an alternative online
newsletter and website, available at
http://www.truthout.org.]
Copyright @ 2002 truthout
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Navajo Lawsuits Contend U.S. Government Failed the Tribe in Mining Royalty
Deals
The New York Times
July 18, 1999
Barry Meier
John W. Fritz, an Interior Department
official during the Reagan Administration,
has long wondered why his decision to
sharply increase the coal mining fees paid
to the Navajo Indians was blocked.
He may now have his answer. On the eve
of his 1985 ruling, the Peabody Coal
Company started a high-stakes lobbying
effort aimed at his boss, Donald P. Hodel,
then Secretary of the Interior, papers
recently filed in a Federal court in
Washington show. Company lawyers even
drafted a memo, issued by Mr. Hodel, that
told Mr. Fritz to withhold his ruling, those
records indicate. "All of sudden I got this
thing flat out of the blue," said Mr. Fritz,
who now works in Wazata, Minn., as a
consultant to Indian tribes. "It was the
first time we had ever been specifically
instructed not to go ahead with the
decision- making process."
Mr. Fritz's stillborn decision is at the heart
of two legal actions brought by the
Navajos, including a civil lawsuit disclosed
last month against Peabody Group, the
parent of Peabody Coal, and others. That
action claims that Peabody Coal and two
utilities unfairly influenced Federal
officials to derail Mr. Fritz's report, a
decision the tribe says cost it $600 million
in lost mining royalties.
Businesses and interest groups lobby
Federal officials all the time and the
Government, the Peabody Group and the
two utilities, the Southern California
Edison Company and the Salt River
Project, said they did nothing wrong.
For his part, Mr. Hodel, now an energy
consultant in Longmont, Colo., said he
did not recall the Navajo coal episode but
that he had always acted in the best
interest of the tribes.
The Navajo lawsuit, like several other
actions brought by tribes in recent years,
accuses the Interior Department and the
Bureau of Indian Affairs of failing to
fulfill their mandate to act as trustees to
get tribes the best possible return on
valuable assets like natural resources and
land leases. In 1993, the Navajos sued the
Government in the United States Court of
Federal Claims in Washington, claiming
that it had breached that trust in dealing
with the same lease at issue in the
Peabody Coal case.
Typically, the Government's role is limited
to approving leases negotiated between
tribes and mining companies. In the case
of the Navajos' Peabody Coal lease,
however, a provision in the original 1964
contract allowed the Government to
adjust the royalty rate after 20 years.
Whether the Government or the
companies named in the latest lawsuit owe
the Navajos anything remains to be
decided. But documents disclosed as part
of the suit against the Government and
Peabody Coal offer a picture of corporate
efforts to sway Interior Department
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officials, whose principal duty is supposed
to be Indian welfare, not company profits.
On Friday, lawyers for the Peabody
Group filed a motion in the Court of
Federal Claims accusing the Navajos of
improperly disclosing company
documents as part of the tribe's lawsuit
against the coal producer. The lawyers
asked the court for sanctions against the
tribe and its lawyers and to dismiss the
Navajo claim against the company. Steven
J. Bloxham, assistant attorney general for
the Navajo Department of Justice, said he
had not had the opportunity to review the
Peabody filing and so could not comment
on it.
Robert A Williams, a law professor at the
University of Arizona in Tucson, said
lawsuits like the one brought by the
Navajos against Peabody Coal reflect a
belief by tribes that the Government
allowed companies to harvest their natural
resources at rock-bottom rates.
"Indian tribes have their lawyers looking
at decades of mismanagement, and there
is a gold mine in Government
accountability," Mr. Williams said.
In perhaps the most sweeping case, a
Federal judge in Washington ruled, last
month that a class-action lawsuit brought
on behalf of 300,000 Indians nationwide
could go forward against the Interior
Department. That lawsuit charges that the
Government failed to properly manage
trust accounts for decades containing
billions of dollars due those individuals
from land lease payments and natural
resource royalties.
Robert A Porter, a law professor at the
University of Kansas in Lawrence, said
the Indian suits have had a mixed record
of success.
Since 1964, Peabody Coal has operated
the Black Mesa and Kayenta mines on
Navajo and Hopi lands in northeastern
Arizona. Peabody Group, the nation's
largest coal mining company, is owned by
Lehman Merchant Banking Partners II
Fund and operates 35 coal mines
worldwide. The Hopi tribe had a separate
lease and is not involved in the lawsuit.
Vic Svec, a spokesman for Peabody
Group, said the mining company had
dealt fairly with the Navajo tribe, paying it
standard fees. Mr. Svec added that the
company did nothing wrong when it
presented its case to Mr. Hodel.
"We believe it is the fundamental right of
every person and organization to petition
their Government and that is what we
were doing," Mr. Svec said.
One 1985 document written by a Peabody
Coal lawyer reveals executives' concerns
that their efforts to lobby Mr. Hodel while
the royalty issue was under review might
run afoul of complex Government rules
that limit undisclosed contacts between
Federal officials and parties to a dispute.
But the company, the document shows,
decided to forge ahead and hired Stanley
W. Hulett, a former Interior Department
official and a longtime friend of Mr.
Hodel's, to lobby the Secretary.
That memo also indicates that two
company lawyers "drafted in large part"
the directive sent by Mr. Hodel to Mr.
Fritz instructing him to withhold his
decision so that Peabody Coal and the
Navajos could negotiate a new deal.
"I have been informed that that memo
was delivered to Mr. Fritz's office," a
company lawyer, Edward L. Sullivan,
stated in the document.
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Mr. Fritz's ruling would have been the
Government's position on the royalty
issue, though the companies could have
challenged it in court. It would have
upheld an earlier Bureau of Indian Affairs
finding that the Navajos should receive a
20 percent royalty on coal profits. Instead,
the tribe negotiated a 12.5 percent fee
with the mining company in 1987.
In their suit, the Navajos contend that
they did not know why Mr. Fritz's
decision was never issued, and argue that
they would have received more money if
it had been. The $600 million they are
seeking from the Government and the
corporate defendants represents the
difference between a 20 percent royalty
rate from mining operations since 1984
and the 12.5 percent rate they collected.
"The Navajo Nation knew nothing about
what was going on on the other side of
the table," said Kelsey A. Begaye,
president of the Navajo Nation.
Mr. Hulett, the lobbyist, said neither he
nor Peabody Coal did anything wrong.
"What they wanted to do was negotiate a
deal with the tribe without the
interference of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs or Washington," said Mr. Hulett,
now an energy consultant in San
Francisco.
He added that Mr. Fritz, who was then
the Interior Department's deputy assistant
secretary for Indian affairs, had to know
that the coal company was lobbying Mr.
Hodel because he had told him.
Mr. Fritz said that while he might have
known about Mr. Hulett's efforts, he had
no idea that the company had a hand in
Mr. Hodel's directive. "For years,
everyone was denying that they had
anything to do with it," he said.
The roots of the Navajo royalty dispute
stretch back to at least 1984 when the
Navajos and Peabody Coal were
renegotiating the 1964 lease. Under that
agreement, the Navajos, who derive about
25 percent of their income from coal,
received a fee of 20 cents to 37.5 cents a
ton, an amount that equaled a 2 percent
royalty over the life of the term, according
to court papers.
That was far lower than the 12.5 percent
fee that the Government had established
in the mid-1970's as the minimum royalty
for mining on both Federal and Indian
lands. In the early 1980's, court papers
indicate, the Navajos and Peabody Coal
tried to strike a new deal, but the talks
broke down.
In 1984, an Interior Department official
reported that the delay was costing the
Navajos, one of the nation's largest and
poorest tribes, $50,000 daily in lost
royalties. Based on a Bureau of Mines
report, a regional director for the Bureau
of Indian Affairs concluded that same
year that Peabody Coal could pay a 20
percent royalty to the Navajos and still
turn a sizable profit.
The mining company and the two utilities
that use its coal to generate power,
Southern California Edison and the Salt
River Project, appealed the finding, saying
that a 20 percent fee would make mining
unprofitable and sharply increase
electricity costs to consumers in Los
Angeles, Las Vegas, Nev., and Phoenix.
In a letter, Mr. Fritz urged Peabody Coal
to submit financial data supporting its
position, and a copy of the letter soon
made its way to Southern California
Edison.
"Perhaps I misjudge the tone of the
letter," an outside lawyer for Southern
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California Edison wrote to the utility in
1985, "but I think that the traih is coming
down the track and the department is
preparing to support the decision of the
area director."
By July 1985, Mr. Fritz's office had
prepared draft documents upholding the
20 percent ruling, court papers show. "I
was frankly just waiting for odds and
ends," Mr. Fritz said.
Both the companies and the Navajos were
aware that Mr. Fritz's ruling was imminent
and would favor the tribe, court
documents indicate. But by then, the
mining company had also begun to lobby
Mr. Hodel, urging that the royalties be
negotiated by the company and the tribe.
Mr. Hulett met privately with the Interior
Secretary, who soon signed the memo
apparently drafted by the coal company
lawyers. It instructed Mr. Fritz "not to
make an untimely decision" so the
Navajos and the Peabody Coal would
negotiate, documents show.
Navajo lawyers say that while they take
exception to Mr. Hodel's actions, they
have found nothing to suggest that he
benefited personally.
"I was acutely aware of the trust
responsibility that I had," Mr. Hodel, who
until recently headed the Christian
Coalition, said in an interview.
Mr. Fritz, who reported to Mr. Hodel,
said the memo effectively put the matter
into his boss's hands, and that is where it
stayed. The Navajos said that they were
unaware that Mr. Fritz's decision had been
put on hold.
The Interior Department would maintain
that position for two years, though court
papers indicate that Navajo officials were
told in 1985 that Mr. Hodel wanted them
to negotiate a deal with Peabody Coal.
They finally did so in 1987.
Mr. Begaye said the Navajos accepted the
deal because they were losing millions of
dollars since they were still collecting a 2
percent royalty. Mr. Svec, the Peabody
Group spokesman, said the new deal for
12.5 percent, which was retroactive to
1984, was consistent with the industry
standard and that the tribe agreed to the
same rate in negotiations last year. He also
said that the tribe in the mid-1980's had
plenty of advocates to press its case with
Federal officials.
"If anyone was the outsider in this case,"
he said, "it was us."
Others may not be so sure. At a May
hearing in the Government case, the
presiding Federal judge, Lawrence M.
Baskir, said he was disturbed by the
undisclosed 1985 meeting between Mr.
Hulett and Mr. Hodel and its potential to
"infect" the Secretary's "fiduciary
decision."
A Justice Department lawyer, R Anthony
Rodgers, said at that hearing that the
meeting and the memo that followed may
have meant little for the eventual outcome
of the royalty issue. Mr. Hodel might have
made the same decision without Mr.
Hulett's lobbying, the lawyer said. But Mr.
Rodgers also indicated that he would have
preferred that the meeting never occurred.
"It is not a practice that should be
encouraged," he said.
Copyright @ 1999 The New York Times
Company
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Fort Apache History
White Mountain Apache Tribe
In 1869 Bnrzet Gil. John Gren marched
from Fort Thomas with a small
expeditionary force. He was given
authority to destroy village crops, food
stock and people. He burned more than
100 acres of corn. Yet the White
Mountain Apache remained friendly. This
is not what he expected. Instead of
hostility, Green found a peaceful tribe
living on their ancestral lands. Because of
the abundance of timber, water game and
farm land, Green recommended a fort be
built at the confluence of the North and
East fodks of the hiteier
Col. John Green recommended the
reservation incorporate lands occupied by
the White Mountain Apache, and Carrizo
bands and also, incorporate a four
company army post to protect peaceful
Apaches from involvement with hostile
bands and the invasion of the white men
looking for mineral deposits, timbers and
arable land.
1870-1886 Apache War
On May 16, 1870 an army post was
established by the 1st Cavalry near the
present town of Whiteriver. The post was
named Camp Ord. August 1, 1870 the
name was changed to Camp Mogollon,
then to Camp Thomas.
In 1871, L t Gd Geoe Croxk was assigned
to command the Department of Arizona.
On February 2, 1871, the name changed
again, to Camp Apache. Captain John G.
Bourke arrived at Camp Apache with Lt.
Col. George Crook. It was not until April
5, 1879 the post became FortApad
In the summer of 1871, Crook enlisted 44
White Mountain and Cibecue Apaches in
the army and organized the Indian Scout In
1872 Quarters were pnimitive, consisting
of rows of log "squad" huts and tents.
* * X
1872-1873 Crx's Tanto Basin Czrpaign
In 1873 Crook promoted a Brigadier
General for his successful campaign.
On February 1, 1877 FortApacheMditary
Resenation was established by executive
order. The original Apache reservation
extended roughly from the Gila River to
the Mogollon Rim, from Cherry Creek to
the New Mexico border.
Geronimo's Return
January 1880 Geroimn returns to San
Carlos. In 1881, Indian Agent John Clum
initiated the relocation of all Western
Apache to the San Carlos Agency. Many
Tonto, White Mountain, Cibecue and
Chiricahua Apaches were forcibly moved
to San Carlos where they lived under
concentration camp conditions.
August 30 , 1881 Battle of Cilewue Military
authorities ordered the Cavalry to arrest a
medicine man named Noch-Ay-del-
Klinne whom white settlers had accused
of "stirring up unrest". In the Battle of
Cilaue that followed the arrest, the
medicine man, some of his followers and
eight troopers were killed. Seeking
retribution, mounted Apache warriors
attacked Fort Apache, but were driven
back. It was the only instance of the Fort
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being attacked. July 17, 1882 Battle ofBig
Dry Wash.
March 1884, Geronimo surrenders, is sent
to Turkey Creek near Fort Apache. On
May 17, 1885 - Geronimo, Naches,
Chihuahua, Nana, Mangus and about 40
warriors and 90 women and children bolt
from Fort Apache. On March 25, 1886
At Canon de los Embudos, General
Crook confers with Geronimo.
March 27, 1886 Gemvninv surenders. It is
said on March 28, 1886 Geronimo got
drunk and changed his mind about
surrendering.
On April 1, 1886 General Croxk is assigrni
Brigadier General Nelson A. Miles
replaces Crook. September 4, 1886
Geronimo surrenders to General Miles at
Skeleton Canyon. On September 8, 1886 -
Geronimo and his followers are shipped
by rail to Florida.
This is The End of the Apache War.
Talay zisitors rry strcil thrug fort Apad
uithe aid of a sdfgu"i tour or wthan
Apahe Tnal guide Oer twenty builangs
datingiftrn 1870 to the 1930's arnprise the 288
acre site L ocatal on the Fort punses are
A reent art faas, petroglyphs, the dld rilitary
aretery a nomatal Apadx zilla, and the
A pache Cultural Center and Museum
Available at:
http://uunanut nn us/unhistoryshtri
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01-1120 Meyer v. Holley
Ruling Below: (Holleyv. Crank, 9 th Cir. 258 F.3d 1127, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 17031, 2001
Cal. Daily Op. Service 6433, 2001 DailyJournal DAR 7915)
The court held that, as a matter of law, the president of a corporation could be held liable
for failure to ensure the corporation's compliance with the Fair Housing Act (FHA) when
one of the corporation's agents allegedly violates the FHA.
Question Presented: Whether owners and officers of corporations may be held vicariously
liable for an employee's violations of the Fair Housing Act?
Emma Mary Ellen HOLLEY; David Holley; Michael HOLLEY, a minor; Brooks
BAUER, individually and on behalf of the general public, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
V.
DAVID MEYER, individually and in his capacity as President and designated
officer/broker of Triad, Inc., et al., Defendant-Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals
For the Ninth Circuit
Decided July31, 2001
HUG, Circuit Judge:
In this case we must decide whether
owners and officers of corporations may
be held vicariously liable for an
employee's violations of the Fair Housing
Act (FHA). We conclude that they can.
Although under general principles of tort
law corporate shareholders and officers
usually are not held vicariously liable for
an employee's action, the criteria for the
Fair Housing Act is different as liability is
specified for those who direct or control
or have the right to direct or control the
conduct of another with respect to the
sale of or provision of brokerage services
to the sale of a dwelling. The decision of
the district court is reversed.
BACKGROUND
Emma Mary Ellen Holley is African
American, her husband David Holley, is
Caucasian and their son, Michael Holley is
African American. The Holleys allege that
in October 1996, they visited Triad
Realty's office in Twenty-Nine Palms,
California where they met with Triad
agent Grove Crank and inquired about
listings for new houses in the range of $
100,000 to $ 150,000. The Holleys allege
that Crank showed them four houses in
the area, all above $ 150,000. In mid-
November 1996, the Holleys located a
home on their own that happened to be
listed by Triad. In response to the Holleys'
inquiry about the home, Triad agent Terry
Stump informed them that the asking
price for the house was $ 145,000. The
Holleys expressed interest in purchasing
the home and offered to pay the asking
price and to put $ 5,000 in escrow for the
builder to hold the house until April or
May 1997 when they closed escrow on
their existing home.
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Stump told the Holleys that their offer
seemed fair, as did the builder, Brooks
Bauer, when Mrs. Holley called him with
the same offer. Bauer did express,
however, that the offer would have to go
through Triad. Later, Stump called Mrs.
Holley to tell her that more experienced
agents in the office, one of whom was
later identified as Grove Crank, felt that $
5,000 was insufficient to get the builder to
hold the house for six months. The
Holleys decided not to raise their offer
and Triad never presented the original
offer to Bauer. One week later, Bauer
inquired at Triad about the status of the
Holleys' offer. Crank then allegedly used
racial invectives in referring to the
Holleys, telling Bauer that he did not want
to deal with those "n -" and called
them a "salt and pepper team." The
Holleys eventually hired a builder to
construct a house for them and Bauer
later sold his house for approximately $
20,000 less than the Holleys had offered.
Bauer and the Holleys filed a complaint
on November 14, 1997, alleging that
Crank and Triad violated federal and state
fair housing laws. They later filed a
separate action against David Meyer as
officer/broker, president and owner of
Triad, covering the same allegations and
adding several new claims. The district
court consolidated the two cases. The
district judge, ruling on a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion,
dismissed all of the claims except the
FHA claim, on the grounds that they were
barred by the applicable statutes of
limitation. Plaintiffs have not appealed
this ruling. With regard to the FHA claim,
the district court granted the motion to
dismiss Meyer in his capacity as an officer
of Triad stating that any liability of Meyer
as an officer of Triad would attach to
Triad in that Plaintiffs have not urged
theories that would justify reaching Meyer
individually. Meyer than moved for
summary judgment on the remaining
FHA claim. The district court granted
Meyer summary judgment on that claim,
finding that, during the relevant time, the
real estate license was issued to Triad,
with Meyer as the designated corporate
officer of Triad. Thus, the district court
concluded that Crank's discriminatory acts
could be imputed to Triad, but not to
Meyer as an individual. The district court
entered a Rule 54(b) certification of that
judgment as final to allow this appeal, and
stayed all remaining proceedings against
Triad and Crank
ANALYSIS
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,
commonly known as the Fair Housing
Act of 1968 (FHA), broadly prohibits
discrimination in housing. 42 U.S.C. S
3601 et seq. An examination of the Act
reveals a "broad legislative plan to
eliminate all traces of discrimination
within the housing field." Marr v. Rife,
503 F.2d 735, 740 (6th Cir. 1974). The
FHA itself, however, does not limit or
define who can be sued for discriminatory
housing practices. The Department of
Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), the federal agency primarily
assigned to implement and administer
Title VIII, has developed regulations and
guidelines, which this Court affords
considerable deference, interpreting when
liability attaches under the FHA. See
Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1054 (9th
Cir. 1999). Historically, HUD's regulations
for administrative complaints have
provided, in relevant part:
A complaint may also be filed against any
person who directs or controls, or has the
right to direct or control, the conduct of
another person with respect to any aspect
of the sale . . . of dwellings or the
provision of brokerage services relating to
the sale[]of dwellings if that other person,
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acting within the scope of his or her
authority as employee or agent of the
directing or controlling person, is
engaged, has engaged, or is about to
engage, in a discriminatory housing
practice.
24 C.F.R § 103.20 (1999)' (emphasis
added).
The district court found that as a matter
of law Meyer could not be vicariously
liable based on his position as president
and officer/broker of Triad. We disagree 2
Considering the relevant HUD regulation
quoted above, Meyer bears potential
liability in his capacity as owner, president,
and officer/broker of the corporation [... ]
While we recognize that holding a
corporation and its officers responsible
even though the acts of subordinate
employees were neither directed nor
authorized seems harsh punishment of an
otherwise innocent employer, we agree
with our sister Circuits in finding that
preferable to leaving the burden on the
innocent victim who felt the direct harm
of the discrimination. See City of Chicago
v. Matchmaker Real Estate Sales Center,
Inc., 982 F.2d 1086, 1096-97 (7th Cir.
1992); Walker v. Crigler, 976 F.2d 900,
1 The current version of this regulation replaces
this language with an apparently more user-friendly
provision instructing that a person should notify
HUD for assistance in filing a claim if they believe
there has been discrimination against them in any
activity related to housing because of race, color,
religion, national origin, sex, disability, or the
presence of children under the age of 18 in a
household. 24 CF. R 5 103.10-20. Absent any
indication that HUD intended to narrow liability
under the new regulations, we find the previous
language instructive regarding the potential scope
of liability.
2 ur decision applies only to vicarious liability for
compensatory damages. We do not address
vicarious liability for punitive damages as the issue
is not before us.
904-905 (4th Cr. 1992). The overriding
societal priority of the FHA indicates that
the owner has the power to control the
acts of the agent and so must act to
compensate the injured party and to
ensure that similar harm will not occur
again. When one of two innocent people
must suffer, the one whose acts permitted
the wrong to occur is the one to bear the
burden. See Walker, 976 F.2d at 904.
Meyer's Liability as Sole Owner and
Officer of Triad
The duty to obey the laws relating to racial
discrimination under the FHA is non-
delegable. Phiffer, 648 F.2d at 552. In
Phiffer, this court concluded that the
owner of the Proud Parrot Motor Hotel
Corporation was liable for the
discriminatory conduct of his desk clerk
even absent any evidence that the clerk
acted under management's instruction. Id.
Although Phiffer involved an owner of a
motel rather than a real estate corporation,
the same rule is compelling here. Triad
was directly and immediately involved in
the sale of real estate involving the alleged
violation. As the real estate agency that
allegedly committed the unlawfully
discriminatory acts in providing brokerage
services for the sale of the property, Triad
is connected to the discrimination even
more directly than the hotel corporation
owner in Phiffer...
In so ruling, we follow the lead of other
federal circuit courts. The Seventh Circuit
held a realty corporation and its sole
shareholder vicariously liable for
compensatory damages resulting from
individual sales agents' FHA violations
even though the sole shareholder had
specifically instructed the agents not to
discriminate and had not personally joined
in any discriminatory acts. Matchmaker,
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982 F.2d at 1096-98. Noting Walker's
policy discussion, the Seventh Circuit
agreed with the Fourth Circuit that "'we
must hold those who benefit from the sale
and rental of property to the public to the
specific mandates of anti-discrimination
law if the goal of equal housing
opportunity is to be reached."' Id. at 1096
(quoting Walker, 976 F.2d at 905). We
also agree with this policy.
Matchmaker concluded that as the sole
owner of the corporation, the chief
executive officer and the supervisor of the
day-to-day operations of the corporation
and its agents, the defendant should be
personally liable for compensatory
damages. 982 F.2d at 1098. We adopt this
reasoning and, thus, remand to the district
court to allow the Holleys the opportunity
to try the issue of Meyer's ownership of
Triad at the time of the alleged violations.
We agree with the Seventh Circuit that a
principal cannot free itself of liability by
delegating to an agent the duty not to
discriminate. See id. at 1096.'
While the evidence does not indicate that
Crank acted with the approval or at the
direction of Meyer, such a finding is not
necessary to hold Meyer liable as the sole
owner of Triad for breach of a non-
delegable duty to comply with the FHA.
See Marr v. Rife, 503 F.2d at 742. If
Meyer solely owned the agency, he had at
least the authority to control the acts of
his salespersons, particularly in light of his
3 The Sixth Circuit also held that a real estate
agency owner should be vicariously liable for
compensatory damages resulting from
salespersons' FHA violations even though there
was no evidence that the agent acted with the
approval or at the direction of the owner. The
court reasoned that the owner of the agency had at
least the power to control the acts of his
salespersons. Marr v. Rife, 503 F.2d 735, 742 (6th
Cir. 1974).
position as president and officer/broker
of Triad...
Perhaps more so than in his capacity as
sole owner of the company, as an officer
of the company he actually did direct or
control, or had the right to direct or
control, the conduct of the salespersons
who allegedly discriminated against the
Holleys with respect to the sale of real
estate. While we recognize that corporate
officers and shareholders are generally
shielded from personal liability, we agree
with the Seventh Circuit that "where
common ownership and management
exists, corporate formalities must not be
rigidly adhered to when inquiry is made of
civil rights violations." Matchmaker, 982
F.2d at 1098. Thus, under relevant HUD
regulatory history, and because the duty
not to discriminate is a non-delegable one,
we join other courts in holding that
officers can be individually liable for
discriminatory acts of corporate
employees under their management and
control. See e.g., Tropic Seas, 887 F. Supp.
at 1365; Northside, 605 F.2d at 1354
(holding president and vice-president of
real estate corporation accountable for
discriminatory acts of their agents,
"whether or not the officers directed or
authorized the particular discriminatory
acts that occurred").
Our decision recognizes the duty under
the FHA as non-delegable, furthering the
purposes of the FHA. Moreover, as
discussed below, Meyer may have
neglected his duties to supervise
salespeople in their real estate
transactions, which included his
responsibility to ensure that they follow
federal and state anti-discrimination laws.
338
Meyer's Responsibilities as Designated
Officer/Broker of Triad
As designated officer/broker of the
company, Meyer was responsible for the
supervision and control of the activities
conducted on behalf of the corporation
by its officers and employees in the
performance of acts for which a real estate
license is required. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
5 10159.2(a). Under California law, a real
estate broker is required to exercise
reasonable supervision over the activities
of his or her salespersons, including
familiarizing salespersons with the
requirements of federal and state laws
relating to the prohibition of
discrimination. 10 Cal. Code Reg. 5
2725(f). His failure to do so also bolsters
the contention that he should be held
personally liable for unlawful
discriminatory acts of Triad's salespersons.
Although federal law governs the issue of
agency under the FHA, the California
licensing scheme is instructive here in
discerning Meyer's supervision and
control over Triad sales activity. California
law provides that "no acts for which a real
estate license is required may be
performed for, or in the name of, a
corporation" unless the corporation has
designated an officer of the corporation to
serve as the officer/broker of the
company. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 5§
10158 & 10211; 10 Cal. Code Reg. § 2740.
As a real estate salesperson for Triad,
acting under the corporate license, Crank
sold real estate under the supervision of
the designated officer/broker. Cal. Bus. &
Prof. Code 5 10159.2(a). Technically, the
licensed broker is the corporation,
however, as designated broker, under
California law, Meyer was personally
responsible for this supervision.
The district court interpreted this to mean
that Meyer could be personally liable only
if Crank operated under a license that
Meyer held in his personal capacity rather
than as an officer of Triad. Based on the
analysis and policy discussed above and
the California real estate licensing
requirements, we disagree. The designated
officer/broker of a real estate corporation
in California is responsible for the
"supervision and control of the activities
conducted on behalf of the corporation
by its officers and employees . .. including
the supervision of salespersons licensed to
the corporation in the performance of acts
for which a real estate license is required."
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 5 10159.2(a). The
state regulations implementing these real
estate licensing laws require that a broker
exercise "reasonable supervision" over the
activities of salespersons.
Meyer's undisputed responsibility to
supervise Triad's salespersons in real
estate transactions places him squarely
within HJD's regulatory history allowing
complaints against any person who has
the right to direct or control the conduct
of another in any aspect of the sale of or
provision of brokerage services to the sale
of a dwelling. See 24 C.F.R. § 103.20
(1999). Meyer argues that this regulation is
irrelevant here as it applies to
administrative complaints rather than civil
actions. The Supreme Court, however, has
interpreted the statute authorizing an
administrative proceeding and that
authorizing the filing of a civil action as
providing parallel remedies to the same
prospective plaintiffs. Gladstone, 441 U.S.
at 105-08. The Court inferred the
congressional intent to provide all victims
of Title VIII violations two alternative
mechanisms to "seek redress: immediate
suit in federal district court or a simple,
inexpensive, informal conciliation
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procedure, to be followed by litigation
should conciliation efforts fail." Id. at 104.
This judicial interpretation of the two
statutes renders the regulation for
administrative complaints highly relevant
to the instant civil action.
Although the federal courts have declined
to allow state law to control rulings on
agency for purposes of FHA violations,
consideration of the state licensing
scheme is appropriate here to determine
Meyer's involvement or omissions in the
alleged discriminatory acts...'
[Meyer's] responsibilities as designated
officer/broker under Triad's corporate
license, by mandate of state law, required
him to direct and control the conduct of
Triad salespersons with respect to the sale
of homes and the provision of brokerage
services relating to the sale of homes. If
Meyer was indeed an officer of the
corporation and the designated
officer/broker of Triad Realty at the time
of the alleged conduct, it is difficult to see
how he could be excused from the
obligation imposed by the FHA to
prohibit discrimination in the housing
field.
CONCLUSION
In light of the evidence that Meyer was (1)
an officer of Triad Realty at the time of
the alleged discriminatory acts; (2) the
designated broker of the corporation who
enabled it to engage in the business of
Meyer argues that the California real estate
licensing law is irrelevant here as California courts
have interpreted it as extending a disciplinary
scheme rather than creating a private right of
action against a designated broker. Appellants here
do not attempt to bring a private action under the
California statute, rather they argue that the statute
is relevant to determining Meyer's responsibilities
of supervision in a claim brought under the FHA.
selling real estate; and (3) the sole
shareholder of the corporation at the time
of the alleged discrimination, we disagree
with the district court's conclusion that as
a matter of law Meyer cannot be
individually liable for damages resulting
from the alleged FHA violations.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand this
case to the District Court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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Supreme Court to Hear Real Estate Discrimination Case; Housing: Jurists Will
Consider Whether a Firm's Owner May Be Liable for an Agent's Bias
Los Angeles Times
May 21, 2002
David G. Savage and Daryl Strickland
The Supreme Court, taking up an appeal
backed by California's real estate industry,
agreed Monday to decide whether the
owner of a small real estate firm can be
forced to pay a damages verdict out of his
own pocket if one of his agents
discriminates against a prospective buyer
or renter.
"What sane individual would take on that
responsibility" of owning or managing a
real estate business if they are "going to be
personally liable for the acts of all of the
agents?" asked Douglas G. Benedon, a
Woodland Hills attorney, in his appeal to
the high court.
He is representing David Meyer, the
owner of a now-defunct real estate
company that sold homes in the
Twentynine Palms area of Southern
California. He was sued for racial
discrimination after one of his agents
allegedly turned away a mixed-race couple
and referred to them as a "salt-and-pepper
team." The couple, Emma and David
Holley, offered $145,000 for a house in
October 1996, but the seller's agent,
Grover Crank of Triad Realty, never
presented the offer. The owner later sold
his house for $20,000 less.
The Holleys and the seller joined a race-
bias suit against Crank, the Triad firm and
its owner and broker, Meyer.
The case has never gone to trial. It
reached the Supreme Court on the
question of who can be held liable for
discrimination under the
Housing Act of 1968.
landmark Fair
Initially, U.S. District Judge William
Matthew Byrne Jr. dismissed Meyer from
the case, ruling that the plaintiffs could
sue only Crank and Triad.
Since the agent and the company had little
in the way of insurance or assets, the
lawyers for the bias victims appealed to
the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals.
Last year, its judges gave the civil rights
law a broad sweep, saying that liability
extends to all who "direct or control" real
estate sales and rentals.
"Owners and officers of corporations may
be held vicariously liable for an
employee's violations of the Fair Housing
Act," said Judge Procter Hug Jr.
The court said the plaintiffs did not have
to prove that Meyer knew of or condoned
the alleged discrimination. Instead, they
needed to show only that he supervised
the agent.
That ruling sent a jolt through the real
estate industry, said June Barlow, general
counsel for the California Assn. of
Realtors, based in Los Angeles.
"We don't have a problem with holding
the firm liable. This went beyond that to
say the owner can be personally liable, and
without any finding of wrongdoing on his
part," Barlow said.
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The California Realtors group and the
Chicago-based National Assn. of Realtors
joined Meyer's appeal to the high court.
They said the entire real estate industry
faced "much upheaval" if the personal
assets of "innocent" owners and directors
could be put at risk in a lawsuit.
A lawyer for the bias victims said the
Realtors groups are exaggerating the effect
of the ruling.
"This has been the law for decades. If you
are licensed by the state and you are in
control [of a real estate operation], with
that control comes the responsibility to
assure that the agents comply with the
law," said Christopher Brancart of
Pescadero.
Arguments in Meyer vs. Holley, 01-1120,
will be heard in the fall.
Experts in housing discrimination say it is
hard to gauge whether blatant bias persists
in the real estate industry.
"It's not the norm, but it's not uncommon
either," said Raphael Bostic, a professor at
USC and an expert on home lending
practices. "It wouldn't be a big surprise to
come across Realtors and brokers that use
this kind of approach, but at the same
time a lot of reputable Realtors don't do
this."
Marlene Garza, chief executive of the
Housing Rights Center, which handles
litigation complaints for the city and
county of Los Angeles and 28 other cities,
said testers continue to see stark
disparities in the treatment accorded
whites and racial minorities. In a recent
test, the group found that a person of
color was handed brochures and showed a
Web site by brokers at a Pasadena agency,
while a white person of similar income
and housing needs got a personal tour of
neighborhoods.
But lawsuits are relatively rare.
"We don't have a rampant number of
[discrimination] cases because a lot of it
goes undetected," said Gary Rhoades,
litigation director for the Housing Rights
Center.
The National Fair Housing Alliance, a
Washington group that supports equal
housing opportunity, estimated in a study
issued last month that only 1% of
discrimination by agents is reported.
The outcome in the Supreme Court case
could make it harder to combat persistent
bias in the sale and rental markets, Garza
said.
Copyright a 2002 Los Angeles Times
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01-7662: Miller-El, Thomas J. v. Cockrell, Dir. TX DCJ
Ruling Below: (Miller-El v. Johnson, 5 h Cir., 261 F.3d 445, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 17635)
The court denied the requested Certificate of Appealability pursuant to the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act and held that petitioner had not made a substantial showing
of the denial of a constitutional right. The state court's detailed factual finding established
that each of the challenged African-American jurors were stricken on race-neutral grounds.
Petitioner failed to generate real, substantial and legitimate doubt concerning his mental
competence. Petitioner's association with paramilitary group was supported by the evidence
and was probative as an indicator of future dangerousness.
Questions presented: (1) Is the court required to ignore uncontested evidence of a pattern and
practice of racial discrimination, and evidence of contemporaneous instances of discrimination,
when assessing the genuineness of a prosecutor's proffered race-neutral reason for exercising a
peremptory challenge?
(2) Did the court of appeals incorrectly conclude that 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2) and 2254(e)(1) require a
habeas corpus petitioner to rebut state court determinations of fact by proving them "unreasonable"
by "clear and convincing evidence"?
Thomas Joe MILLER-EL, Petitioner-Appellant,
V.
Gary L. JOHNSON, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division,
Respondent-Appellee
United States Court of Appeals
For the Fifth Circuit
Decided August 7, 2001
DeMOSS, Circuit Judge:
Petitioner Thomas Joe Miller-El ("Miller-El"),
who was convicted of capital murder in Texas
state court and who was sentenced to death
therefor, and whose petition for habeas
corpus relief and request for a Certificate of
Appealability ("COA") therefrom were both
denied by the federal district court below,
now seeks from this Court a COA pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. 5 2253 (c)(2). For all of the
reasons set forth below, we DENY the
request for a COA.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1985, Miller-El's wife, Dorothy Miller-El,
was employed as a night maid for the lobby
area of the Holiday Inn South. She arranged
for a religious convention for the Moorish
Science Temple's Feast on November 8-10,
1985. Her husband was among the attendees.
After the convention, Dorothy did not return
to work. Shortly before midnight on
November 15, 1985, Dorothy returned to the
Holiday Inn claiming that she was there to
pick up her paycheck. She was given access to
the office area near the vault.
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During this time period, four hotel employees
were working, Doug Walker, Donald Hall,
Anthony Motari, and Mohamed Ali
Karimijoji. Hall, the chief auditor, was training
Mohamed regarding the hotel's daily closing
procedures. Hall instructed Mohamed to close
out the cash registers, a process which would
take one-half hour. Mohamed encountered a
woman who claimed that she needed
accompanying while she waited for her ride.
Mohamed sent her to the front desk area
without leaving the locked area he was in.
At the front desk, a man later identified as
Miller-El appeared and requested a room
from Hall. Witnesses identified Miller-El from
having seen him at the Moorish Feast
convention the previous week. A younger
man, later identified as Kenneth Flowers and
dressed in army fatigues and a headset, peered
around the comer as Hall was giving Miller-El
his room key, and once spotted by Hall, he
also approached the counter. Miller-El told
Hall that he would be needing two beds.
Seconds later, Miller-El and Flowers pulled
out weapons. Miller-El brandished a semi-
automatic "tech" nine millimeter machine
gun, with a flash suppressor for night use.
Flowers had a .45 caliber hand gun.
Hall complied with Miller-El's instructions to
empty the cash drawer and place the money
on the counter. Miller-El then ordered Hall to
bring any other people in the back out front.
Hall instructed Walker to come out. Flowers
jumped over the counter and the two men
instructed Hall and Walker to lay on the floor.
The two men led Hall and Walker to the
bellman's closet which they ordered opened.
Once the two men removed all of the
valuables from the closet and took Walker's
and Hall's wallets, Miller-El tied Walker's
hands behind his back, tied his legs together,
and gagged him with strips of fabric. Flowers
did the same to Hall. Walker was laid on his
face and Hall was laid on his side.
Miler-El asked Flowers if he was going to "do
it" and Flowers responded that he couldn't.
Flowers then left. Miller-El stood at Walker's
feet, removed his glasses and then shot
Walker in the back two times. Hall closed his
eyes after the first shot. He heard two more
shots and realized that he had also been
wounded. Hall tried to talk to Walker but only
heard him choking. When he heard familiar
voices outside, Hall screamed for help.
Several days after the robbery-murder, Officer
Cagle was on surveillance of an apartment
complex believed to be Dorothy Miller-El's.
He spotted Dorothy and Flowers. With the
assistance of back-up units, he stopped their
vehicle and arrested them both. Search
warrants were executed for the residence, and
"walkie-talkie" headsets were found. When
Miller-El was later arrested, found in his
possession was an arsenal of weapons
including the "tech" nine millimeter murder
weapon.
[Procedural history omitted.]
III. DISCUSSION
Miller-El seeks from this Court a COA on
each of the following issues: (1) whether the
district court erred in overruling his challenges
of improper peremptory juror strikes; (2)
whether the state court erred in failing to
conduct a sua sponte evidentiary hearing
regarding his competency to stand trial and in
finding that he was competent to stand trial in
1986; (3) whether the district court likewise
erred in failing to conduct a hearing regarding
his competency, and (4) whether the district
court erred finding that his First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights were not
violated by admission of evidence, during the
punishment phase of his trial, relating to his
affiliation with the Moorish Science Temple.
Miller-El's petition for writ of habeas corpus
was filed on June 17, 1997, and is thus
governed by the provisions of the
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Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act ("AEDPA"). See Lind u Murphy, 521 U.S.
320, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 2068, 138 L. Ed. 2d 481
(1997); Unitd State v Carter, 117 F.3d 262
(5th Cir. 1997). Under AEDPA, before an
appeal from the dismissal or denial of a 5
2254 habeas petition can proceed, the
petitioner must first obtain a COA, which will
issue "only if the applicant has made a
substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (c)(2)...
A.
Miller-El first contends that he is entitled to a
COA regarding his challenge to the
prosecution's alleged improper use of
peremptory strikes to exclude African-
Americans from his jury. Miller-El argues that
the Supreme Court's decision in Svuain u
Alabarm, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S. Ct. 824, 13 L.
Ed. 2d 759 (1965), is still the applicable law
regarding challenges to improper peremptory
strikes when evidenced by data indicating
historic, systematic discrimination against
African-Americans. However, during the
pendency of Miller-El's direct appeal, the
Supreme Court decided Batson v Kentudy, 476
U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69
(1986), in which it stated that "to the extent
that anything in Swain u A /alu is contrary
to the principles we articulate today, that
decision is overruled." Batson, 106 S. Ct. at
1725. Yet Miller-El contends that Batson only
overruled one part of Swir. According to
Miller-El, while under Batson, a defendant is
no longer required to establish a prima facie
case of racial discrimination based upon proof
of historical, consistent, and systematic
exclusion of African-Americans from juries, if
racial discrimination is proffered, nevertheless,
under Swain, then either the Suain or Batson
evidentiary formulations apply. Miller-El
argues that the evidentiary formulation of
Swain is, thus, applicable to his claim of
systematic exclusion. The government
contends that the Batson evidentiary
formulation overruled the Swain formulation
on which Miller-El relies.
In Batson, the Supreme Court, recognizing the
"cnppling burden of proof" which Swimn
created, replaced the Swain evidentiary
formulation with the new Batson standard.
That new standard involves the following
three steps:
First: A defendant can establish his prima
facie case of purposeful discriminatory petit
jury selection solely upon evidence concerning
the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory
challenges at the defendant's trial.
Alternatively, the defendant can make a prima
facie case by proving historic, systematic
discrimination;
Second: If a defendant makes a prima
facie showing, the burden then shifts to
the government to provide a race-neutral
explanation for challenging the excluded
jurors;
Third: The trial court must then determine if
the defendant has established purposeful
discnrimination, and the trial court's
determination is a finding fact entitled to the
applicable level of deference on appellate
review.
Se Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1723-24.
MJiller-El contends that the state court's
adjudication was an unreasonable application
of Batson and that the court's findings were
also unreasonable in light of his prima facie
showing. His primary challenge is to the
district court's alleged failure to give proper
weight and credit to the evidence which he
presented regarding the historical data
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evidencing exclusion of African-American
jurors.
The state court findings in this case on the
issue of discriminatory intent, despite Miler-
El's protestations to the contrary, are entitled
to great deference. See Hernandez u New Yok,
500 U.S. 352, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1868, 114 L.
Ed. 2d 395 (1991). As an appellate court
reviewing a federal habeas petition, we are
required by § 2254(d)(2) to presume the state
court findings correct unless we determine
that the findings result in a decision which is
unreasonable in light of the evidence
presented. And the unreasonableness, if any,
must be established by clear and convincing
evidence. Se 28 U.S.C. 5 2254 (e)(1).
The detailed factual findings made by the state
trial court establish that each of the challenged
African-American jurors was stricken on race-
neutral grounds. Miller-El has addressed the
peremptory challenge of six of the ten Batson
jurors in his request for a COA We have now
conducted an independent review of the
findings of the state court and of the evidence
presented by Miller-El in his application.
Suffice it to say, and without commenting on
each of the challenged jurors and the reasons
proffered for their being excluded, we find
that the state court's findings are not
unreasonable and that Miller-El has failed to
present clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary. The findings of the state court that
there was no disparate questioning of the
Batson jurors and that the prosecution's
reasons for striking the jurors was due to their
reluctance to assess and/or their reservations
concerning the death penalty are fully
supported by the record.
Having determined that the state court's
adjudication neither resulted in a decision that
was unreasonable in light of the evidence
presented nor resulted in a decision contrary
to clearly established federal law as
determined by the Supreme Court, we
conclude that this issue would not be
debatable among jurists of reason, that courts
could not resolve the issues in a different
manner, and that the issue does not deserve
encouragement to proceed further. Miller-El
has thus failed to make a substantial showing
of the denial of a constitutional right.
Accordingly, we deny Miller-El's request for a
COA on this issue.
B.
Miller-El's second issue consists of two parts
that revolve around his claim that he was
incompetent to stand trial. He first claims that
the state trial court erred in failing to provide
him with a sua sponte evidentiary hearing
pursuant to Pate v Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86
S. Ct. 836, 15 L. Ed. 2d 815 (1966). Second,
he challenges his conviction as infirm under
Dusky u United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S. Ct.
788, 4 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1960), on the basis that
he was incompetent, in fact, at the time of his
trial. Before analyzing these claims, a brief
review of some additional facts is necessary.
Miller-El was tried some eight weeks
following his arrest. Incident to his arrest,
Miller-El was wounded by a gunshot. During
the months following his arrest, Miller-El
underwent surgical treatment for his injuries,
and he experienced complications such as
weight loss. On three separate occasions
during his trial, Miller-El was evaluated by a
doctor at the direction of the trial court. First,
during jury selection, he experienced chest
pains, chills, and a fever. He was diagnosed
with pneumonia and was treated and
discharged the same day. Nine days later, still
during jury selection, Miller-El complained of
delays in receiving medication. The trial court
ordered a second evaluation to determine if
Miller-El needed more medication. The
doctor determined that he did not. Two days
before jury selection concluded, Miller-El was
taken to the hospital for treatment of a chest
abscess. During his trial, Miller-El complained
of pain in his ribs and asked to see a doctor.
And finally, on the evening of the day he was
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found guilty, the trial judge ordered a medical
evaluation to determine if Miller-El would be
able to sit through court after complaining of
nausea and colostomy bag complications. He
was kept overnight in the hospital and was
released the next day when the punishment
phase of his trial began.
* * *
First, with respect to whether Miller-El was
entitled to a hearing, the relevant inquiry is
whether the district court received
information "which, if objectively considered,
should reasonably have raised a doubt about
the defendant's competency and alerted it to
the possibility that the defendant could
neither understand the proceedings or
appreciate their significance, nor rationally aid
his attorney in his defense." Lders, 625 F.2d at
1261. In this case, the trial court specifically
found that Miller-El was competent to stand
trial, both at the trial and again on state
habeas review...
Our independent review of the record
evidence convinces us that the district court's
finding that Miller-El was not entitled to a
hearing is not unreasonable, and Miller-El has
failed to present clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary.
With respect to whether Miller-El was, in fact,
incompetent, we find that the district court's
conclusion that he was not, is reasonable, and
likewise, we find that the state court's decision
does not represent an unreasonable
application of federal law. Thus, we conclude
that Miller-El has failed to make a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right,
and we deny Miller-El's request for a COA on
this issue.
C.
In his third issue, Miller-El claims that he is
entitled to a COA because the federal district
court erred in refusing to conduct an
evidentiary hearing nur pm tunc to determine
whether he was competent to stand trial in
1986. Having concluded above that Miller-El
has failed to establish a bona fide doubt as to
his competency at trial under Pate and that the
state court's determination of competence was
reasonable, we need not readdress this issue.
**
D.
In his fourth and final issue, Miller-El argues
that he is entitled to a COA on his claim that
his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights
were violated by the admission of evidence,
during the punishment phase of his trial,
relating to his affiliation with the Moorish
Science Temple faith [... ]
Here the state habeas court concluded that
Miller-El's association with the Moorish
Science Temple was inextricably intertwined
with his conviction and sentence. Evidence
was entered in the guilt phase regarding his
membership as part of testimony regarding
witnesses' ability to identify him through his
participation in the Moorish Temple Feast at
the murder scene' the week before the
robbery-murder. Thus, introduction of this
evidence during the guilt phase was relevant
to other matters.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having carefully reviewed the record, we
conclude that Miller-El has failed to make a
substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right with respect to any of the
issues raised in his request for COA, and
accordingly, we DENY his request for COA
on all issues raised therein.
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Execution Is Stayed in a Case With Race Issues
The New York Tines
February 16, 2002
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court gave a Texas death row
inmate a stay of execution today and agreed to
use his case to decide an important question
of how a defendant can prove that the jury
selection process was unconstitutionally
tainted by racial discrimination.
The inmate, Thomas Miller-El, was to be
executed next Thursday for the 1985 murder
of a hotel clerk during a robbery at a Holiday
Inn in Arlington, Tex., near the Dallas-Fort
Worth airport. His conviction and death
sentence were upheld by the state courts, by
the Federal District Court in Dallas, and last
year by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, which rejected his petition
for a writ of habeas corpus. During his trial in
1986, prosecutors struck 10 of 11 black
prospective jurors, accepting only one who
expressed strong support for the death
penalty and volunteered the comment that
murderers should be tortured. Mr. Miller-El,
who is now 50, is black.
Under the Supreme Court precedents then in
effect, racial discrimination in jury selection
was unconstitutional but was very difficult to
prove under rules that required evidence that
the prosecution had selected jurors on the
basis of race "consistently and systematically."
Weeks after Mr. Miller-El's conviction,
however, the Supreme Court simplified the
process in a decision called Batson v.
Kentucky, which was applied retroactively to
cases still on appeal, including Mr. Miller-El's.
The Batson decision set up a three-stage
process. First, the defendant had only to show
that the prosecution had used its jury
challenges in a way that raised an inference of
discrimination. Then at the second stage, the
prosecution had the burden of showing that
there was a neutral nondiscriminatory reason
for the challenges. Then in the final stage, the
trial judge was to evaluate the evidence and
decide whether racial discrimination had
occurred.
The case the court accepted today, Miller-El
v. Cockrell, No. 01-7662, concerns the
operation of the final stage, a subject the
justices have not explored in the 16 years
since the Batson decision and one that is
causing considerable confusion in the lower
courts.
How broad a context can the judge use in
evaluating the evidence? Is the judge limited
to considering the plausibility of the
prosecution's particular explanations, or can
the judge consider evidence the defense might
have offered, back at the initial stage, of a
wider pattern of discriminatory jury selection
throughout the jurisdiction?
In contrast to most other appeals courts, the
Fifth Circuit has refused to consider the
broader context, which in Mr. Miller-El's case
included undisputed evidence that at least
until the early 1980's, Dallas prosecutors had
pursued an official policy, expressed in a
training manual, of removing as many black
jurors as possible from trials of black
defendants.
Jim Marcus, a lawyer with the Texas Defender
Service in Houston, which has represented
Mr. Miller-El in his federal appeal, said in an
interview today that the Fifth Circuit's
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In Dallas, Dismissal of Black Jurors Leads to Appeal by Death Row Inmate
The New York Times
February 13, 2002
Sara Rimer
Carol Boggess says she was "eager and willing
to serve" on the jury in the 1986 capital
murder trial of Thomas Miller-El in Dallas.
When questioned by prosecutors, Ms.
Boggess, an occupational therapist, said she
strongly supported capital punishment and
"had no doubt at all" that she could sentence
a person to death.
Wayman Kennedy, a Sunday school teacher
and church deacon, also wanted to be on the
jury and told prosecutors he felt confident of
his ability to impose a death penalty. So did
Billy Jean Fields, a postal worker. Mr. Miller-
El is black. He was charged with shooting two
white hotel clerks, one of them fatally, during
a robbery in November 1985.
Ms. Fields, Mr. Kennedy and Ms. Boggess are
also black All were excluded from the jury
panel by Dallas County prosecutors, as were
seven of eight other blacks interviewed as
prospective jurors.
The jury the prosecutors accepted was
composed of nine whites, one Filipino, one
Hispanic and one black man who told
prosecutors that he thought that execution
was too easy, and that the appropriate
punishment for murderers was to "pour some
honey on them and stake them out over an
ant bed."
Mr. Miller-El, 50, is scheduled to be executed
by the state of Texas on Feb. 21, but his
lawyers say the jury that convicted him was
selected according to longstanding racially
discriminatory standards of the Dallas County
district attorney's office.
His lawyers have asked the Texas Board of
Pardons and Paroles to commute Mr. Miller-
El's sentence and have appealed his case to
the United States Supreme Court. The court
decides this week whether to take the case.
Mr. Miller-El's lawyers say his case highlights
the continuing exclusion of minorities from
juries across the country.
"What's at stake in this case is the
fundamental right of citizens of all races to
participate in the justice systen," said his
lawyer, Jim Marcus, the executive director of
the Texas Defender Service.
The Dallas County district attomey's office
has contested the plea for clemency and
opposes review by the Supreme Court.
"There's no evidence showing that there was
any racial discrimination," said Lori Ordiway,
chief of the appellate division of the district
attorney's office. Ms. Ordiway said the blacks
had been struck for "race-neutral reasons."
The federal Constitution has long prohibited
race discrimination in the selection of juries,
but until 1986 the standard that a defendant
had to meet to prove such discrimination was
extremely high, requiring that a pattern of
discrimination be proved.
The Supreme Court recognized this when it
lowered the standard, in its landmark 1986
ruling in Batson v. Kentucky. Before Batson,
neither the prosecution nor the defense had to
provide reasons for its use of peremptory
strikes in excluding prospective jurors.
Batson held that if the defense was able to
show that it appeared the prosecution was
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using its strikes to exclude minorities, the trial
judge would require the prosecutor to explain
the peremptory strikes. Moreover, the reasons
could not be based on race. The Batson ruling
is relied upon by defense lawyers across the
country during jury selection.
Mr. Miller-El was convicted and sentenced
one month before the Batson ruling came
down. Because his case was still on appeal
when Batson was decided, however, the
decision applied to his case retroactively.
Even so, state and federal courts have upheld
Mr. Miller-El's death sentence, finding that no
intentional racial discrimination occurred
during jury selection.
Mr. Miller-El's lawyers contend that the
appeals courts have failed to apply the Batson
ruling correctly. They argue that the courts
looked only at the number of prosecutorial
strikes -- 10 of 11 black prospective jurors --
and accepted the explanations given by the
prosecution as nonracial. And they say the
courts failed to consider historical evidence
that Dallas County prosecutors had
systematically excluded blacks from juries for
years.
"The case is important not as an historic
artifact, but as an ongoing problem that
demands the court's attention," said Elisabeth
Semel, director of the death penalty clinic at
the Hastings School of Law at the University
of California at Berkeley, and one of the
lawyers who wrote an amicus brief in support
of Mr. Miller-El's Supreme Court petition.
Mr. Miller-El's clemency petition contains
testimony from four former prosecutors
whose time in the Dallas County office
collectively covered the period from 1977 to
1989. The four said the office had an
unofficial policy to exclude blacks from juries.
One of the four, Larry Baraka, who was a
prosecutor in the late 1970's and who became
a trial judge in 1981, said: "The policy in a
nutshell was to try to get an all-white jury of
old white men." Mr. Baraka is black.
Statements from several black prospective
jurors who were struck from the Miller-El
trial are included in the clemency petition,
along with a 1986 article in The Dallas
Morning News citing a 1963 internal memo in
the district attorney's office advising
prosecutors who were picking juries: "Do not
take Jews, Negroes, Dagos, Mexicans or a
member of any minority race on a jury, no
matter how rich or how well educated."
That language was later dropped, but in the
early 1970's the office used a training manual
that included a memo from a Dallas County
prosecutor, Jon Sparling, containing advice on
jury selection: "You are not looking for any
member of a minority group which may
subject him to oppression -- they almost
always empathize with the accused."
Mr. Sparling, 60, has since retired. "It's not
something I'd want the world to see,"
Mr.Sparling said in an interview, referring to
his memo, which he said he was asked to
write informally for other prosecutors. "I
wrote it very quickly. I wasn't careful with my
words. I'm not making any excuses for it."
"Everything has changed since then," he
added.
The training manual was in use at least until
1980, Mr. Marcus said, and the practices it
recommended were routinely followed by
prosecutors when Mr. Miller-El was tried.
Ms. Ordiway of the dirtict attorney's office
said she was neither authorized nor qualified
"to talk about what happened in the 1960's,"
but she said that there was no racial
discrimination in jury selection in the 19 80's,
or since.
In 1986, The Dallas Morning News examined
the 15 Dallas County capital murder trials
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from 1980 through 1986, including that of
Mr. Miller-El, and found that prosecutors
excluded 90 percent of blacks who qualified
for jury selection. The newspaper concluded
that in capital murder cases during that period
"prosecutors got what they wanted: the death
penalty, and overwhelmingly white juries."
Paul Macaluso, the assistant district attorney
who picked the jury in Mr. Miller-El's case,
said he had struck the 10 black jurors for
reasons that had nothing to do with race. He
said that he was trying to assemble the best
possible jury and that some of them seemed
to waffle on imposing the death penalty. His
former office had not had a policy of racial
discrimination in the selection of jurors, he
said.
"Things don't operate that way," said Mr.
Macaluso, 59, who is now a federal prosecutor
in Dallas. "I wouldn't put up with it."
Mr. Macaluso was one of two prosecutors
who selected the jury in the 1985 trial of
Ronald Curtis Chambers, a black whose
murder victim was white, and who was
sentenced to death. In 1989, the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals reversed Mr. Chambers'
conviction after finding that the state had
engaged in racial discrimination in its use of
peremptory challenges.
Mr. Macaluso said that the appellate court had
been wrong in the Chambers case and that he
had never engaged in racial discrimination in
selecting jurors.
Copyright @ 2002 The New York Times
Company
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Grutterv. Bollinger
Ruling Below: (Grutter v. Bollinger, 6th Cr., 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis
3256 (E.D. Mich. 2001).)
The court held law school's consideration of race and ethnicity in its admission decisions
violated the Equal Protection Clause of U.S. Const. amend. XIV and Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.
Question Presented: Whether a law school that individually evaluates each application may
provide substantial consideration to race and ethnicity in its admission decisions in order to
achieve a diverse student body?
BARBARA GRUTTER, Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
LEE BOLLINGER, et al., Defendants-Appellants , KIMBERLYJAMES, et al.,
Intervening Defendants-Appellants.
United States Court Of Appeals
For the Sixth Circuit
Decided May 14, 2002
MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge:
For the reasons set forth
REVERSE the judgment of
court.
below, we
the district
I. Adopted by the full faculty in 1992, the
policy states that the Law School's "goal is
to admit a group of students who
individually and collectively are among the
most capable students applying to
American law schools in a given year." It
further provides that the Law School "seeks
a mix of students with varying backgrounds
and experiences who will respect and learn
from each other." As part of the Law
School's policy of evaluating each applicant
individually, its officials read each
application and factor all of the
accompanying information into their
decision.
d .. *
[T]he Law School sometimes admits
students with relatively low index scores. Its
admissions policy describes two general
varieties of students who may be admitted
with such scores (1) "students for whom
[there is] good reason to be skeptical of an
index score based prediction" (e.g., a
student with a track record of poor
standardized test performance, but who has
an outstanding academic record) and (2)
students who "may help achieve that
diversity which has the potential to enrich
everyone's education and thus make a law
school class stronger than the sum of its
parts."
Reflecting the Law School's goal of
enrolling a diverse class, its admissions
policy describes "a commitment to racial
and ethnic diversity with special reference
to the inclusion of students from groups
which have been historically discriminated
against, like African-Amenicans, Hispanics
353
and Native Americans, who without this
commitment might not be represented in
our student body in meaningful numbers."
Professor Richard Lempert, the chair of the
faculty committee that drafted the
admissions policy, explained that the Law
School's commitment to such diversity was
not intended as a remedy for past
discrimination, but as a means of including
students who may bring a different
perspective to the Law School.
The Law School does, however, consider
the number of under-represented minority
students, and ultimately seeks to enroll a
meaningful number, or a "critical mass," of
under-represented minority students. Dean
Lehman equated "critical mass" with
sufficient numbers to ensure under-
represented minority students do not feel
isolated or like spokespersons for their race,
and do not feel uncomfortable discussing
issues freely based on their personal
expenences.
II. To survive constitutional review, the
Law School's consideration of race must (1)
serve a compelling state interest and (2) be
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.
See Adarand u Pena, 515 US. 200, 227, 115
S. Ct 2097, 132 L. Ed 2d 158 (1995).
A. To determine whether the Law School's
interest in achieving a diverse student body
is compelling, we turn to Bakke. [Because
Bakke is a plurality opinion we will treat the
narrowest concurring opinion to be
controlling. See Maks u United State, 430
U.S. 188, 193 (1977). Because Justice
Powell's opinion in Bakke would permit the
most limited consideration of race it is the
narrowest rationale and thus provides the
governing standard.]
2. Under the Harvard plan, Harvard
College justified its race-conscious
admissions policy solely on the basis of its
efforts to achieve a diverse student body.
Sec [Bakke] at 316. [B]y indicating that the
Harvard plan could be constitutional under
its approach, the Brennan concurrence
implicitly - but unequivocally signaled its
agreement with Justice Powell's conclusion
that achieving a diverse student body is a
constitutionally permissible goal.
B. In endorsing the Harvard plan, Justice
Powell accepted that a university could not
provide "a truly heterogeneous
environment [...] without some attention to
numbers." Id at 323.
In Justice Powell's view, a "plus" program
unlike a quota -lacked a "facial intent to
discriminate." Id at 318. Justice Powell
added that "a court would not assume that
a university, professing to employ a facially
nondiscriminatory admissions policy, would
operate it as a cover for the functional
equivalent of a quota system." Id
Justice Powell's opinion sets forth two
guidelines regarding race-conscious
admissions policies (1) segregated, dual-
track admissions systems utilizing quotas
for under-represented minorities are
unconstitutional; and (2) an admissions
policy modeled on the Harvard plan, where
race and ethnicity are considered a "plus,"
does not offend the Equal Protection
Clause. Neither party questions the
applicability of Justice Powell's opinion
regarding the narrowly tailored component
of strict scrutiny, and it is our view that
whether the Law School's admissions policy
passes constitutional muster turns on
Justice Powell's opinion.
1. Drafted to comply with Bakke, the Law
School's consideration of race and ethnicity
does not use quotas and closely tracks the
Harvard plan. Race and ethnicity, along
with a range of other factors, are potential
"plus" factors in a particular applicant's file,
but they do not insulate an under-
represented minority applicant from
competition or act to foreclose competition
354
from non-minority applicants. As part of its
policy of evaluating each applicant
individually, the Law School's officials read
each application and factor all of the
accompanying information into their
decision. The Law School, like Harvard,
attends to the numbers and distribution of
under-represented minority applicants in an
effort to ensure all of its students obtain the
benefits of an academically diverse student
body.
Because race and ethnicity are a "plus," they
undoubtedly "tip the balance" in some
applicants' favor. Importantly, however, the
Law School's consideration of race and
ethnicity does not operate to insulate any
prospective student from competition with
any other applicants.
2. As a matter of definition, we are satisfied
that the Law School's [pursuit of a] "critical
mass" [of underrepresented minority
students] is not the equivalent of a quota,
because unlike Davis's reservation of
sixteen spots for minority candidates, the
Law School has no fixed goal or target.
That the Law School's pursuit of a "critical
mass" has resulted in an approximate range
of under-represented minority enrollment
does not transform "critical mass" into a
quota. Because Bakke allows institutions of
higher education to pay some attention to
the numbers and distribution of under-
represented minority students, see 438 US.
at 316-17, over time, reliance on Bakke will
always produce some percentage range of
minority enrollment. These results are the
logical consequence of reliance on Bakke
and establishment of an admissions policy,
like the Harvard plan, that attends to the
numbers and distribution of under-
represented minority students. As such,
they cannot serve as the basis for a charge
that the Law School's admissions policy is
unconstitutional.
[3.] Although not addressed in Bakke,
subsequent Supreme Court opinions
suggest consideration of race-neutral means
is necessary to satisfy the narrowly tailored
component of strict scrutiny. E.g., Cnon
488 US. at 507 ("In determining whether
race-conscious remedies are appropriate, we
look to several factors, including the
efficacy of alternative remedies.") (quoting
Unite States v Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171,
107 S. CL 1053, 94 L. Ed 2d 203 (1987)).
Upon examination, however, the record
does indicate the Law School considered
and ultimately rejected various race-neutral
alternatives to the consideration of race and
ethnicity. [TJhe Law School engaged in
both pre- and post- admission recruiting
activities but ... such activities were not
enough to enroll a "critical mass" of under-
represented minority students. Additionally,
Professor Lempert testified regarding the
lottery system, in which the Law School
would lower its admissions standards,
establish a numerical cut-off for "qualified"
applicants, and then select randomly from
among those applicants. Given the Law
School's consideration of race-neutral
alternatives and the evidence that "under-
represented minority students cannot be
enrolled in significant numbers unless their
race is explicitly considered in the
admissions process," we find that the Law
School has adequately considered race-
neutral alternatives.
Lastly, we note that we do not read Bakke
and the Supreme Court's subsequent
decisions to require the Law School to
choose between meaningful racial and
ethnic diversity and academic selectivity.
Thus, in applying strict scrutiny we cannot
ignore the educational judgment and
expertise of the Law School's faculty and
admissions personnel regarding the efficacy
of race-neutral alternatives. Mindful of
both our constitutional obligations and our
practical limitations, we also assume - along
the lines suggested by Justice Powell that
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the Law School acts in good faith in
exercising its educational judgment and
expertise. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318-19.
[The concurring opinion of Judge Moore,
objecting and responding to the inclusion
of the procedural annex in Judge Bogg's
dissenting opinion is omitted.]
CLAY, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I concur in Chief Judge Martin's majority
opinion, finding it correct and insightful in
all respects. I write separately, however, for
the purpose of speaking to the
misrepresentations made by Judge Boggs in
his dissenting opinion which unjustifiably
distort and seek to cast doubt upon the
majority opinion.
B. The Evidence Supports Diversity as a
Compelling Governmental Interest
The dissent's claim that it considers the
arguments on both sides is suspect because
conspicuously absent from its consideration
of the benefits of a diverse student body is
any meaningful recognition of the wealth of
legal scholarship including a study
involving students at the University of
Michigan speaking of, as well as
documenting through empirical data, the
positive impact of diversity in education,
not just for the student throughout the
educational journey but for years after the
educational process is completed.
Specifically, the major study conducted by
University of Michigan Professor of
Psychology and Women's Studies Patricia
Guri, encompassed a wide scale analysis of
the effects of a diverse learning
environment, particularly that at the
University of Michigan, on a student's
overall development, and included data
from the Michigan Student Study, the study
of Intergroup Relations, Conflict, and
Community Program at the University of
Michigan, and the 4-year and 9-year data on
a large national sample of institutions and
students from the Cooperative Institutional
Research Program. See Patricia Gurn,
Repos submitted on half of the Unimity of
Michigm- The Conpeing Need for Dimity in
Higer Education, 5 Mich. J. Race & Law
363, 364 (1999). [Professor Gurin's
conclusions have been omitted.]
In light of Gurn's study and, perhaps more
importantly, the data and empirical
evidence backing her findings on the value
of a diverse student body, those who like
the dissent are skeptical of characterizing
diversity as a compelling governmental
interest because "diversity" is not defined or
because they believe it to be a nebulous
concept based on anecdotal evidence, find
themselves standing on ill footings. Se John
Friedl, Making a Cneling Case for DiwMity
in Cdle eAdmssior9, 61 U. Pitt L. Reu 1, 29-
32 (1999) (noting that "to date, almost all of
the evidence in support of diversity in
higher education is anecdotal in nature[.]").
[I]f the purportedly objective merit criteria
embraced by opponents of affirmative
action were in fact dispositive, nearly one in
every six white applicants actually accepted
were arguably not 'qualified' in the
traditional sense." See id at 1321 n.100.
Accordingly, for these white applicants,
something more than merit was considered
in the admissions process, just as something
more is considered in a program designed
to promote diversity. See id
[lit is naive to believe that because an
African American lives in an affluent
neighborhood, he or she has not known or
been the victim of discrimination such that
he or she cannot relate the same life
experiences as the impoverished black
person. A well dressed black woman of
wealthy means shopping at Neiman Marcus
or in an affluent shopping center may very
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well be treated with the same suspect eye
and bigotry as the poorly dressed black
woman of limited means shopping at
Target. [citation omitted].
As schola4's have] recently illustrated, the
idea that an admissions policy which
provides minority applicants with an
advantage does so at the expense of white
applicants is simply a myth. [citation
omitted].
Using 1989 data from a representative
sample of selective schools, former
university presidents William Bowen and
Derek Bok showed in their 1998 book,
"The Shape of the River," that eliminating
racial preferences would have increased the
likelihood of admission for white
undergraduate applicants from 25 percent
to only 26.5 percent. Because the number
of black applicants to selective institutions
is relatively small, admitting them alt]
higher rates does not significantly lower the
chance of admission for the average
individual in the relatively large sea of white
applicants. Id (emphasis added).
C. The Law School's Policy is Narrowly
Tailored
Claiming that the term "critical mass" is
simply a phrase used to disguise what is
actually an impermissible quota system, the
dissent relies heavily upon the fact that the
numbers of minorities admitted over the
years has varied only sightly. [O]n the
record of this case, there are at least as
many reasons to presume that there is not a
quota as there are to presume that there is
one, and the balance certainly tips in favor
of the law school's representation that it
does not employ a quota in the absence of
any evidence to the contrary.
DISSENT:
BOGGS, Circuit Judge, dissenting.:
This case involves a straightforward
instance of racial discrimination by a state
institution.
Our inquiry must address at least one open
question of law: can achieving diversity be a
compelling state interest? On this open
question, I have no argument to which to
respond, as the majority never explains why
"diversity" should be a compelling state
interest, except to say that the conclusion is
demanded by Bakke. After considering the
arguments on both sides, I conclude that
the state's interest in a diverse student body,
at least as articulated by the Law School,
cannot constitute a compelling state interest
sufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny.
[M]y answer to whether the engineering of
a racially diverse student body is a
compelling state interest is not necessary to
the resolution of the case before this court.
Even if student diversity were a compelling
state interest, the Law School's admissions
scheme could not be considered narrowly
tailored to that interest.
[The dissent concludes that Justice Powell's
discussion of diversity was not controlling
for several reasons, including] [t]he
holding/dicta distinction[, which] demands
that we consider binding only that which
was necessary to resolve the question
before the Court. At most, the question
before the Court in Bakke was whether race
could ever be used in admissions decisions.
To resolve that question, the Court only
needed to answer that race could potentially
be used. Any speculation regarding the
circumstances under which race could be
used was little more than an advisory
opinion, as those circumstances were not
before the court and need not be validated
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to overturn an injunction barring any use of
race, to the extent one was in place.
D. Intervening Supreme Court Precedent
Taking together the Court's overturning of
the standard used to uphold the use of race
to encourage diversity in Metro Bralcasting
(thereby calling into question the
permissibility of using race for diversity
purposes) and its statement in Cnson that
race should only be used for remedial
settings, the district court held that the only
permissible use of race under strict scrutiny
is to "remedy carefully documented effects
of past discrimination," and that since the
diversity rationale proffered by the Law
School was not tied to remedying past
discrimination, it is an impermissible basis
for the use of race. Gnmer, 137 F. Supp. 2d
at 849.
While the district court's reading of
[A darand & Ceson] is far from clearly
wrong, it is also not required. A better
approach is simply to address the diversity
rationale on the merits.
II. On the Merits
Even if a racial classification is designed to
achieve a compelling state interest, it must
be narrowly tailored to that interest. The
Law School's efforts to achieve a "critical
mass" are functionally indistinguishable
from a numerical quota.
A. Is Developing a Diverse Student Body a
Compelling State Interest?
1. The Nature of "Diversity"
[T~he Law School rests its claim to the
benefits of a diverse student body on the
unique experiences that students from
under-represented groups will be able to
share with their fellow students. Closely
related, the Law School implies that a
student body diverse with regard to race is
one diverse with regard to viewpoint,
experience, and opinion.
Mentioning status as an under-represented
minority in the same breath, the Law
School generalizes, in the abstract, that it
would also give a preference to an applicant
with "an Olympic gold medal, a Ph.D in
physics, the attainment of age 50 in a class
otherwise lacking anyone over 30, or the
experience of having been a Vietnamese
boat person." Adissions Pdicies, University
of Michigan Law School, April 22, 1992, JA
at 4240. Yet to equate bare racial status with
the experiential gains of these generally
remarkable (and exceedingly rare)
achievements demonstrates that the Law
School's desired diversity is unrelated to the
experiences of its applicants.
Perhaps the one unifying feature of the
minority groups that the Law School
heavily prefers in admissions is that they all,
on awrage, have had some experience with
being the object of racial discrimination.
The possibility of an experientially based
admissions system and the Law School's
apparent disinterest in such a system,
indicate that the Law School grants
preference to race, not as a proxy for a
unique set of experiences, but as a pmxy for
ra itself
2. No Logical Limitation
The Suprerr Cart has cosistendy naed tose
purposes that lade a "logical stopping point"
[citation onitta.
If policies like the Law School's are
permitted, the adverse effect on "over-
represented" minorities will only grow more
grave because such policies inexorably drive
toward a philosophy in which admissions
are parceled out roughly in proportion to
representation in the general population.
[ ... I
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B. Is the Law School's Admissions Policy
Narrowly Tailored?
1. The True Magnitude of the Law School's
Racial Preference
It is clear from the Law School's statistics
that under-represented minority students
are nearly automatically admitted in zones
where white or Asian students with the
same credentials are nearly automatically
rejected. Indeed, the Law School concedes
that its racial preference is sufficiently heavy
that 3 out of 4 under-represented minority
students would not be admitted if all
students were truly considered without
regard to race. JA at 6047.
2. Differentiating a "Critical Mass," a "Plus"
and a "Quota"
The results of the Law School's system to
produce a "critical mus" reassure us that the
Law School really seeks to enroll a critical
rnir of minority students. Between 1995
and 1998, the last four years for which we
have data, the Law School consistently
enrolled a number of under-represented
minonties constituting 13.5 to 13.7 percent
of the class enrolled. University of Michigan
Law School's Report to the ABA, JA at 643.
The range, as I have demonstrated, is
remarkably tight. Admittedly, it is not
identical from year to year - but the lack of
identity does not seem enough to
demonstrate that the Law School does not
have an exceedingly precise numerical
target in mind when admitting its students.
Law School officials testified that they
vigorously monitor the acceptance data
with regard to race on a daily basis, se
Depo. of Dennis Shields, JA at 2219-20,
perhaps to admit minorities that it
otherwise would not have or perhaps to
admit minorities on the waiting list.
The combination of the Law School's thinly
veiled references to such a target, its
"critical mass," and relatively consistent
results in achieving a particular enrollment
percentage, should convince us that the
Law School's admissions scheme is
functionally, and even nominally,
indistinguishable from a quota system.
3. Achieving the Benefits of a Diverse
Educational Environment
The Law School never provided any
evidence that the existence of the "critical
mass" would in fact contribute to classroom
dialogue or would lessen feelings of
isolation or alienation. The only evidence at
all bearing on this is from the Gurin
Report.
The Gurin report is questionable science,
was created expressly for litigation, and its
conclusions do not even support the Law
School's case. The "study" suffers from
profound empirical and methodological
defects that lead me to doubt its probative
value. And certainly neither the trial court
as finder of fact nor the majority opinion
take the report's conclusions as fact.
The relationship between a "critical mass"
and the values of diversity would depend
on contingencies nearly impossible to
predict. The Law School's definition seems
to depend wholly on the psychological
makeup of the people involved, whether
labeled as majority or minority. Certainly
history is replete with examples of members
of minority groups, from Frederick
Douglass to Martin Luther King to Thomas
Sowell, who have said their piece and stood
for what they believed in without regard to
whether others thought them to be a
''representative."
4. Potential Race-Neutral Means
The Supreme Court has made clear that
courts must determine whether a state's
racial classification is necessary with
reference to the efficacy of race-neutral
alternatives. Se, eg., Crtiom 488 U.S. at
507; Umted State u Paradise, 480 US. 149,
171, 94 L. Ed 2d 203, 107 S. CL 1053
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(1987); Associated Gen Contractm <f Obio, Inc
v Drabik, 214 F.3d 730, 736 (6th Cir. 2000).
Consider some of the race-neutral
alternatives available in this case. Swamped
with the children of wealthy suburbanites,
the Law School could seek out applicants
who were raised amidst relative poverty,
who attended under-funded or failing
schools, who walked to school past
warehouses instead of coffeehouses, who
experienced but conquered extreme
emotional trauma, like the loss of a parent,
who prevailed over a profound childhood
illness, who have dedicated years to helping
the poor in the Jesuit Volunteer Corps, or,
even less stirringly, who have a strong
accounting background among a raft of
history majors. If it really is a diversity of
experiences and viewpoints that the Law
School seeks, why cannot the Law School
just seek those experiences and viewpoints?
I am willing to take the Law School at its
word, and believe that it is fully capable of
undertaking this searching review of
individual experience.
III Many commentators have observed
that America is still a society in which "race
[as well as ethnicity, religion and other
ancestral characteristics] matters." But we
can not simply suspend the Equal
Protection Clause until race no longer
matters.
[The dissenting opinion of Judge Siler is
omitted.] [The dissenting opinion of Judge
Batchelder is omitted.]
GILMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
[T]here are aspects of both [the majority
and dissenting] opinions with which I do
not agree.
The facts of the present case, in my
opinion, eliminate the need to decide
whether or not this court is bound by
Justice Powell's conclusion in Regns of the
Ulniwsity of Odfornia v Bakke, 438 US. 265,
57 L. Ed 2d 750, 98 S. CL 2733 (1978), that
educational diversity is a compelling
government interest. No one disputes,
however, that Bakke stands for the
proposition that an admissions policy
designed to further the interest of
educational diversity is not narrowly
tailored if it creates a two-track system for
evaluating prospective students, where
minorities are effectively insulated
competition with other applicants.
319-20.
from
Id at
Based on the record presented, I am
convinced that the Law School's admissions
policy that results in a defacto quota in favor
of minority students is far closer to the rigid
set-aside squarely prohibited by Bakke than
it is to the "plus among equals" that I
believe would be clearly constitutional. I
respectfully dissent.
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Court Says Law School May Consider Race in Admissions
The New York Times
May 15, 2002
Jacques Steinberg
A federal appeals court ruled yesterday
that the Constitution permits colleges and
graduate schools to seek a "critical mass"
of black and Hispanic students in
assembling their entering classes each
year, as long as those rough targets do not
harden into precise quotas.
Voting 5 to 4 in a closely watched case,
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit in Cincinnati overturned a
ruling by a federal judge in Detroit and
upheld the admissions policies of the
University of Michigan Law School. The
university has said its policies were
intended to assemble a class diverse in
both its racial and ethnic makeup and its
intellectual perspectives. In its decision,
the court subscribed to Justice Lewis F.
Powell Jr.'s pivotal, 24-year-old Supreme
Court opinion in the landmark Bakke
case, which has been used to justify race-
conscious admissions policies at public
universities as well as private colleges.
The ruling yesterday, which bitterly
divided the full nine-judge court, is
expected to be appealed to the Supreme
Court by the lead plaintiff, Barbara
Grutter, a Michigan woman who argued
that she had been rejected by the law
school in 1996 because she was white.
The law school case and a second
University of Michigan case involving the
admission of undergraduates have been
closely followed by supporters and
opponents of affirmative action because
they are the only cases that are in close
range of being appealed to the Supreme
Court.
Should the Supreme Court agree to hear
either or both of the cases, it would have
an opportunity to clarify its position on an
issue that it has not confronted directly
since 1978 in Bakke. At that time, the
court struck down a separate policy for
minority applicants at the medical school
of the University of California at Davis
but appeared to support the idea that race
could be factored in as a plus in deciding
whether to admit a student.
In recent years, federal courts in several
states, including those with jurisdiction
over the Universities of Georgia, Texas
and Washington, have issued often
contradictory rulings on the issue. Those
cases have either expired or been sent
back to lower courts.
The two Michigan cases have also been
somewhat at odds. Last year, a federal
judge in Detroit ruled that the Michigan
law school policy was unconstitutional,
because, he said, it appeared to set quotas
for minority applicants. But ruling in a
separate case, a different federal judge
upheld Michigan's admissions policy for
undergraduates, which automatically
awards 20 points on a 150-point scale to
black and Hispanic applicants and to
underprivileged white applicants.
The same court that issued yesterday's
decision is expected to rule in the coming
weeks on a challenge to the undergraduate
policy brought by several rejected white
applicants, and whichever side loses has
suggested that it, too, would appeal to the
Supreme Court. The ruling in yesterday's
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case does not necessarily foreshadow a
decision to uphold the undergraduate
admissions policy, since a specific point
system was not used in the law school
policy.
Much of the confusion over the court's
position on race-conscious admissions can
be traced back to the Bakke ruling, which
was composed of six separate opinions. In
his opinion, Justice Powell wrote that the
assembly of a diverse student body was of
compelling interest to the state because it
benefited not only minority applicants,
but also the white classmates who might
learn from them. It has never been
entirely clear, however, how many of the
justices agreed with Justice Powell's
particular argument in defense of
diversity, although his opinion has been
used to underpin admissions policies ever
since.
In writing for the five-member majority
yesterday, Judge Boyce F. Martin Jr., an
appointee of President [Jimmy Carter]
who is the chief judge of the appeals
court, wrote that the Michigan policy was
consistent with Justice Powell's argument,
and thus constitutional.
Judge Martin, echoing statements made by
the dean of the law school, defined
"critical mass" not as a fixed quota but as
a rough number sufficient "to ensure
under-represented minority students do
not feel isolated or like spokespersons for
their race, and do not feel uncomfortable
discussing issues freely based on their
personal expeniences.
From 1987 to 1994, Judge Martin said, the
percentage of minority students in the
university's entering law school class has
ranged from 12 percent to 20 percent.
Assessing that range, Judge Martin
concluded: "the law school does not
employ a quota or otherwise reserve seats
for under-represented
applicants."
minonty
Writing for the four-member minority,
Judge Danny J. Boggs, a Reagan
appointee, sided with the lower court
judge, saying that seeking a "critical mass"
of minority students was the equivalent of
a quota, and "involves a straightforward
instance of racial discrimination by a state
institution.
Judge Boggs cited figures more current
than Judge Martin's, saying that from 1995
to 1998, the percentage of minorities
admitted to the law school barely
wavered, from 13.5 percent to 13.7
percent.
The federal court decisions on race-
conscious admissions policies in recent
years have left different parts of the
country subject to different policies.
Rice University, for example, a private
college in Houston, has adhered since
1996 to the the so-called Hopwood
decision. In that case, a federal appeals
court ruled that preferences given to
minority applicants to the University of
Texas Law School were unconstitutional,
in part, the judges held, because it could
not be proved that a majority of Justice
Powell's colleagues endorsed his argument
for diversity.
"We are not allowed to consider race
either for admission or financial aid," said
Ann Wright, the vice president for
enrollment at Rice. "Most of our
competitors are not restrained that way."
"Now," Ms. Wright added, "I think there
will be a Supreme Court decision that will
settle the inconsistency."
Copyright @ 2002 The New York Times
Company
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Rolling Bakke
The Wall Stret Journal
May 17, 2002
Bob Zelnick
Proponents of public universities giving
broad admissions preferences to selected
racial minorities won a battle Tuesday as
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed a lower court ruling and upheld
the admissions practices of the University
of Michigan Law School. But the majority
was slender -- 5-4 -- and the ruling
narrow. The majority opinion disdained all
but token consideration of the merits of
the case, instead hiding behind the
Supreme Court's quirky 1978 Bakke case,
declaring simply that Justice Lewis
Powell's lone opinion "remains the law
until the Supreme Court instructs
otherwise."
Opponents of racial preferences can take
heart not only because the dissent in the
case, Grutter v. Bollinger, was far more
impressive than the majority opinion, but
because the decision virtually forces the
Supreme Court to review discriminatory
practices in higher education for the first
time since Bakke, if only to resolve a
hopeless split among the various federal
circuits. As matters now stand:
-- The Fifth Circuit has held that racially
discriminatory admissions policies
designed to promote diversity flunk the
test of constitutionality, thereby tossing
aside a central contention of Justice
Powell, the swing vote in Bakke.
-- The Sixth and Ninth Circuits have held
themselves bound by Bakke.
-- The 11th Circuit has held that race is
not a proxy for diversity, thus skirting the
issue of whether state universities have a
compelling interest in diversity.
That Bakke has staggered along for nearly
a quarter-century is truly remarkable.
Brought by a rejected white applicant for
the University of California, Davis
Medical School, the suit challenged a
quota system that allocated 16% of places
in each entering class to favored minority
students. Four justices held the quotas a
violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Four others argued that the "benign" use
of racial categories designed to redress
past discrimination should not have to
meet a strict "compelling interest"
standard of judicial review.
Justice Powell held that the strict standard
was appropriate and that the quota system
was unconstitutional. But he suggested
that as a matter of academic freedom,
universities have an implied First
Amendment right to promote a diverse
student body through "a properly devised
admissions program involving the
competitive consideration of race and
ethnic origin."
Not a single colleague joined Justice
Powell's constitutional frolic, and in a
series of cases involving state contracting,
federal contracting, and congressional
redistricting, the Supreme Court has
rejected the consideration of race unless
narrowly tailored to redress specific acts
of past discrimination.
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In their scramble to gain the protection of
Bakke, some of the nation's leading public
universities have contrived admissions
practices that offend both the
Constitution and admittedly quaint
notions of academic integrity. Until
Proposition 209 got in the way, for
example, the University of California,
Berkeley tinkered with a "non quota"
matrix system that magically produced
nearly identical percentages of black and
Hispanic students year after year. Until
stopped by the courts, the University of
Texas Law School had color-coded
applicant files considered by separate
committees applying different standards.
The University of Michigan Law School
method involved admitting a "critical
mass" of favored minorities, defined as
the number necessary to "enable minority
students to contribute to classroom
dialogue and not feel isolated." The
school's dean testified that no quota
system was intended, but the numbers
speak otherwise. From 1995 to 1998, the
law school admitted 46, 44, 46 and 47
minority applicants, respectively, in each
case between 13.5% and 13.7% of the
entering class. Minority students were
often dozens, sometimes hundreds, of
times more likely to be admitted than
white applicants with similar grades and
LSAT scores. University officials
acknowledged that had race not been
given weight, minorities would have
comprised 4% or less of each class.
As the Michigan case moves toward the
Supreme Court, the Bush administration
will have to choose between principle and
interest group politics. Those fearing
another steel tariffs type retreat note that,
last October, Solicitor General Theodore
B. Olson asked the Supreme Court to
reject a challenge to the affirmative action
provisions of the Transportation Equity
Act. But then, Mr. Olson was entering a
case well advanced at the time of his
confirmation, and one where the
government could plausibly argue that its
regulations limited preferences to
situations where discrimination had been
documented.
Even a Supreme Court decision
disowning Bakke and rejecting Michigan's
admissions policy is unlikely to end the
struggle over race preferences. Like
Sampson, quota supporters are willing to
bring down the temple rather than see
enemies prevail. Already, assaults on
objective admissions criteria -- such as the
LSAT -- are in the works. Other
jurisdictions are turning to guaranteed
admission for those who achieve a
threshold class standing of, say, the top
10%, a standard that ignores great
differences in school quality. Those
committed both to quality education and
equality under the law must stay the
course, as they did to combat die-hard
segregationists a generation ago.
Mr. Zelnick, chairman of Boston
University's journalism department and a
research fellow at the Hoover Institution,
is the author of "Backfire: A Reporter's
Look at Affirmative Action."
Copyright o 2002 Dow Jones &
Company, Inc.
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Learning From Diversity
The New York Times
May 16, 2002
Jeffrey S. Lehman
On Tuesday, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the University of
Michigan Law School's admissions policy,
in which race is one of the many factors
that can influence a decision. The ruling
leaves in place a policy that is as cautious a
form of affirmative action as one may find
in higher education.
When 361 students enrolled at our law
school this past fall, only 26 were African-
American. That is 7 percent of the class in
a nation where 13 percent of the citizens
are black. A more aggressive affirmative
action policy could easily have admitted
many more black students, yet our policy
led us to reject 70 percent of black
applicants. (We rejected a lower
percentage of white applicants.) Some
critics have called our admissions policy
insufficiently attentive to the cause of
racial justice. They find it shameful that
we enroll so few black students and turn
away so many. But our policy was not
designed to compensate for segregation
and discrimination in American society,
past or present. It was designed to enroll a
group of highly talented students who
will, after three years of study, be as well
prepared as possible for the modem legal
profession. (We pursue other important
values as well; our desire to sustain a
continuity of identity for the law school
leads us to favor Michigan residents and
children of alumni.)
How does a school enroll a class that will
end up as competent as possible at
graduation? It is a matter of predictive
judgment, not science. We consider each
applicant's analytic ability and work ethic
as revealed by grades, test scores, work
experience, essays and letters of
recommendation. Since legal education
depends on intense interactions among
students and teachers, we also consider
what difference an applicant's presence
would make to the mix.
Enrolling students who have studied
abroad or served as interns on Capitol Hill
contributes to lively and sophisticated
classroom dialogue. So does enrolling a
racially integrated class. And students who
learn at integrated campuses are better
prepared to succeed in the courthouses
and companies of America in 2002.
Some critics have argued that our
admissions policy should not consider
race at all. They contend that in light of
the damage done by race consciousness
throughout history, the law school should
be rigidly colorblind, setting an example
that will lead society in that same
direction. This suggestion is wishfully
utopian, as attractive as the ideal of
colorblindness may be. Admissions
policies like ours did not create race
consciousness, nor are they the linchpin
that keeps it in place. Race consciousness
is every bit as strong in California and
Texas today as it was before affirmative
action was banned from their public
universities.
Our policy follows the guidelines for the
appropriate consideration of race in
university admissions established by the
Supreme Court in the Bakke case 24 years
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ago. It is both realistic and pragmatic.
That is why Secretary of State Colin
Powell and former President Gerald Ford
have spoken out in support of our
admissions policy, as have General
Motors, 3M and 30 other major
corporations. The court decision
maintains a sensible balance.
Colorblindness is an ideal, not an idol, and
the Constitution does not require us to
sacrifice effective
integration in its name.
education and
Jeffrey S. Lehman is the dean of the
University of Michigan Law School.
Copyright D 2002 The New York
Times Company
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Suit Tests Race's Role in College Admissions
USA TODAY
January 15, 2001
Dennis Cauchon
ANN ARBOR, Mich. -- Without
affirmative action, Marcela Sanchez would
not be a star student at the University of
Michigan Law School. She wouldn't be
editor of the school's law review. She
wouldn't have a job waiting as a law clerk
for a federal judge.
It's not that Sanchez was an academic
slouch. She graduated second in her high
school class in Los Cruces, N.M. She
earned a 3.8 grade-point average at New
Mexico State University, ranked in the top
fifth of those taking the standardized law
school entrance exam and had
outstanding recommendations.
But those impressive credentials are
usually not enough to get into top-ranked
law schools, such as the University of
Michigan, if you are Caucasian. Among
Caucasian applicants, Ivy League degrees
and high GPAs are common.
"When I first got here, it struck me as odd
that people would talk about going to Yale
as casually as going to the grocery store,"
Sanchez says. "It wasn't until this year that
I realized people came here with a greater
expanse of knowledge and experience
than I had."
Barbara Grutter, a white woman with
similar credentials, was turned down by
the law school one year before Sanchez
was admitted. Grutter sued, charging
racial discrimination.
The case comes to trial Tuesday in federal
district court in Detroit, and many expect
the case -- along with a similar one
challenging the use of race in
undergraduate admissions -- to determine
the future of affirmative action in higher
education.
Both sides believe the cases have a good
chance of reaching the Supreme Court in
what TinE magazine calls "the Alamo of
affirmative action."
The Supreme Court has limited race as a
factor in hiring, government contracting,
drawing voting districts, integrating
schools and other areas. But nearly every
university in the USA still uses race as a
factor in admissions.
The Supreme Court has not considered
the issue since it banned quotas in a
murky 5-4 decision in Unwniity of
Gdfoia Regents s. Bakkein 1978.
As one of the last outposts of affirmative
action, admission policies are under fire in
the courts and from voters.
In 1996, a federal appeals court ruled that
the University of Texas law school could
not consider race. The Supreme Court
declined to hear the case. But on Dec. 4,
another appeals court ruled that the
University of Washington law school
could consider race. (Voters stopped the
practice after the case was filed.)
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Then, last Dec. 13, a federal judge ruled
that the University of Michigan's
admission policy had discriminated on the
basis of race between 1995 and 1998,
when the undergraduate lawsuits were
filed. But, he said, the university's current
use of race in undergraduate admissions is
constitutional.
Voters in California also have banned race
in college admissions. Since the passage of
Proposition 209, the number of blacks
and Hispanics at the University of
California-Berkeley and its law schools has
fallen by half.
Now, with the law unsettled and the
Supreme Court divided, a decision could
hinge on whether George W. Bush gets to
appoint a Supreme Court justice.
The University of Michigan case is
important, in part, because big business
has rallied behind its defense of
affirmative action.
Twenty-one major corporations have filed
supportive legal briefs.
The University of Michigan has spent $
4.3 million so far on legal fees alone, plus
money for expert witnesses and other
costs. "We didn't choose to be sued, but,
having been sued on an issue that goes to
the heart of our educational mission, we're
going to defend ourselves well," says
Elizabeth Barry, the school's top lawyer
on the case.
The university argues that having a critical
mass of minority students is crucial to
providing a quality education for all
students. This argument -- racial diversity
is necessary for a good education -- meets
the legal test created in the Bakke
decision, the school says, and may allow
affirmative action to survive in college
admissions if nowhere else.
"Law school does something different
than preschool or elementary school,"
says Jeffrey Lehman, dean of the
University of Michigan law school.
Race has weight in nearly every area of the
law, from employment law to criminal
law. "If you want to have a really good
discussion of crack cocaine sentencing,
you don't want a homogenous class of all
white students or all black students,"
Lehman says.
But attorney Kirk Kolbo, who represents
the white students suing the university,
says that argument is racist. "It's offensive
to think when talking about crack cocaine
you have black students in class," he says.
"It's wrong to perpetuate these
stereotypes based on race.
Philosophy professor Carl Cohen, who
started the effort at Michigan to eliminate
race as a factor in admissions, agrees that
diversity enhances education but says
schools can't violate the Constitution to
do it.
"The only way to overcome racial
discrimination is to stop doing it," says
Cohen, an old-time liberal who is a former
national board member of the American
Civil Liberties Union.
"When I first heard they wanted a diverse
class, I thought it would help me," says
Grutter, a health care consultant who
wanted to get a law degree. Then, she
says, she realized that race was the type of
diversity the school wanted.
"When I entered the workforce in the
early 1970s, it wasn't the easiest
environment for women. It was very
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disillusioning and discouraging, as a
woman, to be discriminated against on
another basis."
Since the Bakke decision, universities have
devised ways to consider race while
avoiding quotas. The University of
Michigan uses a point system for
undergraduate admissions: a 4.0 GPA is
worth 80 points, scholarships athletes get
20 points, Michigan residents get 10
points, blacks and Hispanics get 20, and
so on.
The law school has a less formal system.
It combines an applicant's undergraduate
GPA and LSAT score into a composite
number. Then it considers other factors,
including race, to create a diverse and
vibrant class. "One might, for example,
give substantial weight to an Olympic gold
medal, a Ph.D. in physics, the attainment
of age 50 in a class that otherwise lacked
anyone over 30, or the experience of
having been a Vietnamese boat person,"
according to a faculty report on
admissions policy.
"Racial diversity requires work," says
University of Michigan president Lee
Bollinger. "This is a matter of deep
principle. This is what a public university
is all about: breaking down barriers of
race, gender and class."
Copyright * 2001 Gannett Company, Inc.
369
Discrimination, Not Diversity: At Michigan and Other Universities, 'Affirmative
Action' Is Just Another Phrase for Racism.
Legal Times
June 3, 2002
Roger Clegg
On May 14, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the 6th Circuit upheld the constitutionality
of the University of Michigan Law
School's use of racial and ethnic
preferences in its admissions. The
preference issue has always been at least
simmering since "affirmative action" or
"reverse discrimination"-or, Nathan
Glazer's phrase, "affirmative
discrimination"-began being used in the
1960s. From time to time, however, it
comes to a boil. That's where we are
headed now.
The practice got a big boost in the Nixon
administration, and has never been very
popular with many Democrats-especially
the blue-collar and Catholic "Reagan
Democrats"-but somehow it has become
an article of faith among politically active
Democrats over the years, even as it has
become unpopular among Republicans.
Consider the 6th Circuit's vote last month
in Grutter v. Bollinger.
The en banc court split 5-4. The five
judges voting to uphold the discrimination
were all appointed by Democratic
presidents (one by Jimmy Carter, four by
Bill Clinton) and all three Republican
appointees (one by Ronald Reagan, two
by George Bush) voted against it. Only
one judge-a Clinton appointee-broke the
party line and voted to strike down the
use of preferences by the law school, and
he did so on narrower grounds than the
three Republican appointees.
The Center for Individual Rights, which is
handling the litigation on behalf of the
discriminated-against plaintiffs, has
already announced that it will be asking
the Supreme Court to review the case.
Typically, the Court weighs three factors
in determining the "cert-worthiness" of a
case: whether there is a division in the
federal courts of appeals on the legal issue
presented (yes), whether the issue is of
national importance (yes), and whether
the lower court's decision was wrong
(there are likely at least four justices-the
number needed for a cert-grant-if not
nine, who will be unpersuaded by the
Grutter majority's bizarre claim that the
Supreme Court has already resolved this
issue). It is very likely that the Court will
grant CR's petition for a writ of
certioran.
Bush On The Spot
So, sometime in the fall, the Court will
probably grant review of this case (and of
Gratz v. Bollinger, the companion case
dealing with Michigan's undergraduate
admissions program, which the 6th Circuit
should hand down soon). When it does,
the Bush administration will be on the
spot. Republicans may not like racial and
ethnic preferences, but it is the
conventional wisdom among them-that is,
they stupidly believe-that the issue is a
political loser. Thus, this administration
has done its best to avoid grappling with
affirmative action, but both sides will urge
it to file a brief in the Michigan case.
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Whichever side it chooses, the other side
will howl. This is not a baby that can be
cut in half, and it will also be awkward for
the administration to say nothing. What's
more, with the Supreme Court almost
certain to divide 5-4, the brief filed by the
United States could well tip the balance.
If the issue is heating up at the
level, it is also boiling in some
states, like Virginia, for instance.
federal
of the
Recently the Center for Equal
Opportunity (CEO) used the state's
freedom-of-information law to get
admissions data from the three public law
schools in Virginia: the University of
Virginia, William & Mary, and George
Mason University. The data were then
turned over to two independent social
scientists, Robert Lerner and Althea Nagai
of Rockville, Md., who crunched the
numbers and wrote a report, "Racial and
Ethnic Preferences at the Three Virginia
Public Law Schools," that was released on
April 25. A similar regression analysis was
used by the Michigan federal trial judge
whose decision striking down the law
school's discrimination there the 6th
Circuit just reversed.
The CEO study and the Michigan case
show that, if you thought that law schools
would be less likely to play fast and loose
with laws and precedents that cast a cold
eye on blatant racial and ethnic
discrimination, you would be wrong. In
fact, of all the schools that the CEO has
studied-47 undergraduate institutions, six
medical schools, and now these three law
schools-the University of Virginia School
of Law wins the dubious distinction of
discriminating the most.
At U.Va., the odds favoring a black
candidate over an equally qualified white
candidate were an astonishing 731-to-1 in
1999 and 647-to-1 in 1998. William &
Mary is no slouch when it comes to
discriminating either: The odds ratio
favoring blacks over whites there was 168-
to-1 in 1999 and 351-to-1 in 1998. At the
University of Michigan Law School,
meanwhile, the black-white odds ratio in
1995 was 513-to-1. (Interestingly, the
Virginia schools did not have preferences
for Hispanics, but Michigan did.
Apparently some minorities are more
equal than others.)
To put it in other terms: In 1999, if you
had an LSAT score of 160 and an
undergraduate grade-point- average of
3.25-these are the two measures that law
schools typically weigh most heavily in
making admissions decisions-you had a 95
percent chance of getting into U.Va. if
you were black, but only a 3 percent
chance of getting in if you were white.
When schools are caught discriminating,
the usual defense is to say that race is "just
one factor." Just one factor, all right: one
that can make the difference between
having a 95 percent chance of getting in,
or a 3 percent chance.
'Pure Sophistry'
U.Va.'s law school dean, John Jeffries Jr.,
wrote a biography of Justice Lewis Powell
Jr., which has in it a passage about
Powell's solo opinion in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke (1978)
that The New York Times has,
embarrassingly, quoted recently. "Mr.
Jeffries wrote that Justice Powell's
distinction between an unconstitutional
quota and giving extra weight to race was
nothing more than 'pure sophistry."'
University officials also object that odds
ratios typically do not consider "soft
factors" like teacher recommendations,
application essays, and the like-as if such
factors were weighed as heavily as test
371
scores and grades, and as if the favored
minorities wrote essays and got teacher
recommendations that were 731 times
better than those of their white
counterparts.
Earlier the same week, the CEO study on
law schools was released. Meanwhile,
State Solicitor William Hurd, in the office
of Virginia Attorney General Jerry
Kilgore, sent a memorandum to all
Virginia state universities, telling them that
racial and ethnic preferences in
admissions and scholarships can no longer
be justified on the grounds that they
"remedy" past discrimination. This is the
only justification for preferences that the
Supreme Court has recognized in recent
years-as Justice Sandra O'Connor has
pointed out-and it's off the table now,
Virginia's top legal office is telling its
clients. Be careful.
The Hurd memorandum does not take a
position on whether the diversity rationale
can ever justify discrimination, but does
make clear that, even if it can, such
preferences must still pass a difficult, five-
part "narrow tailoring" test. Be careful,
again.
Linda Chavez, the CEO's president, got
hold of a copy of the Hurd memorandum
from one of its recipients, and decided to
write a letter to Virginia's governor,
lieutenant governor, and all state
university presidents and members of
their boards of visitors. In it, she urges
them to end the use of racial and ethnic
preferences in Virginia higher education.
The letter encloses Hurd's memorandum
(saying that discrimination is illegal, or at
least very risky), as well as the studies that
the CEO has published (documenting
overwhelming evidence that
discrimination is nonetheless widespread
in Virginia law schools and undergraduate
institutions).
Attention to Damages
Chavez's letter also highlights for
university officials an interesting sentence
in a footnote in Hurd's memorandum that
may get their attention: "Additionally,
monetary damages and attorneys' fees may
be assessed against officials in their
individual capacity if they act in a manner
that violates a clearly established
constitutional right." The Center for
Individual Rights has, in fact, sued
officials in their individual capacities in its
lawsuits against the University of
Michigan, the U.M. Law School, and the
University of Washington School of Law.
There's a simple enough solution to all
this, of course-one that will take the issue
out of the courts, would be politically
popular, and would be fair to everyone.
Start treating people so that their skin
color and where their ancestors came
from don't matter.
Roger Clegg is the general counsel of the
Center for Equal Opportunity, a Sterling,
Va.-based think tank. The CEO filed an
amicus brief with the 6' circuit in the
University of Michigan litligation.
Copyright @ 2002 American Lawyer
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Inclusive America, Under Attack
The New York Times
August 8, 1999
Gerald R. Ford
Of all the triumphs that have marked this
as America's century -- breathtaking
advances in science and technology, the
democratization of wealth and dispersal of
political power in ways hardly imaginable
in 1899 -- none is more inspiring, if
incomplete, than our pursuit of racial
justice. The milestones include Theodore
Roosevelt's inviting Booker T.
Washington to dine at the White House,
Harry Truman's desegregating the armed
forces, Dwight Eisenhower's using
Federal troops to integrate Little Rock's
Central High School and Lyndon
Johnson's electrifying the nation by
standing before Congress in 1965 and
declaring, "We shall overcome."
I came by my support of that year's
Voting Rights Act naturally. Thirty years
before Selma, I was a University of
Michigan senior, preparing with my
Wolverine teammates for a football game
against visiting Georgia Tech. Among the
best players on that year's Michigan squad
was Willis Ward, a close friend of mine
whom the Southern school reputedly
wanted dropped from our roster because
he was black My classmates were just as
adamant that he should take the field. In
the end, Willis decided on his own not to
play. His sacrifice led me to question how
educational administrators could
capitulate to raw prejudice. A university,
after all, is both a preserver of tradition
and a hotbed of innovation. So long as
books are kept open, we tell ourselves,
minds can never be closed.
But doors, too, must be kept open.
Tolerance, breadth of mind and
appreciation for the world beyond our
neighborhoods: these can be learned on
the football field and in the science lab as
well as in the lecture hall. But only if
students are exposed to America in all her
vanety.
For the class of '35, such educational
opportunities were diminished by the
relative scarcity of African-Amenicans,
women and various ethnic groups on
campus. I have often wondered how
different the world might have been in the
1940's, 50's and 60's -- how much more
humane and just -- if my generation had
experienced a more representative
sampling of the American family. That the
indignities visited on Willis Ward would
be unimaginable in todays Ann Arbor is a
measure of how far we have come toward
realizing, however belatedly, the promises
we made to each other in declaring our
nationhood and professing our love of
liberty.
And yet. In the last speech of his life,
Lyndon Johnson reminded us of how
much unfinished work remained. "To be
black in a white society is not to stand on
level and equal ground," he said. "While
the races may stand side by side, whites
stand on history's mountain and blacks
stand in history's hollow. Until we
overcome unequal history, we cannot
overcome unequal opportunity."
Like so many phrases that have become
political buzzwords, affirmative action
means different things to different people.
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Practically speaking, it runs the gamut
from mandatory quotas, which the
Supreme Court has ruled are clearly
unconstitutional, to mere lip service,
which is just as clearly unacceptable.
At its core, affirmative action should try
to offset past injustices by fashioning a
campus population more truly reflective
of modem America and our hopes for the
future. Unfortunately, a pair of lawsuits
brought against my alma mater pose a
threat to such diversity. Not content to
oppose formal quotas, plaintiffs suing the
University of Michigan would prohibit
that and other universities from even
considering race as one of many factors
weighed by admission counselors.
So drastic a ban would scuttle Michigan's
current system, one that takes into
account nearly a dozen elements -- race,
economic standing, geographic origin,
athletic and artistic achievement among
them -- to create the finest educational
environment for all students.
This eminently reasonable approach, as
thoughtful as it is fair, has produced a
student body with a significant minority
component whose record of academic
success is outstanding.
Times of change are times of challenge. It
is estimated that by 2030, 40 percent of all
Americans will belong to various racial
minorities. Already the global economy
requires unprecedented grasp of diverse
viewpoints and cultural traditions. I don't
want future college students to suffer the
cultural and social impoverishment that
afflicted my generation. If history has
taught us anything in this remarkable
century, it is the notion of America as a
work in progress. Do we really want to
risk turning back the clock to an era when
the Willis Wards were isolated and
penalized for the color of their skin, their
economic standing or national ancestry?
To eliminate a constitutional affirmative
action policy would mock the inclusive
vision Carl Sandburg had in mind when
he wrote: "The Republic is a dream.
Nothing happens unless first a dream."
Lest we forget: America remains a nation
with have-nots as well as haves. Its
government is obligated to provide for
hope no less than for the common
defense.
Gerald R. Ford was sworn in as the 3 8 h
President of the United States [August 9,
1974].
Copyright 0 1999 The New York Times
Company
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Easing the Spring:
Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action After the Redistricting Cases
43 Wm &Mary L. Rev. 1569
2002
Pamela S. Karlan
One of the striking features of the
Supreme Court's docket is how few classic
affirmative action cases it has taken over
the years. This has left the lower courts
with relatively little guidance. Not
surprisingly, in the years since Adarand
[Constructors v. Pena (1995)], they have
reached contradictory results. My own
sense is that, with a little help from the
parties, the Supreme Court has been more
than happy to stay out of the fray.
The Supreme Court, however, has not
been entirely absent from the controversy
over governmental uses of race. Far from
it. Over the past decade, the Supreme
Court has addressed the question
repeatedly, in the context of race-
conscious redistricting. Its decisions,
which are all over the map in both the
literal and figurative senses of the phrase,
suggest a nuanced understanding both of
what triggers and of what satisfies strict
scrutiny. The redistricting cases may flesh
out the Court's expressed wish in Adarand
"to dispel the notion that stnct scrutiny is
'strict in theory, but fatal in fact."' They
suggest that strict scrutiny may be strict in
theory, but rather pliable in practice...
When it came to redistricting, for all the
Court's invocations of the ideal of
colorblindness, the Court did not require
plan drawers to ignore race. The Court
distinguished redistricting from other
kinds of government decision making on
the grounds that "the legislature always is
aware of race when it draws district lines,
just as it is aware of age, economic status,
religious and political persuasion, and a
vanety of other demographic factors."
That awareness, however, is not
inevitable: the reason politicians who draw
district lines are aware of race in a precise
form is that they have obtained race-
specific data from the Census Bureau. It is
entirely possible to draw district lines
without regard to race at all. The reason
politicians don't do so is primarily that
they find race very helpful for purely
partisan reasons-in some places race is
highly correlated with voting behavior
(indeed, it can be more highly correlated
than party registration), and serves as a
shorthand way of figuring out the political
complexion of a potential district....
Nor is that awareness unique. Many
government decision makers are aware of
race and other demographic factors when
they make their decisions. An admissions
officer at the University of Michigan, for
example, is bound to know that the
Detroit public school system is over
ninety percent black, and thus that an
applicant who attended high school there
is quite likely to be African-American. An
admissions officer at the University of
Texas who sees that an applicant's name is
"Viola Canales" and that she grew up in
McAllen, in the Rio Grande Valley, can
reasonably assume that she is Hispanic.
Any decision maker who encounters an
individual face-to-face will have at least
some racial or ethnic information about
some applicants. It may turn out that the
Supreme Court has a somewhat naive
view of the information typically available
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to state actors because the affirmative
action cases that produced its embrace of
strict scrutiny Croson and Adarand
involved the highly formal and thus
somewhat atypical practice of competitive
bidding. In competitive bidding,
anonymity is easy to achieve, and,
assuming the bid meets the specifications,
bids can be ranked against each other
along one entirely quantifiable dimension,
namely, price....
The Court's subsequent [redistricting]
cases suggest ... some uses of race are
insufficient to trigger strict scrutiny. That
principle debuted in Miller v. Johnson a
decision announced less than three weeks
after Adarand -and was recently given real
teeth in Easley v. Cromartie [(2002): under
Adarand, all racial classifications must be
analyzed under strict scrutiny, but under
Shaw and its progeny, only when race
predominates and subordinates race-
neutral considerations does it prompt
heightened scrutiny.]....
The Supreme Court's discussions of what
constitutes a compelling state interest
justifying the use of race in the
redistricting process may also mark a
promising turn in equal protection
doctrine. In suggesting that compliance
with sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights
Act can constitute a compelling state
interest, the Court has raised the
possibility that congressional or executive
understandings of equality that go beyond
what the Constitution itself requires can
provide a justification for race-conscious
state action...
[The Court] has recognized that
compliance with federal law can constitute
a compelling state interest for taking race
into account even when the federal law
goes beyond what the Constitution itself
requires. It has permitted states to take
race into account to prevent their election
systems from having a disparate impact
on minonty voters. In short, the Court
has been unwilling to use strict scrutiny to
dismantle the crown jewel of the Second
Reconstruction. Faced with the prospect
of a wholesale ouster of minority
representatives from federal and state
legislative bodies, the Court has created a
more forbearant version of strict scrutiny.
The question is whether that version has
legs beyond redistricting....
[There are] reasons to think that
affirmative action in the higher education
admissions process resembles
redistricting-therefore calling for a softer
form of scrutiny-more than it resembles
the competitive bidding process at issue in
cases like Croson and Adarand.
Redistricting and admissions to
competitive educational institutions share
a set of characteristics that suggests that
race plays a complicated role in each. To
understand why, let us begin by
considering the nature of the decision
process absent the use of race. Both
redistricting and admissions to a state's
flagship educational institutions still would
demand looking at more than numbers,
and for similar sorts of reasons.
One person, one vote is a nice, easy-to-
quantify starting point for drawing
districts, but there are a huge number of
equally compliant plans that will produce
dramatically different legislative bodies. It
would be possible to choose among
equipopulous plans at random. But not all
equipopulous plans will make sense on the
ground: some plans will split real
communities, unite dissimilar groups,
ignore physical and political boundaries,
place incumbents in unfamiliar districts, or
produce very disproportionate partisan
balance. Some plans will simply produce
legislative bodies that are more
representative" than others. Thus, even
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most proponents of computer-driven
apolitical redistricting processes would
require including other variables in the
formula, such as geographic compactness,
respect for subdivision boundaries, and
respect for community lines. In the real
world, where redistricting remains a
fiercely political process, even monoracial
communities consider such additional
factors as partisan advantage and balance,
and protection of incumbents. In any
event, slavish pursuit of maximum
population equality involves a spurious
faith in statistics-the census figures are
themselves essentially a static estimate of a
constantly changing reality and no one
seriously believes that individuals in
districts with over a half million people in
them suffer any real injury if the districts
differ by a few hundred residents....
Similarly, in higher education, elite
institutions could rely entirely on a few
raw or mechanically adjusted numbers.
Indeed, virtually everywhere such
numbers form a starting point in the
admissions process and are used to
separate those who are capable of
benefitting from and contributing to the
school's educational programs from those
who are not (or who are markedly less
likely to be). At most elite institutions,
however, it would be possible to produce
entering classes with vastly different
characteristics, each made up entirely of
well-qualified students. The numbers
themselves, even when adjusted, may
offer a spurious precision with respect to
particular applicants. A school, like a
legislature, may decide that a variety of
other factors beyond standardized test
scores and grade point averages will
enhance its various missions. In that
regard, it might decide, even in the
complete absence of racial considerations,
to take into account factors such as
geographic diversity, choice of
specialization, distinctive extra-curricular
experiences, nonquantifiable evidence that
an applicant's future promise is not
adequately signaled by her past
performance, and the like. Moreover,
along the same vaguely venal lines as
incumbent protection and partisanship, a
school may decide to grant preferences to
children of alumni or other financial or
political supporters...
In a multidimensional admissions process,
race is a factor, but it does not
subordinate such apparently traditional,
race-neutral criteria as prior academic
achievement and promise, and the
admission of a well-rounded class. On the
other hand, in a more rigid admissions
process, race appears to predominate. The
difference between the two maps onto the
distinction the Court has recently made in
the redistricting process. If not all
awareness and use of race triggers strict
scrutiny in the redistricting process, then
why should it do so in the admissions
process?...
The redistricting cases also suggest a
potentially fruitful new line of argument
with regard to the compelling state
interest inquiry. If a reasonable attempt to
comply with a federally mandated effects
test can serve as an appropriate
justification for race consciousness in the
districting process, then perhaps it can do
so in the admissions process as well.
So-called section 602 regulations provide
one possible counterpart to the Voting
Rights Act. Virtually all public institutions
of higher education are subject to Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
forbids racial discrimination in programs
receiving federal funds.... Under section
602 ..., at least forty federal agencies,
including the Department of Education,
have adopted regulations that prohibit
practices that have a discriminatory effect.
The Department of Education's
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regulations provide, among other things,
that recipients of federal funds cannot
utilize criteria or methods of
administration which have the effect of
subjecting individuals to discnmination
because of their race, color, or national
origin," and make clear that admissions
practices are among the covered actions.
Moreover, "[e]ven in the absence of ...
prior discrimination [by the particular
mstitution or program], a recipient ... may
take affirmative action to overcome the
effects of conditions which resulted in
limiting participation by persons of a
particular race, color, or national origin."
Thus, the Department of Education's
regulations, like sections 2 and 5 of the
Voting Rights Act, embody a results test....
An educational institution could
reasonably fear being found in violation of
the Department of Education's
regulations if it implemented an
admissions policy that resulted in the
wholesale exclusion of black or Hispanic
applicants, particularly because it might be
difficult to show that such a policy
pursued some other valid goal. In order to
avoid violating the regulations, some level
of race-consciousness might be necessary.
Further, like section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act, the Department of
Education's regulations do not require
proof of prior intentional,
unconstitutional behavior by the specific
government entity in order to justify race-
conscious affirmative action. In light of
the federal government's determination
that full effectuation of the
straightforward constitutional (and
statutory) command to avoid purposeful
racial discrimination requires prohibiting
state action that has a discriminatory
impact as well, compliance with these
rules by public educational institutions,
like compliance by state redistricting
authorities, ought to be considered a
compelling state interest.
As in redistricting, the question of narrow
tailoring is likely to be the issue least
amenable to broad statements of
principle. It may turn out that many
affirmative action plans, like many
legislative districts, get struck down not
because the institution was forbidden
from relying on race altogether, but
because it relied too much, and in too
visible a way, on racial factors. Pamela S.
Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney
General, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev.
(forthcoming)
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